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T 
he E. C. is already helping to lay the groundwork for the Europe of the 
future. As the world's newly industrialized countries have begun to 
emerge as new leaders in many of Europe's traditional industries-
steel, textiles, and shipbuilding-Europe has been on the lookout for new ar-
eas in which to excel. E.C. policymakers and industrialists have spent much of 
their time and energy in recent years looking for ways the European Commu-
nity can capitalize on its enormous home market of 270 million citizens (with 
EFTA and Spain, 350 million citizens) and on other assets to make it big in a 
high-tech world. 
One of the results of this brainstorming has been the European Strategic 
Program for Research and Development in Information Technology. The pro-
gram, nicknamed ESPRIT,  is an ambitious undertaking important not only in its 
own right, but as a symbol of Europe's commitment to keeping up with the 
times and with the competition. 
In our cover story in this issue, Michel Carpentier, the E.C. Commission di-
rector general responsible for the ESPRIT task force, shares his bird'  s-eye view 
of the program and its whys and wherefores. Carpentier explains how the 
E.C., in cooperation with European industry, hopes to make Europe a major 
player in such highly competitive fields as software technology, microelec-
tronics, and information processing. 
Mter hearing from two highly respected American voices in the first two 
editions of our newly inaugurated guest column feature, Europe this time 
makes a shift to the other side of the Atlantic with Emanuele Gazzo. In his 
many years as chairman of Agence Europe, a daily newsletter published in 
Brussels and covering the Community, Gazzo has become a guru of the E.C. 
and mentor to the political forces that have helped to shape it. He shares with 
us some of his insights and his own prescription for more solid ties between 
the United States and Europe. 
France takes its tum in the spotlight as the focus of our member state re-
port. Axel Krause, economic correspondent for the International Herald Tri-
bune, reports on the challenges French President Fran~ois Mitterrand faces 
in his efforts to revitalize France's economy. With his economic policies under 
attack from both the right and the left, Krause looks at the question of 
whether Mitterrand can stay the relatively unpopular course of economic aus-
terity. 
In a related article, Bernard Mazieres, a political writer for the French 
weekly L 'Express, tells us that French politics may be headed for a major 
turning point this spring. Mazieres offers a glimpse at the stresses at work 
within the Mitterrand Government and assesses the likelihood of a split be-
tween the Socialists and their Communist partners. The French left, says 
Mazieres, is looking more confused at a time when the opposition has come to 
understand the importance of maintaining a united front. The upcoming Euro-
pean Parliament elections in june may give the newly unified right a chance 
to flex its muscles. 
On the cultural front, Carolyn Lesh reports that despite economic austerity, 
the French are still maintaining an active interest in architecture and are 
planning for construction of a new opera house, a controversial project for the 
Louvre, and the construction of several new museums and other public build-
ings. How might this construction boom change the face of the City of Lights? 
Lesh gives us some clues. ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
•  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  . 
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THE 
CAPITALS 
ROME 
Monuments 
Are Suffering 
F
or two years the Porta del 
Popolo  was  completely 
obliterated by scaffolding. The 
16th-century gate,  still  fitted 
with  colossal  wooden  doors, 
stands  at  the  northern  en-
trance to the old city of Rome, 
where the ancient roman road, 
the  Via  Flaminia,  opens  out 
into  the  magnificence  of  the 
Piazza  del  Popolo.  The  gate 
had become black with dirt and 
wrapping  it  up  in  scaffolding 
virtually removed it from sight 
and mind. 
Recently,  the  scaffolding 
came down and a stunning new 
Porta  del  Popolo  emerged, 
crisp,  yellow,  and  sensibly, 
barred  to  most  traffic.  The 
journey down to the center of 
Rome  from  the  north  of  the 
city  suddenly  became  a  plea-
sure again. But a little further 
on, in the center of the Piazza 
itself,  the Egyptian  obelisk  is 
boarded  off,  wrapped  up  in 
scaffolding and nylon netting. 
So  are dozens  of  the other 
great monuments of Rome: the 
columns of the ancient Roman 
emperors  Tr~an and  ~arcus 
Aurelius, which tell the stories 
of  their  conquests  in  carved 
friezes, the triumphal arches of 
Septimus  Severus  and  Con-
stantine,  the  basilica  of  Con-
stantine which inspired ~ichel­
angelo, Roman temples, part of 
the  Colosseum,  and  Renais-
sance  palaces  and  fountains. 
The masking  of  some  of  the 
most famous buildings in Rome 
is  so  complete  that  many  of 
them almost might not exist, so 
little is to be seen of them. 
Scaffolding is now the most 
obvious reminder of the fright-
ening decay the monuments of 
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Rome have suffered in the past 
30 years.  Pollution  of the air 
from  the exhaust of cars and 
the use of heavy oil in domestic 
heating has eaten away at the 
marble of which so many mon-
uments  are  made,  turning  it 
into something close to plaster 
which  crumbles  almost  at  a 
touch. Carved friezes of price-
less historical value are being 
lost forever.  And  many monu-
ments are also in grave danger 
because of the weight of daily . 
traffic  and  the shocks caused 
by slight earthquakes. 
Even  so,  questions  are  in-
creasingly  being  asked  about 
the scaffolding, which in some 
cases  has  been  up  for  five 
years. In most cases it is  offi-
cially there not for treatment, 
but only for studies to be made 
of how bad the condition of the 
monuments actually is. But are 
such  all-embracing  structures 
of  scaffolding  necessary  for 
that, even if  in some cases they 
keep off the acid rain which is 
slowly  destroying  the  monu-
ments? 
Chemicals based on fluoride 
have been used with success on 
threatened  marble  in  other 
parts of Italy. Some people are 
asking  why  can't they be  ap-
plied  here  before  it  is  too 
late-even  though  the  work 
would  be  colossal  and  vastly 
expensive? 
Adriano La Regina, the gov-
ernment's  superintendant  for 
cultural  heritage  who  is  re-
sponsible for many of the mon-
uments  of  Rome,  says  that 
some  of  the  scaffolding  will 
soon be coming down and the 
results  of  such  work  as  has 
been going on underneath will 
be seen, just as it was at the 
much  younger  Porta  del 
Popolo. But almost nothing can 
be  done  to  restore  what  has 
been lost. 
In the meantime, the air re-
mains  as  poisonous  as  ever, 
with  virtually  nothing  being 
done to improve it. The traffic 
swirls past the works of antiq-
uity  and,  though  barricades 
have recently pushed the cars 
a few  yards further from  the 
most  delicate  monuments,  a 
vast  plan  to  close  to  traffic 
much  of  the area around  the 
ancient  Roman  Forum  was 
scrapped  last  year.-]AMES 
BUXTON 
BRUSSELS 
BBC Brings 
Golf, Cricket 
A 
startling  change  has 
taken place in the leisure 
habits of Belgians and it is all 
due to the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC). You can now 
receive  BBC  television  trans-
missions via  cable in  Brussels 
and throughout most of Dutch-
speaking  Belgium.  What  peo-
ple seem to prefer is sports and 
especially the traditional Brit-
ish  games  of  snooker  (pool), 
darts, golf, and even-whisper 
it  quietly-cricket.  Even  low 
British comedy seems to have 
taken a hold.  The respectable 
Dutch-language newspaper De 
Standaard has just devoted a 
full  page to a profile of Benny 
Hill,  an  English  comedian 
whose brand of humor seemed 
supremely unexportable. 
A pub in Ghent has installed 
three snooker  tables  and  the 
manager reports he is  "over-
whelmed"  by  bookings.  "The 
BBC  television  made  my  busi-
ness," he says.  There are re-
ports  that Belgium  may  soon 
start its own  snooker compe-
titions.  The  English  way  of 
playing darts is now spreading 
rapidly from  west Flanders to 
the rest of Belgium. A Belgian is ranked fourth on the world
championship  scale for darts
and Belgium itself bows only to
England and Scotland in its
mastery of the game.
Golf had never commanded
public imagination in Belgium
until the ssc broadcasts  began.
It remains  a game for the privi-
leged. There are only 18 clubs
in the whole of Belgium,  all
privately owned. The BBc
broadcasts have created a
move to "democratize"  the
sport. According to De Stan-
daard, "As we can now see it
on the television thanks to the
BBc, golf is a wonderful  out-
doors event. We Continentals
once more have to look uP to
the centuries-old British re-
sourcefulness  to remain sPort-
ingly and competitively active
in nature."
Cricket?  Ah, well, that is an-
other thing. A Belgian writer
tried hard to explain the rules,
only to conclude sheePishlY
that "until further notice this
game can only be understood
properly  by Britons and inhab-
itants of Britain's former colo-
nies." Cricket is played in Bel-
gium, but not by Belgians. If
you see a gathering of "flan-
nelled fools," its a safe bet that
all of them will be British or
"inhabitants  of Britain's for-
mer colonies." But this may
not last. The Belgian  television
viewers who tune in to the ggc
-and 
there are now so many
of them that BBC broadcasts are
listed routinely in the newspa-
pers-will be saturated by live
transmissions  of this summer's
test matches and cup compe-
titions in England. "Where
snooker leads, cricket will fol'
low," said a BBc man here.
Then there's rugby, which
has roughly the same associa-
tion with American  football as
cricket does with baseball. But
rugby is not unknown to Bel-
gian sportsmen or television
viewers since it is played in
France. British telecasts may
well promote an interest in the
sport, but up to now it must be
said that the following is
largely in the French-speaking
regions of Belgium and these
are the slowest in hooking  up
their systems to take British
television.
The export of British culture
to the Continent,  be it by way
of songs, books, television pro-
grams, or sporting achieve-
ments, is one of the more unre-
marked developments in the
European  Community. More
hard-back  copies of novels in
English are said to be sold in
Holland than in Britain, and
presumably Belgium cannot  be
far behind. Certainly the Bel-
gian following for books by
Le Carr6., Dick Francis, and
Graham Greene is astonishing.
The extra injection of Eng-
lish now that ssc cable televi-
sion is available could even in-
fluence the long-running
language  war between French
and Dutch speakers in Bel-
gium. Said De Standaard:
"The arrival of egc programs
on cable television has subtly
affected  the pattern of thinking
and acting in Flanders.  The
Flemish viewer discovers his
'slightly different' British
neighbors and, for a commu-
nity which for generations
could only deal with the French
speakers, the availability of the
'anglophony'is  often a real rev-
elation."  -ALIN 
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he chose to place his expertise
in the service of practical jokes.
He said he was out to embar-
rass the so-called expertise of
the art critics he despised.
The suggestion  that the
Luxembourg painting was a
forgery was not wholly implau-
sible. Keating had died leaving
it known that several more of
his "bombshells" had yet to
explode. The opportunity to
discomfort the staid Luxem-
bourgers was too much for
some British officials and jour-
nalists. They let out that Lon-
don Turner experts were ques-
tioning the work. The story
appeared on April 1. It was a
classic April Fool's joke, and it
worked. Virtually all the Lux-
embourg papers picked up the
story.
Whether this in turn does
much for Anglo-Luxembourg
u
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The Luxembourgers know
this. They do not press absurd
claims. They pursue their own
national and modest claims
with devotion.
Luxembourg is different
from other E.C. member coun-
tries not just because of its
smallness,  but also because of
its ethnic mix. The proportion
of foreigners among the popu-
lation is striking-more  than a
quarter of its residents are for-
eign-born and in some indus-
tries half the workers come
from abroad. This is worrying
to those who want to preserve
a "Luxembourg"  identity. The
country may have been trod-
den down by invaders over the
centuries, but it retains its
sense of historical identity. The
native birth rate is falling,
while the number of foreign
residents rises all the time.
Who are to be the "Luxem-
bourgers of tomorrow?"
The Turner exhibition raises
a flag.It suggests  that there is
a "Luxembourg identity." It is
romantic and perhaps not
wholly realistic. The march of
foreigners into Luxembourg
will not be halted by protesta-
tions of national identity. By
the end of the decade, it is
supposed  that a third of all resi-
dents in Luxembourg will be
foreign-born. Where then will
be the national identity? You
can see why the Luxembourg-
ers cherished the Turner exhi-
bition. It told them what they
once had and to what they
could aspire.-AlAN  OsBoRN
LUXE}IBOURG
The Way
It Was
Th.  great English painter
I  Turner liked Luxembourg
very much. He visited the
country in 1828 and 1834,
making hundreds of sketches
of castles, houses,  streets, ra-
vines, hills, and woods. From
them, he distilled 60 watercol-
ors that went on display in the
state museum earlier this year.
It was an occasion for great
Anglo-Luxembourg accord,
crowned by the purchase by
the Grand Duchy of its own
Turner "A View of Luxem-
bourg, 1834."
Then a shock went through
the country when it was sug-
gested that its prized Turner
was a fake. Reports said the
painting  was the handiwork  of
the notorious English art
forger Tom Keating who died
earlier this year. Keating was
an odd man. Greatly talented,
relations is a different  ques-
tion, but it has to be said that
the Turner exhibition  is a total
success. Luxembourg is won-
derfully paintable and Turner
did it justice. His canvasses
suggest a land of romance and
enchantment. It's doubtful that
any foreigner ever paid a more
handsome tribute to the Grand
Duchy.
The exhibition is indeed a
needed corrective to the per-
ception of Luxembourg  held by
most other countries. They
think of it as tiny, which it is,
and inconsequential,  which it is
not. The idea of a country the
size of Maryland,  with a popu-
lation of less than haH a million
people, having the same clout
in the Common Market as the
Federal Republic of Germany,
the United Kingdom, or
France is clearly unacceptable.
ATHENS
Colonels
Appeal For
Release
I  ocked away in a high-secu-
Lrity  wing at Athens'
Korydallos prison since L975,
the cashiered colonels of
Greece's one-time military
junta have recently grown vo-
ciferous behind bars. Former
dictator George Papadopoulos
has been named leader of a
new right-wing  political party,
while his two chief aides, Nich-
olas Makarezos  and Stylianos
MAY/IUNE  I984Pattakos,  have  appealed 
against  what  they  claim  is 
wrongful imprisonment. 
A  smuggled  tape-recording 
played at the first rally staged 
in  Athens  by  the  new  party, 
EPEN, earlier this year brought 
tears  to  the  eyes  of  diehard 
junta  supporters  as  they  lis-
tened  to  Papadopoulos'  grav-
elly  voice  denouncing  the So-
cialist  Government.  The 
colonels' efforts to make them-
selves heard from their prison 
cells have attracted little com-
.  ment here. Nobody thinks they 
could pose a threat to political 
stability in Greece these days. 
EPEN  wants the 64-year-old 
former  dictator  to  head  its 
ticket  at  next  month's  elec-
tions  to the  European  Parlia-
ment. Socialist Government of-
ficials  point out, however, that 
the  jailed  officers  were  de-
prived of civil rights when they 
were  sentenced,  after  being 
found  guilty of conspiracy and 
high treason. 
In the meantime, Makarezos 
has  sued  the European  Com-
munity for failing to grant him 
freedom. The junta's economic 
czar  claims  he  should  have 
been  released  when  Greece 
joined the E.C. in 1981. Maka-
rezos appealed last December 
to  the E.C.  Council  of  Minis-
ters and to the E.C.  Commis-
sion  for  immediate  release 
from jail. According to his law-
yer,  Panayotis  Charitos, 
Makarezos and  more  than  20 
other officers who led a blood-
less  coup  in  1967  were  sen-
tenced  retroactively  under  a 
1975 decree. 
Greek  legal  experts  who 
were  involved  in  the  junta's 
trial nine years ago dismiss the 
argument, saying that the offi-
cers  were  condemned  under 
laws  dating back to 1939 and 
1951.  E.C.  law  experts  say 
Makarezos'  suit  is  unlikely  to 
be heard at the E.C.  Court of 
Justice in  Luxembourg on  the 
grounds that it probably will be 
inadmissible.  Ex-artillery  offi-
cer  Stylianos  Pattakos  had  a 
similar suit thrown out by the 
Greek supreme court, after ap-
pearing  before  an  in camera 
hearing.  Undeterred,  another 
leading  member  of  the  dis-
graced junta has filed an appeal 
I.  FlJROPE 
for a retrial. 
Papadopoulos, Pattakos, and 
Makarezos were sentenced to 
death  as  leaders  of  the  coup 
that overthrew democracy for 
seven years. But the sentences 
were  never  carried  out  and 
automatically were commuted 
to  life  imprisonment  in  1978. 
Many leading Greek Socialists, 
including  Premier  Andreas 
·  Papandreou were jailed and ex-
iled during the junta years. But 
according to the imprisoned of-
ficers'  families,  conditions  at 
Korydallos  have  improved 
since  Papandreou  came  to 
power 32 months ago.-KERIN 
HOPE 
BONN 
Take It 
To Court 
C 
itizens of the Federal Re-
public of Germany will go 
to court to fight  a $20 traffic 
fine  or a  $50 tax assessment 
and  few  litigants  ever accept 
the ruling of the court of first 
instance.  "No  country  in  the 
world has more judges per cap-
ita,"  says  Franz  Klein,  presi-
dent  of  the  Federal  Finance 
Court.  "And yet the water is 
up  to  our  necks."  Klein  says 
that  his  own  court,  although 
recently expanded from  eight 
to nine  chambers, is  suffocat-
ing. The federation's other su-
preme  courts-the  Federal 
Court  of Justice,  the  Federal 
Labor Court,  the Federal Ad-
ministrative Court, the Federal 
Social  Court,  and  the Federal 
Constitutional Court  -tell the 
same story. 
The Constitutional Court re-
ceived more than 4,000 com-
plaints in  1983, for  a total of 
more  than  58,000 complaints 
since it was created in Septem-
ber 1951. Only  1.5 percent of 
the  plaintiffs  have  been  suc-
cessful, although some of that 
few were spectacularly victori-
ous, such as the two Hamburg 
lawyers who  managed to stop 
the national census last year on 
grounds  it  violated  individual 
rights. Equally successful were 
two companies fined for unfair 
competition  and  for  violating 
banking  laws.  Klein's  Federal 
Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
Finance Court said they could 
legitimately treat the fines  as 
operating expenses and deduct 
them from taxable income. 
The great majority of cases 
that reach the supreme courts 
fail,  however,  as did  the com-
plaint of a Hamburg pet owner 
to  the  Federal  Constitutional 
Court. He complained that his 
constitutional rights were be-
ing violated by the city's deci-
sion to double the annual tax on 
dogs to about $90 per animal. 
The judges  rejected his  plea, 
advising him to come back only 
after going  through the three 
levels of the Finance Court sys-
tems. 
In self-defense, the Constitu-
tional Court declared in March 
that it would no longer accept 
any complaint involving a fine 
of less than about $30. It an-
nounced  the  new  limit  in  re-
jecting the complaint of a man 
who claimed a court that fined 
him about $20 for illegally rid-
ing a bicycle through a pedes-
trian zone had failed to hear all 
available witnesses. The court 
does have the right to charge a 
fee of up to about $385 to any 
plaintiff it considers has abused 
his right to appeal to it.  How-
ever,  judges  are  reluctant  to 
assess the fine,  on grounds all 
citizens  ought  in  principle  to 
have  free  access  to the Con-
stitutional  Court  created  to 
protect their civil rights. How-
ever,  the  court  is  said  to  be 
considering  collecting  a  fee 
from each lawyer representing 
a person filing a complaint. 
There has been a lot of talk 
lately about a  surplus of  law-
yers. Judges suspect that some 
of them will encourage a client 
to file a complaint even though 
it clearly is hopeless, simply in· 
order to collect the fee for pre-
paring the complaint, which is 
a minimum  $190.  Proponents 
of the scheme say that lawyers 
will  be more careful about go-
ing to the courts if it's going to 
cost  them  their  own  money. 
But others say it would do  no 
good as the lawyers would sim-
ply pass the charges onto their 
clients.  Until  some  such  rule 
goes  into  effect,  however, 
court calendars will continue to 
overflow.  Klein  says  that  be-
cause  so  many  persons  auto-
matically go  to the courts and 
always appeal twice, tax cases 
are tied up  in  the system for 
about 10 years. Most civil and 
criminal  proceedings  require 
about eight years to go through 
appeal and revision. 
COPENHAGEN 
A Cautious Eye 
on Europe 
D
enmark has never been in 
the  vanguard  of  Euro-
pean  integration.  In  fact  it 
would  be  easier to  argue  ex-
actly  the  opposite  case.  And 
through  the  present  Liberal-
Conservative  Government  is 
the most favorable to E. C. inte-
gration  since  Denmark joined 
the E.C.  in  1973, there is  no majority  in  the Danish  parlia-
ment for such a policy. 
Thus, the election campaign 
for  the  European  Parliament 
elections  in  June  is  being 
fought on essentially defensive 
platforms by the pro-E.C. par-
ties. They stress the practical 
value  of  membership  and  the 
contribution the E.C. is making 
toward  relatively  more  stable 
conditions  in  the  world  econ-
omy.  The largest party in  the 
Danish parliament, however, is 
still  the  Social  Democratic 
Party, which rallied late to the 
very  idea  that  the  European 
Parliament  should  be  directly 
elected.  In  this campaign,  the 
party  is  careful  to  dissociate 
itself from  those in  the Euro-
pean  Parliament-Socialist 
parties included-that still see 
European union as a desirable, 
thought distant goal. 
Early  opinion  polls  indicate 
that  the  best  organized  na-
tional  anti-E.C.  group  in  Eu-
rope,  the  Danish  People's 
Movement Against the E.C., in 
theory  has  the  sympathy  of 
close  to  half  the Danish  elec-
torate,  those  saying  they  be-
lieve that E.C.  membership is 
not beneficial to Denmark. But 
sympathy is  not votes. As  the 
political  parties  mount  their 
campaigns  and  call  on  party 
loyalties,  most  observers  be-
lieve that at least two thirds of 
the 15 Danish seats in the Eu-
ropean Parliament will  be oc-
cupied by pro-E.C. members. 
The anti-E.C. group is trou-
bled  not only by  a narrow po-
litical base, dominated by  left-
wing  groups,  but  also  by  the 
lack  of  any  conspicuous  suc-
cesses of the E.C.  in  the past 
five  years.  It  is  difficult  to 
present a convincing picture of 
the  E.C.  as  the  super-state 
usurping  the  powers  of  the 
smaller,  independent  coun-
tries.  Lack  of  interest  in  the 
election is seen by many as the 
gravest threat to the credibil-
ity of the European Parliament 
in  Denmark,  and  to  Danish 
commitment  to  the  E.C.  in 
general. At  government level, 
there is  no  lack of interest in 
the E.C.,  either in  political  or 
personal terms. 
At least three Danish minis-
ters have shown interest in be-
coming members of the execu-
tive E. C. Commission. One, the 
Liberal  Minister  of  Finance, 
Tower of the House of 
Parliament and equestrian 
statue of King Frederick VII of 
Denmark. 
Henning Christophersen, is the 
official  Danish  candidate  for 
the  E.C.  Commission  presi-
dency.  Considered  an  ex-
tremely able  economist and  a 
committed European, he would 
seem  to  have  two  important 
prerequisites for  such a  post. 
Whether  Denmark  can  mar-
shal  the  necessary  political 
support  remains  to  be  seen. 
But his  candidacy has already 
created problems for his party 
and  the Government.  Neither 
the stock exchange  nor  party 
leaders  cherish  lame-duck 
Ministers of Finance. The Dan-
ish economy is still doing well, 
but it needs a steady hand  at 
the helm for  a long  time yet. 
- LEIF BECK F  ALLESEN 
AMSTERDAM 
Planning a 
New Polder 
N
ot only do the Dutch face 
a decision on whether or 
not to deploy 48 cruise missiles 
on  Dutch soil,  but by  summer 
M6YIIIII'\IC  IOOA  .. they also must decide whether
to wrest one more polder from
the former Zuyder Zee, now
called the Ysselmeer after the
Yssel River flowing into it.
While pacifists resist the de-
ployment of missiles, so are
there growing numbers  of peo-
ple resisting the reclamation
project, which will be the fifth
and last polder in the former
inland  sea.
The Zuyder Zee project is
based on the Zuyder Zee Actof.
1918 whose three major objec-
tives were greater  protection
from flooding, better use of the
water, and expansion of the
area of agricultural land. The
first two objectives were real-
izedby the construction  of the
Zuyder Zee barrier dam, com-
pleted in 1932. Four of the
planned polders have already
been completed  and the pro-
tecting dyke for the final pol-
der, Markerwaard,  was com-
pleted in 1976.
Thriving cities have already
grolvn up in the frst reclaimed
polder, Wieringermeer,  as well
as in the northeast  polder and
in eastern and southern Flevo-
land. The taming of the inland
Zuyder Zee's nearly 1 million
acres must be completed,
farmers argue as they line up
for land in the new polder.
The government, though
saddled with a large budget
deficit, in principle favors re-
claiming the Markerwaard.
But since the mid-1970s, oppo-
nents have argued that the
Markerwaard is unnecessary
and can be developed only at
the cost of the disappearance
of a unique area of water. They
also claim it will damage
coastal cities of the former
Zuyder Zee, small jewels of
Holland's golden age where
the ships of the Dutch East
Indies Company unloaded their
spices and where old monu-
ments recall former greatness.
After completion of the first
four polders, it was established
that the soil on which the
coastal cities are built had sunk
by 10 to 15 centimeters. Also
dead set against the reclama-
tion of the Markerwaard  are
the fishermen. The Yssel Lake
is famous for its fresh-water
eel.
Businessmen and Holland's
largest banks have already said
that if the government won't
finance the reclamation, they
will. The cities in the other
reclaimed polders also have an
it certainly rings true. The Re-
public of Ireland is a neutral
country.  Neutral countries  are
nothing new even in Europe.
The Swedes and the Swiss are
both neutral, and maintain for-
midable and unorthodox de-
fense arrangements to deter
anyone from interfering with
their neutrality.  Their chosen
position also prevents them
from joining the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (Nero) or
the E.C.
The Irish, on the other hand,
with a tiny army and virtually
no naval or air forces, take no
steps to protect their neutral-
ity. And, while they refuse to
join Nero, they enthusiastically
voted to join the E.C. in 1972.
Commentators tend to reach
for descriptions  from the ani-
mal world when trying to de-
scribe Irish neutrality. "Sacred
cow" describes  the way it is
trotted out to demonstrate
Irish independence; "chame-
leon," given its ability to
change its appearance;  and
even the "Cheshire cat," to
describe its habit of disappear-
ing from view altogether  for
long periods.
Most of the time, it does not
matter much that the Irish stay
out of military alliances.  There
have been times, though, when
it mattered a great deal. The
crucial period was during
World War II, when Ireland
stayed out of the conJlict and
established  neutrality as a cen-
tral policy for Dublin Govern-
ments ever since.
The issue arose again during
the 1982 conflict between  Brit-
ain and Argentina over the
Falkland Islands. The then
Irish Prime Minister, Charles
Haughey,  cited Irish neutrality
as the reason Ireland could not
continue to support E.C. sanc-
tions against Argentina,  once
the British task force went into
action. Just as in 1939-45, that
demonstration  of neutrality
caused bad feeling between
London and Dublin and further
widened the gap between  the
British-minded  Protestants of
Ulster and the Irish-minded
Catholic  majority. But even in
those periods, Irish neutrality
was not quite what it seemed.
The gradual lifting of secu-
interest in reclamation because
it shortens the distance to
large cities like Amsterdam,
the Hague and Rotterdam.  The
new polder would be an outlet
for crowded Amsterdam,  espe-
cially when the area is well
developed with woodlands
which are scarce in that part of
the Netherlands. The trade
unions believe it will help em-
ployment.
If the decision in favor of
reclamation  is taken this sum-
mer, it will be some eight to
nine years before people  could
settle there. The conquest  of
land from the water is no small
matter. After the dikes have
been built, the water above the
former  seabed is pumped away,
leaving one great mudflat
three to 15 feet below sea
level. Seeds sown from aircraft
transfer the polder into an ex-
panse of reeds.
To make the land suitable
for different uses, the Yssel-
meer Polders Development
Authority as a rule grows crops
on it for five years. The rota-
tion includes rapeseed and ce-
reals. fueas of land are leased
out for growing of flax, grass
seed, and peas for freezing and
carrning. After five years of cul-
tivation by the state, the land is
ready for permanent uses such
as private farming, natural ar-
eas, recreation,  and urban
development.
The first polders in the
Netherlands date from about
1200. First, windmills were
used and several of these pol-
ders have survived. Since the
Middle Ages, the level of the
land in the Netherlands  has
been sinking in relation to sea
level, while the average sea
level has been rising relative to
the land, at a rate of about one
meter per 1,000 years.
-NeIs 
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The Irish
Neutrality
Th.  Irish have a reputation
I  for doing things differ-
ently. It's a reputation that is
probably exaggerated,  but, in
one key area of foreign policy,rity from  the files  of  the war 
years has revealed that Ireland 
was  less neutral than most of 
its  citizens  imagined.  In  the 
area  of  military  intelligence, 
the  Allies  received  consider-
able  cooperation.  It  has  long 
been known  that German air-
men  and  sailors  who  found 
themselves on  Irish soil  were 
interned, while  their U.S.  and 
British counterparts were qui-
etly sent back across the bor-
der to Northern Ireland. 
The view of most observers 
here  over  the  Falklands  dis-
pute is  that Ireland's attitude 
had  more  to  do  with  her old 
quarrels with Britain than the 
principle  of  neutrality.  The 
sight of  British military force 
being used across the globe to 
defend  an  outpost  of  Empire 
was too much for  many Irish-
men, no matter how much they 
might tell themselves that Ar-
gentina was the aggressor. 
In  fact,  Irish  neutrality  ap-
pears to have more to do with 
the history of Irish nationalist 
struggle  than  anything  else. 
Early on, neutrality was a way 
of proving that Ireland was an 
independent  state,  at  a  time 
when it was still formally linked 
to the English  Crown.  But by 
1949,  Ireland  had  become  a 
republic  and  its independence 
was  no  longer  in  doubt.  Why 
should it not join with the other 
Western  states  in  a  defense 
pact against Soviet aggression. 
The answer at the time was 
that the partition of the island 
made  it  impossible  to  join  a 
pact  in  which  Britain  was  a 
member  because  Britain,  ac-
cording  to  the  Irish  Foreign 
Minister  of  the  day,  Sean 
McBride, was "responsible for 
the unnatural invasion  of  Ire-
land, and occupies a portion of 
our  country  with  its  armed 
forces ....  " 
How was such a view to be 
squared with the joint entry of 
Britain and Ireland, (along with 
Denmark)  into  the  E.C.  in 
197  3?  For the most part,  the 
Irish ignored the problem and 
concentrated on the economic 
benefits which would flow from 
membership. 
Nevertheless,  Irish  Prime 
Ministers  have  always  con-
ceded that there is a contradic-
tion between the E.C.'s goal of 
political  union  among  the  na-
tions of Europe and Irish neu-
trality. A politically united Eu-
rope  would  have  to  have  a 
common  defense  policy.  Irish 
ministers  took  consolation 
from  the  fact  that  European 
union seemed as distant a pros-
pect  as  ever ...  just  as  far 
away as an end to the partition 
of Ireland. 
But  while  Irish  and  Euro-
pean  unity  remain  elusive,  a 
common  European  defense 
strategy may be on the way. A 
combination of factors has led 
today' s  European  leaders  to 
look again at the possibility of 
Europe  taking  more  respon-
sibility for its own defense and 
heightened  all  Europeans' 
awareness  of  the  dangers  of 
nuclear war. 
No  part of  the globe  could 
escape the consequences of an 
all-out  nuclear  exchange  be-
tween  the  superpowers,  but 
the Irish could reasonably hope 
that they would be spared in a 
limited  European  exchange  if 
such  a  thing  were  possible. 
They also  do  not have to pay 
the  costs  of  a  modern  army 
equipped  to  NATO  standards 
and many would feel that Irish 
membership  of  NATO  would 
make  little  difference  mili-
tarily,  while  it  might  damage 
the  good  trading  relations 
which  Ireland  has  with  coun-
tries like Iran and Libya. 
Nor  have  people  forgotten 
the last war when Dublin was 
spared  the  horrors  of  aerial 
bombing  (except for  one acci-
dental attack by a lost German 
pilot) while  Belfast,  100 miles 
away  in  Northern Ireland,  re-
ceived one of the heaviest raids 
outside London. 
So  Irish  politicians  may 
come to regret their loose use 
of  the neutrnlity argument. It 
could  become an international 
embarrassment for them while 
the  electorate  is  unwilling  to 
give  it  up.  The  only  way  to 
change opinion may be to begin 
a rational debate on  Ireland's 
attitude  to  defense  and  that 
would  be something new in it-
self.-BRENDAN KEENAN 
relying less on U.S. forces. The 1----------- -----'------- - -- - ----' 
French, in particular, have acti-
vated  military  consultation 
procedures  with  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  which 
had  not  been used since  they 
were agreed to in  1963. They 
also are interested in  reviving 
the Western European Union, 
a defense treaty involving most 
of the E.C. countries which has 
been moribund even longer-
since 1954. 
Such developments threaten 
to  leave  Ireland  isolated  and 
open  to  accusations,  which 
have already been voiced by a 
British Defense Minister, that 
Ireland  is  willing  to  let  other 
countries bear the burden of its 
own defense. Irish members of 
the European Parliament were 
left  on  their own  when  a mo-
tion calling for the E. C. to have 
a common  defense policy was 
debated recently. Irish officials 
have already been placed in the 
position of having to leave cer-
tain  meetings  when  security 
and defense matters were be-
ing discussed. 
In theory, because Irish neu-
trality  is  a  matter  of  policy 
rather than principle, the Irish 
could drop it in the interests of 
closer  European  union  some-
thing they support. In practice, 
there is reason to believe that 
neutrality will be a harder nut 
to crack. Ordinary Irish people 
have come to like their lack of 
military  entanglements.  The 
controversy  over  the  deploy-
ment of  U.S.  cruise  and  Per-
shing  missiles  in  Europe  has 
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THE  HIGH  COST 
OF  PROTECTIONISM 
STUDY  SHOWS  U.S.  CONSUMERS  PAY 
.. HIDDEN"  TAX  OF  $58.5  BILLION  AS  A 
RESULT  OF  TRADE  BARRIERS. 
MICHAEL C. MUNGER 
and KATHLEEN A.  REHBEIN 
W
orld  leaders today  acknowl-
edge that barriers to interna-
tional trade are both damag-
ing to the producers of exports and costly 
to consumers who are denied the right to 
buy  these  goods  at  world  prices.  We 
might expect, then, that support for pro-
tectionist policies is largely a thing of the 
past.  In  the  past  five  years,  however, 
political  pressures for  increased protec-
tion  of  domestic  producers  have 
mounted.  Governments  in  many  coun-
tries have  repeatedly given  in  to these 
pressures. In the United States recently, 
there have been a series of "voluntary" 
quotas  on  televisions,  autos,  and  steel; 
numerous "buy American" policies of the 
federal  and  state  governments;  and  a 
number  of  protectionist  legislative  pro-
posals, including the "domestic content" 
bill  for  automobiles.  They  all  serve  to 
remind us that, although the advantages 
of free trade are accepted in theory, prac-
tical acceptance even in the United States 
is still largely incomplete. 
of imported goods.  This,  in  turn,  raises 
the  consumption  of  domestically  pro-
duced goods as well  as domestic prices. 
Thus, we can think of trade barriers as a 
"hidden tax" on consumers of protected 
products. 
Policymakers can choose to support a 
faltering domestic industry either by pro-
tecting its  market from  foreign  compe-
tition or by taxing consumers and subsi-
dizing the industry with the proceeds. In 
the case of protectionism, the transfer to 
the  protected  industry  is  directly  from 
the  consumers'  pockets,  rather  than 
through government as an intermediary. 
Our estimate of the cost of protection-
ism to U.S.  consumers in  1980 is  $58.5 
billion. A summary of the components of 
this  cost  appears  in  the  accompanying 
box. Two aspects of this estimate should 
be emphasized. First, the figure substan-
tially understates what consumers actu-
ally pay for  protectionism because it in-
cludes only the static, or short-run, costs. 
The dynamic costs-or the losses in ca-
pacity,  innovation,  and  productivity that 
occur when firms are insulated from mar-
ket forces that give impetus to corrective 
changes in industry structure and produc-
tion methods-are probably substantial, 
but no estimate is here included. 
The estimate is  also  understated be-
cause the static cost estimates are them-
selves  incomplete.  No  costs  have  been 
estimated for more than a dozen specific 
programs,  including  orderly  marketing 
agreements  on  automobiles,  ball  bear-
ings, dairy products, meat, and tin; tariffs 
on fruit juices; and other restrictions be-
cause no figures were available for use in 
a cost estimate. 
The second point to stress about our 
overall estimate is that, even though it is 
incomplete, it represents a significant and 
little recognized burden to the consumer. 
Trade  barrier costs  of  $58.5  billion  in 
1980 amounted to an implicit per-capita 
tax of $255 that year-over $1,000 for a 
family  of  four-to protect a  variety of 
domestic  industries.  The  total  tax  or 
transfer associated with  tariffs  is  about 
$45.8 billion,  with another $12.7 billion 
resulting  from  quantity  limitations  and 
other regulatory barriers. 
The  product  category  totals  contain 
estimates of  the total cost of  trade re-
strictions on broad product groups. The 
largest  cost  is  for  textiles  and  apparel 
restrictions at $18.4 billion, with machin-
ery and transportation equipment next at 
$15.9  billion. 
The metals and  minerals category of 
$10.2 billion includes restrictions on alu-
minum,  copper,  iron,  steel,  zinc,  etc. 
Ranking  fourth are restrictions on  foot-
wear,  furniture,  stainless steel flatware, 
glass  products,  printing  and  publishing, 
and  other  manufactured  products.  Fi-
nally,  for  agricultural goods,  $3.9 billion 
of  the  total  of  $6  billion  comes  from 
quotas  and  orderly  marketing  agree-
Precisely how much do trade barriers 
cost consumers? And why,  if these costs 
are so high,  are these barriers erected? 
To  answer  these  two  questions,  we 
present an estimate of the costs imposed 
on  American  consumers  by  U.S.  trade 
barriers in  1980, and then focus  on one 
example, the steel industry. 
COST OF PROTECTIONISM TO U.S. CONSUMERS 
The Costs of Protection 
Protectionism  takes  three  basic  forms: 
tariffs, or explicit duties; quantitative re-
strictions,  either  quotas  or  any  of  the 
various kinds of "voluntary" restrictions 
on  quantity; and  other barriers, such as 
"buy American" laws or the steel trigger 
price  mechanism.  Each  of  these  is,  in 
effect,  a  tax on  consumers  of  the pro-
tected products and on producers of prod-
ucts that are not protected, raising  the 
price and reducing the available quantity 
(billions of 1980 dollars) 
Quantitative 
restrictions and 
Product Category  Tariffs  other barriers  Total 
Textiles and Apparel  $15.0  $  3.4  $18.4 
Machinery and Trans- 15.9  - 15.9 
portation Equipment 
Metals and Minerals  7.3  2.8  10.1 
Other manufactured  5.5  2.6  8.1 
products 
Agricultural  2.1  3.9  6.0 
--- --
TOTAL  $45.8  $12.7  $58.5 
Source:  Michael C. Munger, "The Costs of Protectionism," Center for the Study of American Business 
Working Paper #80, Washington University, St. Louis. ments, with the remainder accounted  for
by tariffs.
It is difficult to understand  the popular-
ity of costly trade barriers as national
policy-except  in light of the politics of
protectionism. Protectionist  devices  are a
means by which small, well-organized
groups use the political process to their
advantage.  That the tax effects of these
measures are hidden is of no small impor-
tance in explaining  their attractiveness to
policymakers and to business.  Certainly,
direct subsidization of producers  leading
to increased taxes-or, more likely, to
increased deficits-would  be very unpop-
ular politically. Protectionist  aid to indus-
tries facing strong foreign competition,
on the other hand, can be rationalized by
pointing the finger at foreigners.
Steel: Trade Barriers and Survival
The steel industry provides a useful and
enlightening example of the reasons firms
may seek to use a political, rather than an
economic, response  to solve the difficul-
ties posed by foreign competition.  Tariffs
and quotas on steel imports were esti-
mated to cost consumers  nearly $6 billion
in 1980. The trigger price mechanism,  by
establishing  a price floor below which
foreign firms could not sell their prod-
ucts, tacked on an additional $1.1 billion.
Since 1980, protection  of the steel indus-
try has continued and even accelerated.
The explanation of why this is so-in
import-competing industries in general,
but in steel in particular-rests on two
mutually reinforcing factors. First: It
works. The steel industry has had great
success in obtaining new trade restric-
tions from the U.S. Government. Second,
and no less important: Little has been
done to solve the long-term  structural
problems of the industry so that there is
continuing pressure  both on management
and political leaders to do something.
That "something" has repeatedly been to
raise trade barriers.
The success of the steel industry in
obtaining protection depends on its well-
organized efforts to lobby Congress and
on what amounts to a veto Power each
firm possesses  over existing trade policy.
The steel industry or in some cases a
single large firm, can at any time veto the
existing government policy by initiating a
dumping, countervailing-duty,  or escape-
clause case. Since the initial filing of these
cases usually elicits retaliatory threats
from exporting nations in Europe or Ja-
pan, these filings are really threats to
start a trade war, and the exporting coun-
try and the United States are forced to
negotiate  a voluntary  settlement restrict-
ing those exports.
This pattern of behavior  has been re-
peatedly successful. In L977, 1980,
1981, and 1984, steel firms filed a flurry
of petitions for relief, which under U.S.
trade laws engender  an automatic review
with the possibility of legislative action,
while industry representatives  lobbied
Congress directly  and fervently. By pro-
viding steel with the ability to veto exist-
ing agreements simply by filing com-
plaints, and then pliantly negotiating or
imposing  stricter barriers after such com-
plaints are filed, the U.S. Government
has allowed steel firms to use a political
response  as an effective  bar to economic
competition.
The avowed purpose of trade PolicY
has been to facilitate  a fair trade environ-
ment and, implicitly, to allow the steel
industry to earn profits which will help it
pay for modernization of its facilities.  Far
from having this effect, however, the re-
peated acquiescence to industry  demands
has slowed the process  of adjustment by
steel firms. The most important,  and
most tragic, lesson that U.S. policy on
steel has to teach us is that while restrict-
ing imports that compete with mature
industries may serve short-run  political
goals, in the long run, trade barriers
reduce incentives to innovate and im-
prove productivity and they eventually
reduce the likelihood that domestic  indus-
tries can compete against foreign  firms.
By preventing foreign imports from
reaching consumers at world prices, pro-
tectionism effectively  subsidizes domes-
tic production.  But the cost is difficult to
justify, even in the short run. Estimates of
the costs to consumers  per job "saved" in
the television,  footwear,  steel, and auto-
mobile industries show that consumers
pay more than three times, and in some
cases nearly 10 times, as much as the
worker whose job is saved receives in
salary and fringe benefits.
Moreover, as our discussion of the
steel industry indicates, trade barriers
tend to be self-perpetuating.  Unfortu-
nately, protection may impose high long-
run costs on the protected industry  itself:
An industry such as steel that once
sought protection as a short-run cure
often ends up dependent on trade barri-
ers for its continued existence. The
present  system of offering protection to
faltering industries has tended to in-
crease these firms' chances of survival
for a short period, but in some cases
already may have ensured their ultimate
decline.  C
Michael C. Munger  and Kathleen A. Rehbein  are
economists  at Washington  University's  Center for
the Study  of American Business in St. Louis, Mis-
souri.U.S.·E.C.  RELATIONS/FINANCE 
MONETARY 
RELATIONS  ACROSS 
THE  ATLANTIC 
OR:  HOW TO COOPERATE  IN  AN 
"UNSTABLE  NON-SYSTEM" 
ANDRE szAsz 
F
inancial  and  monetary  relations 
between  the  United  States  and 
Europe  in  recent  years  have  not 
been  free  from  irritation  and 
recrimination.  These have  gone  beyond 
the  sphere  of  monetary  experts.  U.S. 
financial  policies have been criticized by 
Prime Ministers, by Presidents, and even 
by  a  King.  Listening  to  the reproaches 
going  back  and  forth,  I sometimes feel 
like  that judge who,  after having  heard 
the plaintiff, concluded he was right and 
then,  after  listening  to  the  defendant, 
agreed with him also.  When  someone in 
court protested that the judge could not 
agree with both, the latter pondered this 
and then said:  "Why, you're right too!" 
I share the European worry that the 
United States tends to be inward-looking 
in  financial  and  monetary  matters, 
ignoring the international repercussions 
of its internal policies. At the same time I 
believe  there  is  much  truth  in  the 
American  rejoinder  that  many  of  the 
problems Europe blames on  the United 
States are of its own making. Perhaps the 
most  succinct  way  to  summarize  the 
following  view is that on  neither side of 
the  Atlantic  are  policies  sufficiently 
consistent  to  make  international 
monetary cooperation effective. The lack 
of  international  monetary  cooperation 
cannot  fail  to  have  negative  effects 
outside the monetary sphere. 
U.S. policies 
The international  monetary  role  of  the 
United States is characterized at present 
by its twin deficits: an unsustainably large 
public-sector  deficit  and  an  equally 
unsustainable  current-account  deficit. 
These  deficits  are  reflected  in  high 
interest rates and unpredictable, strongly 
fluctuating exchange rates. Both are bad 
for the world economy. 
The reasons for the U.S.  tendency to 
ignore the external repercussions of its 
1'1  I=IIRr\DI= 
policies  are  in  part  the  size  and 
"closedness" of the U.S. economy, and in 
part what  could  be  called  "ideological" 
factors. The size of the U.S. economy and 
the modest part of international trade in 
proportion to national income-some 10 
percent-has for many years determined 
the U.S. attitude in international financial 
and monetary affairs. Other countries, in 
taking  into  account  external 
repercussions,  do  so  not  primarily  for 
idealistic  reasons  but because  they are 
aware of their dependence on the rest of 
the  world.  In  the  case  of  the  United 
States, both dependence and  awareness 
of it are less. There is a feeling  that to 
take it into account would  mean the tail 
wagging the dog. 
The  ideological  factor,  though  not 
new-the expression  "benign  neglect" 
dates  from  the  early  1970s-has 
probably  been  strengthened  by 
monetarist  theories.  These  discourage 
Europeans worry that 
the United States tends 
to ignore the interna-
tional repercussions of 
its internal policies. 
authorities  from  having  external  policy 
objectives concerning the exchange rate 
or  the  structure  of  the  balance  of 
payments.  In  this  view,  if  only  the 
authorities  pursue  correct  domestic 
monetary policies,  international stability 
will automatically result. 
They should not try to aim at a specific 
exchange-rate  or  balance-of-payments 
structure since this would be an obstacle 
in  attaining  the  domestic  monetary 
objectives, while the authorities are not in 
a position to know better than the market 
the correct exchange-rate or balance-of-
payments structure anyway.  Whether a 
country is a net lender or a net borrower 
should be determined, in this view, by the 
market. 
In  my view,  proper monetary policies 
are  certainly  necessary,  but  I  cannot 
agree that when such policies are in place 
the  exchange-rate  and  balance-of-
payments structure can be left entirely to 
the  market.  There  has  to  be  an 
international consensus on the desirable 
balance-of-payments structure. The basis 
of  that  consensus  should  be  that  the 
industrial world has to be a net lender, not 
a net borrower. This to some extent is the 
view  that  prevails  in  the  European 
Monetary  System  (EMS).  The  U.S. 
authorities reject it and are not prepared 
to  discuss  policy  coordination  in  these 
terms. 
The resulting imbalances bother them 
less than they do other countries. This is 
not only because the size of the domestic 
economy makes it less sensitive, but also 
because it  led  to the emergence of  the 
dollar as an international currency. This 
enables the United States to pay other 
countries  with  dollars  or,  which  is  the 
same  thing,  not  to  pay  but  to  borrow. 
Thus, while Europe has to pay the price 
in  the  end  when  it  loses  control  of  its 
public  finances,  when  the  U.S.  budget 
gets out of  control it is  not the United 
States but others who foot the bill, among 
them  once  again  Europe.  Europeans 
watch this with a mixture of feelings,  in 
which righteous indignation is paramount 
and envy not entirely absent. 
Monetary  relations  with  the  United 
States  are  further  complicated  by  a 
number of factors. One is a divergence of 
views within the Reagan Administration. 
There is  a general desire to reduce the 
budget deficit,  though no  agreement on 
how to do it. There are also differences in 
the  degree  of  willingness  to  take  the 
exterior  into  account.  The  Federal 
Reserve System-at least in Washington 
and New York-would probably be more 
ready to  cooperate with other countries 
in,  for  instance,  intervention operations 
than  in  fact  proved  possible  in  recent 
years. 
Let me try to balance my criticism to 
some  extent.  If the  United  States  has 
been  reluctant  to  accept  external 
constraints  with  regard  to  domestic 
policies, one cannot say that the rest of 
the world has been more willing to do so if 
they  could  help  it.  Not  being  reserve 
centers, most countries could not escape 
constraints in the way the United States could. In the IMF,  it is the United States 
which  has  checked  the  permanent 
international  pressure  for  reserve 
creation  which  unabated  could  have 
turned  the  IMF  into  a  kind  of  United 
Nations  or,  failing  that,  to  transfer 
decisions  on  money  creation  to  the 
United  Nations.  Treasuries and  central 
banks  of  most  industrial  countries 
opposed this, but I am not sure how firm 
some  of  them would  have ·been  in  the 
absence  of  the  consistency  in  the 
American view in this matter. And most 
important  of  all,  of  course,  economic 
recovery in  the United States played  a 
crucial  role  in  helping  the  rest  of  the 
world  to  start  coming  out  of  the 
recession. 
European monetary cooperation 
An obvious European reaction to mitigate 
the negative effects of U.S. policies would 
be  intensified  efforts  for  European 
cooperation. This was the case five years 
ago,  when  an  uncontrolled  slide  of the 
dollar  was among the main reasons for 
the foundation of the EMS.  More recently 
it could also have mitigated the effects of 
high U.S. interest rates. 
If  the EMS countries formed a solid bloc 
with sustainable, and therefore credible, 
exchange-rate  relations  among  them, 
they  would  be  less  affected  by  large 
exchange-rate  movements  vis-a-vis  the 
dollar  than  they  are  now.  That  would 
enable them to some extent to insulate 
their  interest-rate  policies  from  U.S. 
interest rates. If one takes the E.C. as a 
whole,  trade  with  third  countries 
amounts  to  merely  12  percent  of 
aggregate GNP,  making it comparable to 
the United States in this respect. 
Unfortunately, exchange-rate relations 
within the EMS  in the past seldom have 
remained credible for  long.  One  reason 
was  diverging  policies  and  diverging 
fundamentals. This sooner or later-and 
in  fact  increasingly  sooner-led  to 
realignment  of  expectations  and 
speculation. 
There has always been a tendency in 
the  E.C.  to  concentrate  on  technical 
gimmicks  as  an  escape  from  policy 
constraints.  Couldn't  Europeans  obtain 
autonomy from  the dollar by creating a 
dollar  of  their  own,  the  European 
Currency  Unit  (ECU)?  The  only  thing 
Europeans  need  is  having  it  replace 
present national currencies and creating 
common  European markets comparable 
to the American ones. Unfortunately that 
means a phase in integration not quite yet 
achieved.  Then  couldn't  Europeans 
achieve  autonomy  by  surrounding 
themselves  with  a  wall  of  exchange 
restrictions?  Given  the  objective,  that 
would  imply  uniform  exchange 
restrictions  against  third  countries 
applied  in  Europe  by  both  deficit  and 
surplus countries, which it is not so easy 
to imagine. Here too lack of homogeneity 
seems to render uniformity impractical. 
Quite  apart  from  the  fact  that 
exchange  restrictions  have  seldom 
proved effective, and seldom result in low 
interest rates. Thus, autonomy vis-a-vis 
U.S.  interest rates does not mean that 
Europeans can act as they like. It does not 
Effective  European  co-
operation  on  exchange 
rates could  be a first 
step toward  increased 
global  stability. 
free  them from  the need for  monetary 
discipline.  But  the  dollar  constraint, 
which  can  be irrational  if  U.S.  policies 
ignore  external repercussions,  could  to 
some  extent  be  replaced  by  EMS 
discipline, which can be beneficial as long 
as it reflects the purpose of the EMS:  to 
establish a zone of monetary stability in 
Europe. 
U  .S.-E.C. Cooperation 
In 1975, the United States and France, 
after much bickering about whether or 
not a system of stable exchange rates was 
an acceptable objective, finally agreed on 
a formula  subsequently enshrined in  the 
Articles of Agreement of the IMF: not on 
a system of stable exchange rates, but on 
"a  stable  system  of  exchange  rates." 
Each  side  could  give  its  own 
interpretation. It is obvious now that the 
result  was  not  stable  exchange  rates. 
Neither  was  it  a  stable  system.  The 
question is whether it was a system at all. 
One might call it an unstable non-system. 
It did not prevent the authorities from 
coping  with  emergencies,  since  all 
participants realized that this was in their 
own best interests. I am fairly confident 
that they will  cope with emergencies in 
the future as well.  But one should hope 
for more, for the emergence of a system 
which  to  some  extent  will  prevent 
emergencies from arising. In my view, a 
system  by  definition  implies  the 
acceptance of international commitments 
and constraints. On paper, all members of 
the IMF  have accepted the obligation to 
promote stability and entrusted to the IMF 
the  task  of  surveillance  of  their 
exchange-rate policies. 
However,  this  is  a  far  cry  from 
accepting  external  constraints  in 
practice.  That  is  what  I  meant  when 
questioning  to  what  extent  we  have  a 
system. But I could happily go along with 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Donald Regan's 
formulation that the real challenge is to 
develop the system we already have and 
to  strengthen  the  fund's  surveillance 
activities. 
The real issue is, of course, not one of 
words. It is how to reconcile internal and 
external  objectives,  what  external 
constraint -or discipline-to  accept  in 
domestic policies. 
In  this  respect,  the  EMS  countries 
recognize-at  least  in  principle-that 
international  monetary  cooperation 
implies  that  internal  and  external 
objectives  will  have  to  be  reconciled. 
They are not always  successful in  that 
reconciliation,  i.e.,  in  agreeing on  what 
measure  of  external  discipline  is 
necessary. As long as they disagree about 
that  among  themselves,  prospects  for 
better  transatlantic  cooperation  are 
limited. You  cannot obtain it by blaming 
one  another  for  its  absence.  Nor  by 
instituting  "target zones"  between  the 
ECU  and  the  dollar.  In  the  present 
situation,  those  measures  would  be 
meaningless. The ECU would stand for a 
number  of  European  currencies  with 
widely  different  balance-of-payments 
positions. The U.S. would not submit to 
external constraints, whether the dollar 
was within the target zone or outside it. 
As long as that is the case, the institution 
of target zones would constitute the same 
kind  of  gimmickry  some  want  to 
introduce in the EMS. 
Global  stability  should  start  within 
Europe. If Europe succeeded in moving 
toward becoming a more solid bloc with 
credible and sustainable exchange rates, 
this  might  have  two advantages in  the 
monetary  sphere.  On  the one  hand,  it 
would  become  less  vulnerable  to  the 
effects  of  dollar  fluctuations.  On  the 
other, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, it 
might  be  in  a  position  to attain better 
cooperation with the United States and 
thus  reduce  dollar  fluctuations.  Thus, 
effective European cooperation could be 
a  first  step  toward  increased  global 
monetary stability.  A  renewed effort to 
bring  about  a  stable  system,  while 
implying  the acceptance  of  constraints, 
would  bring  benefits  far  beyond  the 
monetary sphere. E 
Andre  Szasz,  an  executive  director  of  the 
Netherlands  Bank,  is  a  member  of  the  E.C.'s 
Monetary Committee. This article is adapted from a 
paper delivered to the eighth annual conference of 
European  and  American  journalists  in  Knokke, 
Belgium, in April. 
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COMPARING 
CONGRESS 
TO  THE  PARLIAMENT 
CONTRAST  BETWEEN  TWO VERY 
DIFFERENT  ASSEMBLIES  IS  STRIKING  AS 
BOTH  PREPARE  FOR  ELECTIONS. 
CLIFFORD HACKETT 
I 
f you look down from the gallery of the 
European Parliament when it assem-
bles for an important debate, you will 
certainly believe  that you  are watching 
one of the miracles of Europe in  action. 
Before you sit members from 10 coun-
tries and from 60 political parties. Most 
of  the  434  members  will  be  present. 
When they speak, it will be in one of the 
EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT 
Legislative Roles 
Only  advisory,  on  proposals  made  by 
Commission  before their consideration 
by the Council. Must approve budget. 
Relation to Executive 
Parliament's seven official languages. Yet 
each member can listen in  his  own  lan-
guage  through  a  combination  of  gifted 
interpreters  and  European  technology. 
The  debate  will  be  animated  and  the 
voting,  when  it  occurs,  comes  with  a 
speed and discipline which amazes those 
more familiar  with  the folksiness  of the 
U.S.  House of Representatives. But the 
scene deceives the eye. What the Euro-
pean Parliament produces is  not legisla-
tion,  but  its own  reports.  It lacks  true 
legislative powers. It is not even a parlia-
ment in the European meaning. 
The American Congress, by  contrast, 
has a leisurely and almost homespun pace 
when viewed from the public galleries. It 
is  ·rare  to  see  even  half  of  either  the 
House  or  Senate  present  on  the  floor 
together.  Politically,  its  members seem 
only  distantly  related  to  each  other in 
ideology.  They move  about  the  anony-
mous  benches like  casual  acquaintances 
meeting in a railroad waiting room. 
Yet the Congress is the powerhouse of 
world  legislatures.  This  power  is  now 
making some Europeans look to the Con-
gress as a model toward which its Com-
munity's Parliament should move. These 
comparisons are also of interest this year 
when  both  the  Congress and  the Euro-
pean Parliament face reelection. What do 
the two bodies have in common and what 
are their differences? 
To start, one is a legislature, the other 
is  not. The Congress actually writes the 
laws,  even though the executive branch 
Single chamber meets one week in ple-
nary, two weeks in committee, and one 
week in political groups each month. 
Jurisdictions 
Community  laws,  regulation,  and  bud-
get (in part) which cover areas defined 
by the Treaty of Rome creating the E. C. 
Defense excluded. 
Staffs 
Entrance exam into civil service status 
for  secretariat;  free  hire  for  political 
groups. Very small personal staff. 
Committee Structure 
Substantive (12): Political Mfairs; Agri-
culture;  Economic  &  Monetary;  En-
.  ergy, Research & Technology; External 
Reacts to specific Commission  propos-
als,  but provides public forum for  E.C. 
issues. Can remove entire Commission 
but  not  replace  it.  Can  force  some 
changes in  budget. Questions Commis-
sioners in plenary. 
;on:sen:ts ~  Economic  Relations;  Social  Mfairs  & 
Election, Chambers, Sessions 
Elected  for  five-year  term  by  direct 
vote, but under national electoral laws. 
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Unemployment;  Regional  Policy  & 
Planning;  Transport;  Environment, 
Public Health &  Consumer Protection; 
Youth,  Culture, Education, Information 
& Sport; Development & Cooperation. 
Budgetary: Budget; Budgetary Control. 
Institutional: Rules of Procedure & Pe-
titions;  Verification  of  Credentials;  In-
stitutional Mfairs. may make suggestions. But it is a legisla-
ture closely  tied to  the President since 
the  congressional  work  product  cannot 
become law without both Houses agree-
ing  on  a version nor without the Presi-
dent's action. 
The European Parliament only reviews 
proposals of the E.C. Commission, which 
is  the  equivalent  of  the  U.S.  executive 
branch. Then the proposed law or regula-
tion goes to the E. C. Council of Ministers, 
which functions like a parliament by giv-
ing  final  assent  to  the  proposals  in  the 
name of the 10 E.C.  member countries. 
Even  with  European  Community  fi-
nances, where the Parliament has had its 
most dramatic successes by twice reject-
ing  the budget,  the representatives can 
only delay and debate. 
Another  major  difference,  related  to 
this functional one, lies in the institutional 
structure in  which the  t~o bodie~ oper-
ate. In  the United States, the Congress 
was intentionally put into tension with the 
executive branch with which, however, it 
must move in tandem. Neither Congress 
nor the President can go far without the 
other. 
The European Parliament tries to as-
sert its elected role against the E. C. Com-
mission, which is an appointed executive, 
and against the E.C.  Council, which rep-
resents national governments meeting as 
Ministers of Finance, Agriculture, and so 
on.  There  is  little  institutional  tension 
between  the Parliament and  these two 
other  branches  of  Community  govern-
ment (although considerable political ten-
sion).  One  can  imagine  the Commission 
and the Council making legislation quite 
easily and quite happily without regard to 
the Parliament. 
The  European  Parliament  fights  for 
recognition of a representative role; the 
U.S.  Congress  confidently  asserts  that 
role  by,  among other acts,  standing for 
election more frequently that the Presi-
dent  and  keeping,  therefore,  in  closer 
communion  with  the  people.  Most  na-
tional  parliaments in  Europe also  assert 
this  representative  role.  Their  political 
majorities  form  the  government.  When 
the majority shifts, the government must 
adjust or fall.  The European Parliament 
exists in institutional isolation from Com-
mission and Council. 
Leadership 
President and 12 vice presidents repre-
sent national and  party balance in  ple-
nary vote; they form Bureau for general 
direction of Parliament; 7 political group 
chairmen are added  to form  Enlarged 
Bureau which  handles  most important 
matters  involving  political 
management.  Five  questors  serve  as 
ombudsmen  for  many  administrative 
matters. Rapporteurs, selected by com-
mittee members, draft and  defend  re-
ports. Committee chairmen function as 
non-partisan managers. 
Role of Parties 
Committee assignments, chairmenships 
and inter-parliamentary delegations de-
termined by  relative size  of  each of  7 
political  groups.  Discipline  varies  de-
pending  on  ideological  breadth  of 
groups,  but generally is  much  greater 
than in U.S. Congress. Group chairmen 
elected for  one-half of  5-year term of 
Parliament but may be re-elected. Par-
ties tried to run Community-wide elec-
toral campaigns in first direct election in 
1979 with varying success. Most mem-
bers elected on party-list system, which 
requires  them  to  keep  active  role  in 
national parties. 
To  understand  better some  of  these 
differences,  and  the  similarities,  of  the 
European Parliament and  the U.S.  Con-
gress,  it  is  useful  to look  at some  key 
operations. The accompanying box shows 
how the two compare. 
Conversations with many members of 
the present European Parliament suggest 
that the body, which faces reelection june 
14-1 7, could develQp in one of two direc-
tions: it could become more like a Euro-
pean parliament by naming the Commis-
sion's 14 members or by otherwise taking 
some legislative power from the Commis-
sion, the Council, or both. Or, the Parlia-
ment could recognize that the European 
Community is not ever going to be like a 
European country and therefore the Par-
liament of that Community must seek a 
unique role, perhaps more like that of the 
Congress  whose  central role  in  day-to-
day government is unmatched elsewhere 
in the world.  E 
Clifford  Hackett manages  the  Congress-European 
Parliament Project. He worked many years on both 
House and Senate staffs. 
MAY/JUNE  1984  15 U.S.·E.C. RELATIONS/CONFERENCE 
EXPERTS  EVALUATE 
TRANSATLANTIC  TIES 
TRADE  AND  SECURITY  ISSUES  DOMINATE 
AGENDA  AT  MEDIA  SEMINAR  ENTITLED 
"CONFLICT  AND  COHESION." 
H. PETER DREYER 
T
ense for quite some time now, will 
the  relationship  between  the 
United States and  the European 
Community  keep  getting  worse?  If so, 
why?  And  is  this  estrangement process 
bound to continue-conceivably with fa-
tal consequences? Such questions are not 
precisely  new.  They  might  justifiably 
have been asked (and indeed often were) 
two or four or more years ago. But famil-
iar as they may be to the players on, and 
to  the  observers  of,  the  transatlantic 
stage, they are as topical as ever. In fact, 
they may well have become more press-
ing as well as disquieting than at any time 
since the Treaties of  Rome establishing 
the E.C. were signed. 
There  is  a  simple  reason  why  this 
should be so.  Not only have some major 
controversies  turned  into  hardy  peren-
nials which still elude solution, but fresh 
and serious problems are being added to 
them  at so  fast  a  pace  as  to  give  the 
overall  issue  perhaps a  new  and  highly 
dangerous dimension. 
That, in  a nutshell, is  how  the eighth 
annual European-American media confer-
ence-"E.C.-U.S. Relations: Conflict and 
Cohesion" -can be summed up. That the 
speakers who came to address this April 
gathering in  Knokke,  Belgium,  of  some 
20 newspersons included the French and 
Belgian  Foreign  Ministers,  two  Vice-
Presidents of  the E.C.  Commission,  and 
other prominent American and European 
political figures and senior officials consti-
tuted ample proof as to the importance of 
this topic to the powers that be. 
protectionist attitudes and practices and 
the sad truth is that such charges tend to 
be correct one way as well as the other. 
More  specifically,  there has  been  no 
abatement whatever of the confrontation 
on agricultural policy matters, a feuding 
which  started more  than  20  years ago 
with the "chicken war." While novel dis-
putes keep turning up all  the time, such 
as the recent E.C. effort to initiate Gen-
eral  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
(GATT)  procedures for limiting U.S. ship-
ments of corn-gluten feed, the presenta-
tions made by both Claude Villain, Direc-
tor  General  of  the  E.C.  Commission's 
agriculture department,  and  Richard  E. 
Lyng,  U.S.  Deputy Secretary of Agricul-
ture, were in  essence no  different from 
what the two men might have said a year 
or two ago. 
Lyng  actually  put  this  quite  clearly, 
pointing out that at a similar seminar in 
1982 he had remarked how, if only some-
one  would  come  up  with  a definition  of 
"equitable" world  trade which  was  sat-
isfactory to both the E.C. and the United 
States,  the  solution  to  the  problems 
would be  at hand.  "Well, here we are in 
1984: the United States and the E.C., still 
talking,  still  agreeing  that  we  should 
agree, and still looking for the definition 
that would make it possible, he said. 
More and more, however, the conflict 
pattern is  broadening out by  coming  to 
take  in  some  other  actual  or  potential. 
quarrels.  It is  no  exaggeration to  state 
that, given European unhappiness about 
the impact of a strong dollar,  high  U.S. 
interest  rates,  and  the  huge  American 
budget  deficit  on  the  outside  world,  a 
severe economic policy rift has emerged 
between the two sides.  Here again,  the 
chief difficulty may well be the readiness 
of either side to blame everything on the 
other, while considering its own stance to 
be pure as the driven snow. 
It was both useful  and unusual there-
fore to listen to as balanced an evaluation 
as  that  submitted  by  Andre  A.  Szasz, 
executive  director  of  the  Netherlands 
Bank.  On  the one  hand,  he  shared the 
European concern that the United States 
tends to look inward in financial and mon-
etary matters and also to ignore the inter-
national repercussions of its internal poli-
cies.  But  at  the  same  time,  he 
acknowledged that there is  considerable 
truth  in  the  American  rejoinder  that 
many of the problems Europe blames on 
the United States are of its own making. 
"Criticism  of  the  United  States,"  he 
said, ''thoughjustified in several respects, 
should  not  ignore  those  elements  that 
were beneficial.  Nor should those Euro-
peans  who  justly  reproach  the  United 
States for  its  reluctance  to  coordinate 
policies forget that the negative effects of 
In  previous  years,  of  course,  it  was 
trade questions which dominated the pro-
ceedings on such occasions and this was 
quite  normal for  a seminar on  relations 
between the world's two leading trading 
units.  They  have  not  disappeared,  of 
course, nor have they become less signifi-
cant. Generally speaking, each side is as 
vocal  as  ever in  accusing  the  other of 
Left to right at the seminar are Claude Villain, director-general of the E.C. Commission's agri-
culture division; Axel Krause, economic correspondent for the International Herald Tribune 
and moderator of the conference; and Richard Lyng, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Agriculture. 
16  EUROPE that reluctance would harm us less if only 
we ourselves would be prepared for more 
coordination among  ourselves." And  he 
added  that  "Europe  would  be  in  a  far 
more advantageous position in the mone-
tary  sphere  if  it  succeeded  in  moving 
toward  a  more solid  bloc  with  credible 
and sustainable exchange rates." 
In yet another realm, where the E.C.-
U.S.  conflict situation may well be heat-
ing  up,  part  of  the  difficulties  can  be 
described  as  "made  in  Europe."  E.C. 
Commission  Vice-President  Etienne 
Davignon,  who  is  responsible for  indus-
trial  policy,  conceded  that the E.C.  do-
mestic market still  is  not working  ade-
quately, that this deficiency costs the E. C. 
between 1.5 and 2.0 percent of its com-
bined GNP,  and  that,  had  the E.C.  man-
aged to maintain the same market shares 
for "new" products as it had had for "old" 
ones, it would now have between 6 mil-
lion  and  7 million  more job slots than it 
has. 
Europeans, Davignon said, may be un-
beatable  at working  out  alibis  for  why 
they cannot do this or that, but there can 
be  no  doubt  at all  about  their concern 
over a technological lag behind both the 
United States and Japan.  Were their ef-
forts to catch up blocked or hampered by 
U.S. legal or other restrictions, the ensu-
ing battle over the transfer of technology 
might make the current confrontation on 
agriculture look "like chickenfeed." 
The inference of so dire a prediction 
was naturally that the United States must 
not resort to a  new,  but no  less  perni-
cious, type of protectionism. Taken on its 
own merits, such a warning was perfectly 
sound. Americans, however, might be ex-
cused for  feeling  similarly apprehensive 
about a matching form of emerging E.C. 
protectionism, especially after reading an 
article by Louis Mexandeau, French Min-
ister of Posts  and  Telecommunications, 
which appeared in Le Monde several days 
before the Knokke meeting and pleaded 
for  a  (tightly fenced  in)  European tele-
communications policy. 
Conceivably, as evolved in  the discus-
sion, these matters are and might stay a 
shade academic. For better or worse, in 
the absence of clearly circumscribed E. C. 
policies, the leading European companies 
in  the  fields  of  new  technologies  have 
often preferred to fashion close coopera.., 
tion links with individual U.S. or Japanese 
firms.  That they should opt for  this ap-
proach  may  not  be  a question solely of 
bigger or lesser profits,  but literally of 
survival. Presumably they just cannot af-
ford to remain inactive and resign them-
selves to waiting until E.C. Governments 
have  managed to create the infrastruc-
ture of  truly European  policies. 
All this, though, ties up very definitely 
with another kind of trouble besetting the 
transatlantic relationship which, while not 
new either, appears to have become much 
more  formidable  of  late.  It is  that, 
whether in the industrial-policy realm or 
that more particularly of defense and se-
curity  matters,  Western  Europe  still 
seems to be groping for a role of its own. 
It was surely no  coincidence that in  the 
Knokke  debate,  which  basically  should 
have been limited to economic topics, the 
problem  of  the  "European  pillar"  sur-
faced again and again. The unmistakable 
implication  was  that,  as  judged  by  the 
Europeans, this facet  and the part they 
are  expected  to  play  in  the  defense 
sphere were bound up closely with their 
economic posture. 
In private conversation a senior Com-
mission official came up  with the follow-
ing  intriguing,  if  admittedly highly  sim-
plistic, formulation: "The Americans," he 
said,  "want us to spend more money on 
our common defense. This we cannot do 
because we do not have the money. Why 
do  we not have the money?  Because all 
our  funds  are  moving  to  the  United 
States.  Why  do  they  do  that?  Because 
they are attracted by  the high  interest 
rates there. Why are those rates so high? 
·Because of the huge U.S. budget deficit. 
Why is that deficit so enormous? Because 
the U.S. is spending so much on defense." 
But if this cartoon-like "vicious circle" 
corroborates the link of defense and eco-
nomic aspects, it also points to the uneasi-
ness  of  many  Europeans,  voiced  quite 
unambiguously  at the seminar,  as  they 
realize more and more that: 1/  · In many 
ways, they are still not an adequate part-
ner for the United States-the syndrome 
of, if an American leader wishes to talk to 
Europe, to whom can and does he talk?-
and 2/the E.C. has far to go still before it 
becomes  a  real  economic  community. 
That certainly  was  the trenchant  sum-
ming up  by Lord Soames, himself a for-
mer Commission Vice-President, and no 
one contradicted him. Taking as an exam-
ple  the recent truckers'  strike he said: 
"We have not succeeded in superimpos-
ing a European interest on our national 
ones,"  a  state of  affairs  which  had  not 
been  anticipated  "by  our  founding  fa-
thers." 
Precisely  because  they  are  unhappy 
about their own performance, the Euro-
peans in Knokke were worried also about 
possible  new  directions  in  U.S.  policy. 
They were  asking  themselves  whether 
the "European option" which plainly pre-
vailed in Washington during the post-war 
decades  was  still  in  force  and  whether 
Americans, disappointed as they must be 
in several respects about the E.C.'s less-
than-perfect showing, continued to have a 
long-term interest in  backing  European 
integration. Talk about a "Pacific tilt" in 
American  policy,  soothing  noises  from 
some U.S. speakers to the contrary not-
withstanding, clearly remained distinctly 
on  their minds,  as  did  uneasy thoughts 
about what this might mean for Europe's 
future. 
Partly  in  this  context  George  Vest, 
U.S. Ambassador to the E. C.  and one of 
the seminar's two hosts, put his finger on 
the two major threats currently confront-
ing the transatlantic relationship.  There 
was  first  the  "generational  gap."  No 
longer were the key persons in charge in 
either the United States or the E.C. the 
same as those in  the  1950s and  1960s 
whose motivations, aims, and conduct of 
policy  had  been  determined  largely  by 
what  had  happened  before,  during,  and 
after  World  War  II.  Inevitably  for  the 
people now deciding policy, the priorities 
had changed. 
Second,  the  relationship  had  under-
gone  many  individual  crises  since  the 
E.C.'s  coming  into  being  even  so,  and 
usually had managed to handle them quite 
satisfactorily. What was making things so 
much  more  difficult  right  now,  and 
amounted  in  fact  to  an  unprecedented 
challenge,  was  the convergence  at one 
and  the  same  time  of  so  many  acute 
problems,  some  of  which  against  the 
background of the Western world's grav-
est and most prolonged economic crisis 
since the Depression. 
Diplomats,  though,  would  hardly  do 
honor to their profession were they to let 
this kind of conference wind up on a near 
cataclysmic note. Not surprisingly there-
fore co-host Sir Roy Denman, head of the 
E.C.  Delegation in  Washington,  made a 
valiant and at the same time lighthearted 
effort in his final address to explain away 
some  of  the  problems  Europeans  and 
Americans have with one another and to 
prove  that they are not inevitably  con-
demned to find  themselves on a collision 
course. 
Previously, and in a similar vein,  Am-
bassador Vest,  while  conceding  that to-
day's problems are horrendous, that they 
may well  continue  indefinitely,  and  that 
there exists "no quick fix for our differ-
ences," had insisted on "the innate resil-
ience  of  the  transatlantic  relationship." 
Maybe  so.  One  hopes  this is  right,  but 
would not wish to take it for granted. Or, 
looking at the scene dispassionately and 
realistically,  things may well  get worse, 
even if not necessarily out of hand, before 
they get better. E 
H.  Peter  Dreyer  reports  from  Brussels  for  the 
journal of Commerce. 
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IS A CONFRONTATION 
OVER  CREDIT  NEXT? 
EUROPEANS  UPSET  AS  U.S.  EXPORT-
IMPORT  BANK  GETS  NEW LEASE  ON  LIFE 
FROM  REAGAN  ADMINISTRATION. 
BAILEY MORRIS 
T
his year, the U.S.  Export-Import 
Bank celebrated its 50th birthday 
with  pomp  and  fanfare  befitting 
an  institution  which  has  only  narrowly 
escaped  a  premature death.  just three 
years  ago,  the  bank  appeared  doomed, 
caught as  it were in  the web  of  David 
Stockman's  budget  cuts  and  the  free-
market  philosophy  inherent  in  Reagan-
omics. "We are not going to subsidize our 
way  into  export  expansion.  For  us  to 
increase support for export credit means 
we  must  take  the  money  from  some-
where  else  in  the  budget,"  said  Stock-
man,  head of the Office  of Management 
and Budget, in 1981. 
Now,  however, the EXIM Bank has be-
come a favorite of all three of the leading 
Presidential candidates in a development 
which  could  herald not  only  a  dramatic 
new chapter in  U.S.  trade development, 
but also a serious new trade confrontation 
with Europe. Walter Mondale is  on rec-
ord in  support of what could  become a 
vastly  expensive  credit-subsidy war.  As 
part of his industrial program to revitalize 
U.S. industries, he has vowed to match or 
better the subsidized credit packages of-
fered by foreign governments. President 
Ronald  Reagan, while  continuing to de-
nounce the use of credit subsidies to gain 
new  export  business,  nonetheless  has 
supported his  Administration's  proposal 
to  "counter foreign  mixed  credits with 
subsidies of our own." Even Gary Hart, . 
an  avowed  anti-protectionist  who  de-
nounces the use of subsidies, foresees an 
important role for the EXIM Bank as part 
of his industrial strategy. 
It all adds up to a new lease on life for 
an institution founded, ironically, to facili-
tate trade with the Soviet Union following 
the  U.S.  decision  to recognize  formally 
the new U.S.S.R. in late 1933. "We have 
a budget this year which is potentially as 
big  as  any  year we've ever had  at the 
EXIM Bank", says William  H.  Draper III, 
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the bank's president.  Why  the dramatic 
about-tum? 
The answer from  official  Washington 
was "job creation." At a time when U.S. 
unemployment was still high-in the 7-
percent range nationally and even higher 
in  depressed,  older  industries  such  as 
steel-the idea  of  boosting  exports  to 
create jobs was not only politically conve-
nient,  but philosophically appealing.  But 
at closer glance, it appeared that a series 
of  related  developments  linked  to  the 
recession, the worsening debt crisis, the 
high-flying  dollar,  and  the  dismal  U.S. 
trade performance, were the real reasons 
for the sudden spurt of interest. 
In  addition,  and  again  ironically,  just 
two  months  after  taking  office  in  july, 
1981, Draper and  Marc Leland,  former 
Assistant Treasury Secretary for Interna-
tional Affairs, attacked the problem caus-
ing the EXIM  Bank's unpopularity within 
the  Administration:  the  credit  -subsidy 
war.  The  price  war  over  export  -credit 
subsidies which erupted in 1980 was ex-
hausting the treasuries of industrial na-
tions by an estimated $10 billion a year. 
Draper and Leland sensed that the time 
was right to negotiate a truce. "Nobody 
could afford it and nobody liked it," Dra-
per said. "It was a matter of breaking the 
momentum  of  ignoring  commercial 
rates." 
First, however, a cease-fire had to be 
effected. This was accomplished, Draper 
said,  through a two-stage series of  ma-
neuvers resulting  in  agreements in  the 
Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and Development and with the European 
Community.  The United States and  the 
E.C. agreed to accommodate changes in 
the market place with a "fluctuating pro-
gram" which would vary with commercial 
rates.  There was  still  some  subsidy in-
volved in the new spread, but very little. 
For  the  moment,  the  credit  spiral  had 
been broken. 
This  didn't  mean,  of  course,  that  in 
terms of its balance sheet the EXIM Bank 
was in  the clear. Although rates on new 
loans were now close to borrowing costs, 
the weighted average on EXIM loans out-
standing was 8.12 percent while the cost 
of borrowing from the U.S. Treasury av-
eraged 11.33 percent. The losses result-
ing from  this spread amounted to $240 
million  in  fiscal  1982,  $160  million  in 
fiscal 1983, and are expected to continue 
through  fiscal  1985.  But  Draper  could 
show a clear trend of  narrowing losses 
and reduced subsidies. In the process, he 
removed the most convincing argument 
critics of the EXIM Bank had used against 
it and he gained the personal support of 
the President. 
This  was  made  clear  in  the  Reagan 
Administration's new 1985 budget which 
granted the  EXIM  Bank  $3.83  billion  in 
direct  loan  authority and  $10  billion  in 
loan-guarantee  commitments.  In  addi-
tion, President Reagan promised to pro-
vide up to $6.5 billion in additional fund-
ing  if  "extraordinary  circumstances" 
warranted it. The EXIM Bank was not only 
alive but kicking. Another important rea-
son for its renewed vigor was related to 
the  turbulent  international  events  of 
1982 and 1983 when the Reagan Admin-
istration  and  European  Governments 
were working to hold together a financial 
system dangerously close to collapse. 
In  cobbling  together rescue packages 
of $10 billion for Mexico in 1982 and $11 
billion for Brazil in 1983, the Administra-
tion-in particular  R.T.  "Tim"  McNa-
mar,  Deputy  Treasury  Secretary-
realized  it  had  a  secret weapon  in  the 
EXIMBank. McNamar used $1.5 billion in 
EXIM  guarantees as the catalyst to per-
suade reluctant commercial banks to put 
up the extra funds needed to secure $6.5 
billion  of the $11 billion  for  Brazil.  The 
EXIMBank played a similar, albeit smaller, 
role in  Mexico where it remains active, 
having created a new $500-million insur-
ance and  guarantee program.  Suddenly, 
the EXIM Bank had a new role to play as an 
important catalyst in  solidifying interna-tional rescue  packages.
The shift in emphasis over the Past
three years and the global conditions
which brought it about were reflected,
however, in the Bxttu Bank's results. The
effect was a dramatic  shift in the mix of
program activity. In 1981, direct EXIM
loans represented 42 percent, of the
bank's authorization guarantees  and in-
surance, 58 percent. By 1982,loans were
down to 38 percent and guarantees and
insurance were up to 62 percent. Last
year, loans accounted  for only 9 percent
and guarantees  and insurance  had surged
to 91 percent. The Bxttvt Bank was being
used to fill a void created by the increas-
ing reluctance of commercial  lenders to
assume the risk of international transac-
tions. It is expected to continue  playing
this role for the foreseeable  future as the
United States, shackled with a huge trade
deficit projected at $100 billion in 1984,
increasingly  looks abroad for new mar-
kets.
Inevitably, the new focus on risk has
made ExIM operations  riskier and given
new ammunition to the bank's critics.
Last year, it had to create two special
task forces to sift through  a record num-
ber of claims under its guarantee and
insurance programs.  Draper, responding
to the concern, said the focus should be
not on amounts outstanding,  but on the
Bxlu Bank's record of recoveries. The
policy guiding the bank's operations
would continue to be that "resource-rich
countries have long-term  credit-worthi-
ness," he said.
In Europe, this message caused raised
eyebrows among trade veterans inti-
mately familiai with the ins and outs of
financing exports. An official of the Euro-
pean Community said that at the same
time the rxnu Bank was publicly decrying
the use of subsidies, it appeared to be
engaging  in what amounted to a different
form of subsidy. "A guarantee you don't
get back is a subsidy. In the case of Branl,
it is clear that they either won't pay back
or they will at such easy terms, it may as
well be a subsidy," the E.C. official said.
This outbreak  of antagonism, after an
encouraging period of relative calm, sets
the stage for a new U.S.-European  con-
frontation  over subsidies when the two
sides meet for the next round of export
negotiations-this  time .on the sensitive
issue of mixed credits. In addition, the
Reagan Administration  said this time it
intended to force all players to the table
by fighting fire with fire as it had been
directed to do by the Trade and Develop
ment Enhancement  Act of 1983. This
was another first for the rxnu Bank. Un-
der sections 644 and 645 of the new
legislation, it was directed by Congress to
join with the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development in "establishing  a
program of mixed credits competitive
with those of other exporting nations."
On the one hand, fhe Bxnra Bank said its
goal was to eliminate such credits. On the
other, it was obligated  by statute to de-
velop a competitive  program.  Draper's
response  was to try and straddle the two
opposing positions by saying the nxn,t
Bank would never initiate its own mixed
aid package.  Instead, it would attempt to
"neutralize" the market by responding
aggressively to the initiatives of other
countries. John D. Lange, Deputy Assis-
tant Treasury Secretary, was more spe-
cific on the Administration's  approach.
He said the Administration  would adopt a
program  of extended repayment  and ex-
tensive grace periods on loans. Thus the
stage has been set for another round of
credit wars. C
Bailey Morris writes from Washington D.C. for The
Times of London
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hat is the psychological  cli-
mate surrounding  the Atlan-
tic partnership  today? The
answer, you discover,  is frequently  based
on the opinions held by a small number of
highly influential  people. And their views
deserve attention. But opinion leaders
also have an understandable  tendency to
draw conclusions about the state of U.S.-
European relations based not only on
their "objective"  reading of the diplo-
matic, economic,  and political trends, but
also on unique personal experiences,
which may in turn lead to some question-
able conclusions.
We need, then, to develop a broader,
more objective, perspective on the Atlan-
tic partnership,  one which makes it possi-
ble for us to compare  the views of opinion
leaders with broader segments of mass
public opinion. Fortunately, a number of
survey organizations  have been gathering
such data in both the United States and
Western Europe for a number of years
now. In summary form, this is what they
seem to be telling us about that partner-
ship.
Despite strains, the U.S.-European se-
curity partnership  remains intact. Really?
What about all the threatening  noises that
we have been hearing from influential
spokesmen about the serious deteriora-
tion in U.S.-European security ties? In a
recent Newsweek  article ("The Decline
Of Europe," April 9, 1984), for example,
former U.S. Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger sharply criticized the Europe-
ans for engaging in neutralist practices,
even while Helmut Schmidt,  former
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of
Germany, was no less insistent  in articu-
lating his impatience with the alleged
absence of a "grand design" in U.S. pol-
icy toward Europe.
There is little question, of course, that
U.S.-European  security relations are a bit
strained these days. Which is not the
same thing as saying that the Atlantic
alliance is about to dissolve. Indeed, de-
spite those strains, the trans-Atlantic
partnership remains intact. At least this is
the view of the United States Information
tf.s..E.c. RELATIONS/PUBLIC  OPINION
20  EUROPEAgency  (USIA)  which  has  been covering 
the subject for years now. 
USIA  surveys are specifically designed 
to measure European opinions on a vari-
ety  of  important  foreign  and  security-
policy issues. And those surveys supply a 
helpful corrective to the fashionable, and 
largely  inaccurate,  American  view  that 
the  Continental  allies  are  embracing 
neutralism.  Commenting on  one agency 
study of European public opinion on key 
security issues (1981-1982), analyst Ste-
phen  M.  Shaffer  maintains  that despite 
trans-Atlantic strains, "NATO continued to 
be widely perceived as the cornerstone of 
Western security." It still is. 
Those USIA surveys also confirm, how-
ever,  some  of  the  underlying  anxieties 
which burden those security relations in 
the 1980s. Europeans, for  instance, are 
generally at odds with those U.S. policies 
which seem to be at variance with East-
West detente. In Shaffer's words: "East-
West negotiations were widely desired by 
West  Europeans  [in  1981-1982]  to  en-
hance  their  security,  despite  wide  mis-
trust  of  Soviet  motives  and  a  general 
belief that arms talks will  not succeed." 
In  other  instances,  USIA  analysts  have 
uncovered longer-term trends (reaching 
back into the early 1960s) which reflect 
ambiguities in  traditional U.S.-European 
security  arrangements-notably,  the 
overwhelming opposition, by as much as 
3 out of every 4 respondents in one 1982 
poll, of Europeans to the NATO doctrine of 
flexible response which envisions the use 
of  tactical  nuclear  weapons  to  blunt  a 
Soviet attack on Western Europa. In sum, 
while European opinion remains strongly 
supportive  of  the  NATO  commitment,  it 
reserves the right to be selectively criti-
cal of various U.S.  doctrines and overall 
alliance practices. 
On the American side, opinion surveys 
over the years consistently reflect strong 
mass support for the trans-Atlantic part-
nership. A Roper poll in November 1983, 
for instance, discovered a two-to-one ma-
jority in favor of employing U.S. troops if 
Soviet  forces  invaded  Western  Europe. 
More broadly,  there appears to  be  sub-
stantial  public  support  for  maintaining 
America's military commitment to NATO, 
with 67 percent of the general public and 
86  percent of  the  elite  public  favoring 
such  a  posture,  according  to  a  Gallop 
survey taken in late 1982. 
Not  surprisingly,  however,  these sur-
veys  of  American  opinion  also  reflect 
varying degrees of tension in the partner-
ship. A case in point is a late 1982 Louis 
Harris  poll  which,  among  other things, 
reflected  a  strong  U.S.  belief  that  the 
American public is dissatisfied with West-
ern Europe's contribution to Western se-
curity. Fully 68 percent of the American 
sample agreed that America's allies are 
not taking on enough of the burden, ver-
sus  28  percent of  the  European  public 
who agreed with that view. As with Euro-
pean poll findings, however, some Ameri-
can  dissatisfaction  with  European  secu-
rity  approaches  should  not  lead  to  the 
false  conclusion  that  support  for  trans-
Atlantic security arrangements is eroding 
in the United States. It isn't. 
There are,  however,  major  economic 
differences. While  Americans and  Euro-
peans  appear  to  have  maintained  their 
security  consensus,  there  are  growing 
indications  that  economic  issues  could 
seriously divide the alliance. Proof is sup-
plied by  a three-part survey of Western 
opinion performed by Louis Harris for the 
Atlantic  Institute and the International 
Herald  Tribune  between  September 
1982 and October 1983. For these pur-
poses, the last two surveys (performed in 
the  spring  and  fall  of  last  year)  of  9 
Western countries (Britain, France, Italy, 
japan, Netherlands,  Norway,  Spain,  the 
United States, and the Federal Republic 
of Germany) will concern us. 
These surveys did not examine-with 
one significant exception-Western atti-
tudes toward international economic co-
operation, or its absence.  But in  impor-
tant ways, the Harris polls do shed light 
on  relevant differences which  appear to 
separate the United States from its West 
European allies.  One of the most signifi-
cant findings in this regard was the diver-
gence in U.S. and European attitudes on 
unemployment. To the question, "Which 
of  the following  are your greatest con-
cerns for  yourself and for  your country 
today?" residents of the European Com-
munity  members  of  the  sample  (the 
United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Neth-
erlands, and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many) answered that unemployment was 
their greatest concern, with 71  percent 
saying so in the spring of 1983, versus 70 
percent in  the fall.  Comparable U.S.  re-
sponses were 52 percent and 46 percent. 
The Harris survey also provides some 
confirmation of  European dissatisfaction 
with certain U.S.  economic policies.  On 
interest rates and the role of the dollar, 
for  instance,  E.C.  respondents  voiced 
varying degrees of concern-running the 
gamut  from  46  percent  of  the  French 
sample, to 6 percent of the British sample 
when  they  were  queried  in  the  fall  of 
1983. Italy and  the Federal Republic of 
Germany  found  themselves  somewhere 
between, with one out of every four re-
spondents in  those countries registering 
the opinion  that U.S.  interest rates and 
the dollar were responsible for  interna-
tional tension. 
Clearly one  of the most significant-
and  disturbing-results of the fall  1983 
Harris survey were the comparative find-
ings  on  attitudes  toward  international 
trade.  Excluding  Norwegian,  japanese, 
and Spanish responses, here are the ques-
tion and accompaning answers to the fol-
lowing: 
Question:  Many  people  believe  that, 
even if free trade brings important bene-
fits,  imports must be  restricted in  your 
country  because  jobs  are  being  lost  to 
foreign competition. Do you ... 
Agree with this position because un-
employment  is  the  most  critical  short-
term problem for your country? 
U.K.  53 percent 
France  48 percent 
Italy  53 percent 
F.R.G.  39 percent 
U.S.  63 percent 
Netherlands  29 percent 
Disagree because retaliation by other 
countries  would  reduce  your  country's 
exports  and  thus  aggravate  unemploy-
ment in your country: 
U.K.  36 percent 
France  40 percent 
Italy  21  percent 
F.R.G.  27 percent 
U.S.  31 percent 
Netherlands  4 7 percent 
The  above  findings  reflect  a  signifi-
cantly larger U.S. propensity to resort to 
trade-restrictive actions under conditions 
where unemployment is  seen to  be the 
result of imports.  For the moment,  de-
clining  unemployment  in  the  United' 
States should dampen popular support for 
such restrictive measures.  In  the event 
joblessness  increases  in  the  United 
States, however, the Harris poll suggests 
that pressures to adopt those restrictive 
practices might  be  very  strong indeed. 
And  that's  hardly  an  encouraging  eco-
nomic message for the Europeans. 
So  what  are we  to  make  of  this  in-
formation? Clearly the data suggest there 
is a full,  and complex,  agenda ahead for 
Americans  and  Europeans-notably  in 
the  economic  field.  In  this  sense,  the 
experts  are justified  in  their  worrying. 
"There is obvious and evident frustration 
and  impatience"  in  the  trans-Atlantic 
partnership, in the words of Georgetown 
University's Robert]. Lieber. Neverthe-
less, the underlying elements of strength 
in  the partnership-notably in  the vital 
security arena-should not be underesti-
mated. For all of the problems facing the 
U.S. and Europe, the foundation of politi-
cal  consensus  remains  strong and  very 
much intact. E 
john Starrels is a freelance writer based in Washing-
ton, D.C. 
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LABOR RELATIONS IN
EUROPE AND THE U.S.
AS DIFFERENCES NARROW, THE TWO
CONTINENTS HAVE MUCH TO LEARN
FROM EACH OTHER.
DAVID CLUTTERBUCK
I  t'r been said with a large measure of
I  truth that hardly anyone in Europe
I  understands  industrial relations in the
United States and that no one at all in
America understands  European  industrial
relations. The truth is that industrial-
relations structure is very closely tied to
culture-hence  in Europe every country
has developed  its own forms of relation-
ships between employees, employers,
and trade unions and they are all differ-
ent.
The size of the cultural gap between
European countries and the United
States is also revealed by the radical
differences  in approach to industrial  rela-
tions. However, it is increasingly  notice-
able that those differences  are narrowing,
as Europe and the United States learn
from each other. The industrial  problems
the two continents now face are increas-
ingly similar, and the solutions often have
much in common.
One major common feature on both
sides of the Atlantic is that the trade
unions are passing through a rough pe-
riod, perhaps even a decline. In the
United States, the aftermath of the air
traffic controllers' dispute in the early
days of the Reagan Administration,  the
movement of industrial  investment  to the
less unionized southern states, and the
overall economic  trend toward small
plants which often cost more to organize
than can be justified from the expected
dues, are all weakening union power. Un-
employment in Europe, currently running
at Il.2 percent, has also strengthened
management's hand even in countries
with Socialist Governments such as
France and Spain.
In the United Kingdom, a series of
tough stands in both private and public
industry, by companies  such as Allied
Breweries, British Leyland, and British
Steel effectively has broken much of the
unions' muscle. The Conservative  Gov-
ernment has also introduced a range of
legislation designed to curb union power,
including measures to break the "closed
shop" agreements condemned  by the Eu-
ropean courts. These agreements re-
stricted employment  in a plant to mem-
bers of a particular union.
Other measures by the British Govern-
ment include banning secondary picket-
ing (where unions not involved  in a dis-
pute would bring their members  out in
sympathy) and restricting  the number of
pickets at each site to six people. These
laws in particular  have led to an angry
trade-union reaction, and open defiance in
the case of the miners' dispute which
began in March this year. Miners' "flying
pickets" have been met by an unprece-
dented mobilization  of police. In at least
one case, employers have made use of the
removal of trade-union immunity from
prosecution to claim damages for illegal
strike action and union funds have been
sequestered  by the courts.
The British unions did manage to stave
off Government  attempts to legislate for
secret balloting, by agreeing to try to
keep their own house in order. But the
threat of Government intervention re-
mains and there seems little doubt that,
for the time being, trade-union power in
Britain is on the wane.
Both European and U.S. trade unions
have failed to capitalize on the growing
percentage of women in the labor force.
The indBtriel-r€l.tion  prcbl.m3.ncountered in thc Unit d St to3.nd Europc.rc  incr€rslngly .imil.r .nd therc.r. oftcn l6.on. to bc
lc.rned from cornp.tinS th. two. Shown ho|r .rG tro comp.nler th.l rec.ntly wore hlt with rtrike.: 6G Gr.yhound bu. comp.ny in thc
United State5 .nd T.lbot in F .nc..In the United States, this has led to new 
female-dominated unions in open opposi-
tion  to  the  male-dominated  traditional 
organizations.  In  Europe,  the  struggles 
are still going on within the formal trade-
union  movement,  but  with  little  real 
progress. Attempts to introduce job-shar-
ing  in  Britain  and  "flexi-years"  in  the 
Federal Republic of Germany have been 
blocked  or  sidetracked  by  male-domi-
nated union executives with other prior-
ities. "We are not interested in part-time 
jobs for women until we have found work 
for all the unemployed men," some union 
officials have stated. 
Another large section of the commu-
nity,  amounting in some European coun-
tries to 20 percent of the labor force,  is 
part-time workers. In  Holland,  the part-
timers at the post office  became so  in-
censed  at  second-rate  treatment  that 
they formed  their own  union,  picketed, 
demonstrated and forced both the official 
union and the Government to acceed to 
most of their demands. 
Another new twist to European indus-
trial relations has been the sight of man-
agers and executive in  protest marches. 
In  the Federal Republic  of  Germany,  it 
has been to protest at union demands for 
a 35-hour week;  in  Sweden, one  of the 
few  countries  in  Europe  where  trade-
union  influence  has  not  been noticeably 
curtailed,  100,000  people,  including 
many of the country's top industrialists, 
marched  with  the  Swedish  Employers' 
Federation  to  protest  against  the  pro-
posed  "wage-earner funds,"  which  will 
take  20  percent of  company  profits for 
investment in union-managed funds.  The 
funds, which are expected to accumulate 
$250 million a year, will be used to pur-
chase shares in Swedish companies. The 
Swedish  opposition  parties  have  prom-
ised to abolish  the funds  if they are re-
elected,  but  there is  pressure in  other 
Scandinavian countries to introduce simi-
lar funds. 
German  unions'  demands  for  shorter 
working weeks without loss of pay have 
brought almost all negotiations between 
Government,  industry,  and  unions  to  a 
standstill. Tripartite discussions are a fea-
ture of  industrial relations in  almost  all 
European  countries,  primarily  in  those 
countries where wage bargaining is cen-
tralized.  (But  even the United Kingdom 
conducts tripartite talks on the economy, 
where each side makes its views felt.) In 
Holland,  there are signs that the unions 
have  softened on  the principle  of  main-
taining pay levels while reducing working 
time.  But  there  has  been  little  real 
progres& and there are growing doubts as 
to whether such measures will really cre-
ate substantial numbers of new jobs. 
Most  of  the main  Italian  unions  have 
finally  reached  an  agreement  with  the 
Government to relax the rules controlling 
indexation of wages. The unions accepted 
a  10  percent ceiling on  wage  increases 
against  a  Government  promise  to  take 
measures to restrain higher prices. The 
arguments were bitter and long, and even 
at the end the Communist union refused 
to agree. 
Against  the  background  of  all  this 
strife, it has to be remembered that the 
concept of cooperation between employ-
ees and employers has been a long-stand-
ing feature of many European countries. 
The quality-of-working-life programs and 
employee  participation  now  being  es-
poused so enthusiastically by major U.S. 
companies such as General Motors origi-
nated in  Europe. Involving employees in 
major decisions about the future of their 
workplace goes back 30 years and more 
to  the  immediate  post-World  War  II 
years, where employee council  and em-
ployee director principles first tried in the 
British steel industry were applied whole-
sale  in  large  German  firms.  Industrial 
democracy, as it came to be called, played 
a key role in the German economic mir-
acle  of  the  1960s and  1970s,  and  has 
developed over the years. 
Worker  participation  at  the  ground 
floor,  through  semi-autonomous  work 
groups,  originated  in  Britain,  where  it 
was promptly forgotten and left to a Nor-
wegian, Einar Thorsrud, to develop. His 
experiments  were  quickly  taken  up  by 
Swedish  firms,  most  notably  car-manu-
facturer  Volvo,  and  subsequently 
throughout northern Europe. The recog-
nition that industrial growth and survival 
depend  on  securing  productivity  in-
creases through the cooperation of  em-· 
ployees came late to the United States, to 
a large extent from direct experience in 
European subsidiaries.  New experimen-
tation continues: There are examples of 
plants  where  the  employees  elect  the 
managers  and  plants  where  employees 
rate their managers rather as U.S.  col-
lege  students  rate  their  lecturers.  In 
Sweden,  employee-safety  represen-
tatives have  the legal  authority to stop 
any machine or process which they con-
sider unsafe.  In none of these cases has 
there been significant abuse of the privi-
leges. 
During 1983, Swedish employers and 
unions  went  a  lot  further  in  terms  of 
collaboration with an "agreement on effi-
ciency  and  participation"  under  which 
both parties contract to work together to 
maximize  companies'  efficiency.  In  par-
ticular, this allows for joint union-manage-
ment task forces to tackle personnel, pro-
duction,  or  commercial  problems.  The 
United States still has a long way to go to 
catch  up  with  the  leading  countries  in 
Europe in these areas. Employee partici-
pation  at shop-floor  level  has  too  often 
and too easily been confused with indus-
trial socialism, but the reality is that it is 
an  essential part of  extracting the best 
effort  and  motivation from  people.  The 
likelihood  is  that the  United States will 
pull  ahead  of  some  European  countries 
within the decade. 
Nonetheless, there remain many strik-
ing dissimilarities between the two conti-
nents in industrial relations. In the United 
States,  the  closure  of  an  unprofitable 
plant,  while  unpleasant,  may  be  an  un-
avoidable necessity. In many countries of 
Europe, it may not be possible to close it 
at all, or be so expensive to do so that the 
company is forced to keep it open. France 
may  require an  employer who  closes  a 
plant  in  one  area  to  take  on  an  equal 
number  of  employees  elsewhere.  Italy 
and Holland insist on heavy compensation 
for redundant employees. 
In  the Federal Republic  of  Germany, 
the unions  have  taken an active part in 
training  the  unemployed  for  new  jobs. 
The clerical workers' union, for example, 
runs a series of six-month courses where 
jobless people who lack up-to-date skills 
work  in  a  total  simulation  of  a  modern 
office.  During  the  training  period  they 
sample a range of clerical jobs for a mythi-
cal company. There are now several hun-
dred of these companies, together with a 
simulated tax and Social Security Minis-
try and a simulated bank.  So realistic is 
the  training  that occasional  slip-ups  by 
the  post  office  cause  havoc  in  the  real 
Social Security Ministry. 
Also unfamiliar to the U.S. manager is 
the concept of managerial trade unions, 
which are one of the few sectors gaining 
in  strength  and  influence.  Particularly 
strong in  France, the managerial unions 
are  becoming  increasingly  vocal.  In  at 
least one instance involving a U.S. multi-
national, they forced an investigation by 
parent-company top management and ex-
tracted  an  agreement  for  consultation 
and  information  on  issues  that affected 
them. 
Whether  trade-union  fortunes  on  ei-
ther side of the Atlantic will recover with 
the end of the recession and the expected 
fall  in the number of unemployed people 
is a matter for speculation. But all sides 
are agreed that considerable changes are 
taking place in industrial relations on both 
sides of the Atlantic and  that no  one is 
quite sure where they are leading.E 
David  Clutterbuck,  formerly  managing  editor  of 
International  Management,  writes  on  business 
topics from London. 
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TRADE  FAIRS  OFFER 
BIG  OPPORTUNITIES 
WITH OVER  700  SHOWS A YEAR  IN  THE 
E.C.,  AMERICAN  FIRMS  CAN  FIND  A WIDE 
RANGE  OF  BUYERS  FOR  THEIR  GOODS I 
JAMES DAVID SPELLMAN 
A
t  European  trade  fairs  today, 
businesses gather like cloth mer-
chants  did  a  millenium  ago  to 
tempt, cajole, and dazzle prospective buy-
ers with their goods and services. More 
than 7  00 trade fairs are held each year in 
BELGIUM-Brussels 
5/8-10, 1984  COMPEC (data processing, 
pocket computers, etc.). 
11/4-9, 1984  HORESCA (hotel and 
restaurant kitchen 
equipment). 
DENMARK-Copenhagen 
10/3-10, 1984  KONTOR & DATA '84 
(computers and other 
businesses). 
10/30-11/3, 1984  INTERTOOL '84 (machine and 
industrial tools). 
10/30-11/3, 1984  INDUSTRIKONTAKT '84 
(subcontractors and 
components fair). 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY-
Hannover 
5/20-27, 1984  International Aerospace 
Exhibition. 
Munich 
5/22-26, 1984  IFAT (waste disposal, city 
cleaning, winter road 
repair). 
9/21-26, 1984  IKOFA (food industry). 
11/13-17, 1984  ELECTRONICA (components 
and assembly methods). 
FRANCE 
5/24-28, 1984  International Exhibition of 
Wallpapers, 
Wallcoverings, 
Furnishing Textiles. 
5/24-28, 1984  International Carpet and 
Floor Coverings 
Exhibition. 
24  EUROPE 
the  European  Community,  covering  a 
range of products from marble to security 
systems to road-maintenance equipment. 
Fairs can be classified in two ways: hori-
zontal, meaning those featuring a diverse 
range of products and  services such as 
the  Milan  Fair,  and  vertical,  meaning 
those which specialize in  a particular in-
CALENDAR 
9/1-4, 1984  International Games and 
Toys Exhibition. 
9/19-28, 1984  International Exhibition of 
Data Processing of 
Communication and 
Office Organization. 
10/4-14, 1984  Paris Motor Show. 
11/13-16, 1984  International Exhibition of 
Prevention, Safety, and 
Security. 
GREECE-Athens 
11/1984  MULTI-INDEX (mechanical 
equipment, industrial 
machinery). 
Thessaloniki 
11/22-25, 1984  TEXTILIA (textiles, ready-to-
wear apparel). 
9/9-22, 1984  Thessaloniki International 
Trade Fair (consumer 
goods, industrial 
products). 
IRELAND-Dublin 
4/1985  COMPUTEX '85 (computers). 
ITALY -Bologna 
9/7-10, 1984  MICAM (footwear). 
10/23-28, 1984  SAlE-SUN (building materials, 
equipment). 
11/14-18, 1984  EIMA (agricultural 
machinery). 
Milan 
5/4-7, 1984  MIDO '84 (optics, optometry, 
and opthalmology). 
9/25-30, 1984  SMAU (office furniture and 
equipment). 
dustry,  such  as  computers  or  dental 
equipment. 
European fairs provide American com-
panies with access to a $2.4-trillion mar-
ket which buys roughly $78 billion in U.S. 
goods and services each year. The impor-
tance of fai,rs  to American businesses is 
suggested  by  a  recent  Commerce  De-
partment  survey  showing  that  the  50 
trade shows (one-third were in  Europe) 
which  were  certified  over  the  past  15 
months, brought 17,700 U.S. companies 
representing  49  industries  into  contact 
with  1  million  potential  buyers.  Within 
the  12  months  following  the  Paris  Air 
Show of June last year, the participating 
130 U.S.  companies anticipate $97 mil-
lion in sales as a result of their meetings 
with  about  181,000 business  represen-
tatives.  Systems  '83, a  computer trade 
fair  in  Munich  is  expected  to  bring  in 
$54.7 million worth of business for the 68 
U.S. participants by October, which is one 
LUXEMBOURG 
9/1984  International Autumn Fair 
(consumer products, 
business equipment, 
industrial goods). 
THE NETHERLANDS-Amsterdam 
5/8-12, 1984  FESPA '84 (screen printing). 
5/8-10, 1984  EUROPE SOFTWARE 1984. 
8/31-9/9, 1984  FIRATO '84 (audio-visual 
equipment). 
9/17-21, 1984  AQUATECH '84 (water 
treatment, storage, 
transport). 
10/29-11/2, 1984  FIAREX '84 (industrial 
electronics). 
12/3-6, 1984  COMDEX  EUROPE '84 
(computers). 
UNITED KINGDOM-London 
6/19-22, 1984  International Control and 
Instrumentation 
Exhibition and 
Conference. 
6/25-29, 1984  International Fluid & 
Mechanical Tool 
Exhibition. 
9/4- 12, 1984  International Printing 
Machinery and Allied 
Trades Exhibition. 
9/11-14, 1984  International Dental 
Exhibition. 
10/17-28, 1984  International Motor Show 
and Conference. 
12/11-13, 1984  International Medical 
Electronics Exhibition 
and Conference. ,f,
European
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auto show in Paris are held each year in the Community,  bringing  industries  into contact More than 700 trade fairs, like the annual
with prospective  buyers.
year after the fair was held. find today are:
r The Paris Air Show, perhaps the
most prestigious. The latest in aerospace
technology is demonstrated  with P.T.
Barnum-like  showmanship.
o The Hannover Fair, considered  to be
the world's largest international  indus-
trial show. In 1983, about 6,000 exhibi-
tors were spread throughout  the fair's 29
halls which range in size from one to 20
acres. The number of visitors reached a
record 600,000.
o Cart '85 at Milan for the latest in
stationery  school and art supplies.
o The International  Spring Gift Fair at
Birmingham,  England, attracting  50,000
buyers from 80 countries. More than
2,700 firms participate in what is En-
gland's largest consumer-goods  trade ex-
hibition.
The most difficult  decision a company
confronts is choosing which fair would
best generate sales. A small, highly spe-
cialized fair may offer better opportuni-
ties to sell one's products and services
than the large and famous ones, which
demand costly displays to attract visitors'
attention amid the hundreds of other ex-
hibits. Most embassies and foreign cham-
bers of commerce  in the United States
provide background information on their
fairs. Additional information is available
from the U.S. Commerce Department.
To set up and operate a standard  booth
at a European fair, the typical cost is
between $15,000 and $20,000. That kind
of investment  demands that the potential
exhibitor exhaustively  research the fairs
he plans to join. Exhibition costs, the
t'air's promotional  campaign,  the coun-
try's business regulations, transportation
facilities, and accommodations  are just
some of the areas of research a company
needs to pursue before making  a decision.
Trade show experts advise businesses to
visit the fairs that interest them prior to
their participation.  Potential exhibitors
should question participants  about the
fair's advantages  and disadvantages.
Since location in a fair's hall is critical,
fair's facilities should be evaluated to de-
termine where the optimal points of dis-
play are.
After the fair has been selected, the
company should begin designing its ex-
hibit booth given the fair's rules, electri-
cal sources, floor-load  standards,  and the
fair building's dock capabilities.  Promo-
tional literature-including  catalogs, invi-
tations, advertisements,  and press kits-
should be developed. And arrangements
for ship or air transportation should be
confirmed at least six months prior to the
fair, according to some veterans.
At the fair, there are many cultural
differences which American firms need to
recognize to ensure their exhibit's  suc-
cess, according to a Commerce  Depart-
ment guide entitled "European Trade
Fairs: A Guide for Exporters."  "Most
business visitors to European  fairs ob-
serve a businesslike dress code, are
more formal than Americans,  never use
first names, shake hands at each encoun-
ter, are usually punctual, and always ex-
change business cards. Trade shows in
Europe are very serious events and gim-
micks are frowned  upon. . . . Visitors are
experienced,  professional  buyers and if
they visit an American stand, it is more
often by design than not."
After the fair, the freshman will proba-
bly realize what merchants have been
discovering for centuries:  that European
trade fairs are a timeless and effective
tool for commerce. €
James David Spellman is a free lance writer based in
Washington,  D.C.
"Europe's major shows are usually
held at the same place at the same week
of the month each year," said Ingrid
Bauer, president of Glahe International,
Inc., which assists firms with their trade-
show exhibits. The established clientele
ensures that participants will not have to
risk facing a dearth of visitors, Bauer
continued. Further, the trade show en-
ables a company to assess first-hand their
competition and consumer demand.
It is the Romans who are said to have
introduced fairs to Europe.  The earliest
fairs in Europe were held near abbeys  and
cathedrals  on the feast days of saints.
This religious affiliation is reflected in the
German word for fair rnessen, which is
derived from the Latin word missa,
meaning  mass. Historians  claim that the
earliest recorded trade fair occurred in
710 A.D. at St. Denis near Paris. "To it
came the iron and lead of the Saxons, the
slaves of the northern nations, the jew-
elry and perfumes  of the Jews, the oil,
wine, and fat of Provence and Spain, the
honey and madder of Neustria and Brit-
tany, the merchandise of Egypt and the
East," according to Cornelius Walford in
his 1883 classic, "Fairs: Past and
Present."
Currency improvements,  the emer-
gence of craft guilds, and rapid commer-
cial growth shaped the development  of
trade fairs as Europe emerged from the
feudal age to embrace the Renaissance.
Laws, traditions, and etiquette affecting
sales agreements, payment, and delivery
of goods developed. And the religious link
was severed in the 12th century when the
Vatican issued instructions  forbidding
fairs near churches  and other religious
sites.
Some of the fairs that Americans  can
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SUMMIT SETBACKS
HIDE REAL PROGRESS
DESPITE CURRENT GLOOM AND DOOM,
E.C.'S WORK CONTINUES ON
NUMEROUS FRONTS.
I
seemed
Internal
JOHN WYLES
he European Community's  ability
to confound its friends, comfort
its enemies, and confuse itself has
infinite in the last few years.
division  and crisis has given an
impression  of political inertia and even of
fundamental incompatibility between the
present membership. Little wonder that
E.C. Commission  President  Gaston
Thorn began his term of office with
warnings  of the dire consequences of con-
tinuing failure to grapple with internal
problems  and that as time has gone on he
has hardened up his doomsday predic-
tions for the future.
And yet, there is a real sense in which
the doom and gloom is overdone. French
President Frangois Mitterrand  wisely
pointed out at the end of the Brussels
Summit of E.C. heads of Government  in
March that the Community's  work con-
tinues despite totally abortive meetings
like the one in Athens in December  or
only partially successful  ones such as at
Brussels. Since Athens,  the 10 E.C. mem-
ber states have agreed  on new measures
to clean up the environment,  on a frame-
work for high-technology research co-
operation between European companies,
on new procedures  for dealing with unfair
trading  practices by third countries,  and
they are also making progress toward
removing some of the non-tariff barriers
to trade between E.C. member states.
More important  still, they have now
embarked upon the long-awaited  and
badly needed reform of the E.C.'s Com-
mon Agricultural Policy. Production quo-
tas have been brought in to cut milk
output by 7 percent in the first-ever move
to grapple with the expensive  and absurd
dairy surplus. At the same time, guide-
lines have been adopted which hold out
some prospect of a more disciplined  ap-
proach to the fixing of farm prices in the
future and to curbing overproduction in
Mediterranean  products.
Why, then, is there a tangible sense of
disappointment  and disillusionment  even
though the Community wheel still turns
and carries the Ten toward closer cooper-
ation? Explanations vary, but there are at
least three important elements. The first
is the absence of a sense of purpose and
direction  which carried the Community
through the 1960s and into the first en-
largement of the E.C. 10 years ago.
Whatever the difficulties  of the day, politi-
cians and officials had a stronger  sense 15
years ago of participating  in a great politi-
cal adventure.  This in turn generated  a
drama and excitement  which encouraged
people to think the unthinkable.
The objective of economic and mone-
tary union by 1980-set in 1970 and
reaffirmed  in 1972-seems naive and in-
genuous when set against the progress
actually made. It represented,  neverthe-
less, a political impulse which was lost
through changes of leadership in the
United Kingdom, France,  and the Federal
Despite only partial success at the March European Council  meeting  of heads of Government
(above), work continues  on projects  such as cleaning up the environmeng new procedures for
dealing with unfair trading practices  by third countries, and removal  of some of the non-tariff
barriers to trade between E.C. member states.
EUROPETOWARD ''EURO.REALISM'' 
BERNARD VERNIER-PALLIEZ 
T
here seems to be a general feeling 
in the United States that Europe 
is slowly plodding through a quagmire. 
Progress looked as if it had come to a 
near halt last March in Brussels when 
the  European  Council,  composed  of 
the heads  of  Government and  State, 
failed to reach an agreement on finan-
cial issues facing the E.C. 
But are Europe's prospects really so 
bleak? In fact, the E. C. crisis is neither 
generalized nor irreparable; quite the 
contrary.  It is  not  generalized,  since 
agreement was reached in  March on 
all  issues of the agenda,  except one. 
These  included  the  three  following 
measures: 
•  Of  particular  importance  was  the 
limitation of increases in  Community 
spending, along with corresponding in-
creases in  the Community's financial 
resources over the next two years and 
the elaboration of new policies (such as 
scientific  cooperation,  notably  in  the 
ESPRIT program). 
•  Reforms  in  the  Common  Agricul-
tural Policy (regulation of milk produc-
tion, elimination of Monetary Compen-
satory Amounts). 
•  Enlargement of  the Community to 
include Spain and Portugal as of 1986. 
Since January 1, 1984 when France 
assumed the presidency of the E. C. for 
a six-month period, President Fran~ois 
Mitterrand has shown an unwavering 
determination to see Europe play  an 
even greater role  in  the free  world. 
Republic  of  Germany  and  which  has 
never been recovered since. As a result, a 
petty nationalism has taken over and the 
drama thus created is  based on political 
conflict. The apotheosis is the protracted 
and objectively trivial row over reducing 
Britain's  payments  to  the  E.C.  budget. 
Differences over sums of money amount-
ing to less than one day's farm spending 
in  the Community were allowed  by  the 
heads of Government to obscure impor-
tant progress made on several other is-
sues at the recent Brussels summit. In-
stead of being a summit which could have 
been portrayed as a crucial step forward 
in relaunching the Community, it became, 
instead, another sour advertisement for 
division and disarray. 
The summit was a poor reflection on 
the quality of the Community's current 
political  leadership.  Final  agreement on 
the British  budget  problem  will  be  too 
little too late, and the political impact of 
Our  present  temporary  difficulties 
should not then obscure the many im-
portant technological projects we have 
recently  undertaken  which  illustrate 
that  Europe  is  resolutely  turned  to-
ward the future: a new Airbus (the A 
320)  and  a  nuclear  fusion  research 
laboratory (JET), for example. 
It  is equally important to realize that 
the  current  crisis  can  certainly  be 
overcome.  All  the  European  leaders 
have in fact expressed their desire to 
see the problem of Britain's contribu-
tion  to  the  E.C.  budget  resolved, 
thereby clearing the way for the appli-
cation  of  the  aforementioned  agree-
ments. 
During his state visit to the United 
States in March, President Mitterrand 
stressed  the  French,  and  European, 
desire to have even freer commercial 
relations with the United States, and 
to  fight  against  protectionism,  espe-
cially  in  agricultural  exchanges.  As 
America's leading agricultural trading 
partner  and  as  the  world's  largest 
commercial  group,  Europe,  with  its 
270 million people and long tradition of 
ties to the Third World, can only favor 
increased trade and economic cooper-
ation. Indeed, Europe, due to its very 
structure and own self interest, can ill 
afford to be protectionist. 
Europe has to work its way out of its 
quagmire. To  assert this is  not to be 
overly "Euro-optimistic"; it is, simply, 
"Euro-realism." 
Bernard Vernier-Palliez is the French Ambassa-
dor to the United States. 
the  related  agricultural  and  budgetary 
reforms  and  the  setting  of  new  policy 
priorities  has  undoubtedly  been  weak-
ened. 
This is a great pity because there are 
signs from Paris, Bonn, and even London 
that Governments do  want to mold  the 
Community into a more effective vehicle 
for  addressing the crucial economic and 
political problems of the day.  There is a 
greater agreement than there was  five 
years ago  on  the need to complete  the 
Community's internal market by disman-
tling its non-tariff barriers to trade. The 
10 E.C. member states are searching in a 
way  they have  not searched before for 
forms  of  industrial  collaboration  which 
will  close  the  technology  gap  between 
Europe and the United States and Japan. 
They are giving a much higher priority to 
creating the conditions in which small and 
medium-sized entrepreneurs can restore 
vitality  to an  ailing  economy.  They are 
looking more closely than ever before at 
the United States and Japan for  lessons 
which can be applied on this front. 
At the same time, Britain's Prime Min-
ister Margaret Thatcher, France's Presi-
dent  Fran~ois Mitterrand,  and  Germa-
ny's  Chancellor  Helmut  Kohl  are 
increasingly interested in  strengthening 
the  Community's  political  coherence. 
Much of their incentive comes from the 
increasing difficulties of containing politi-
cal  and  economic  disputes  with  the 
United States. Their concern is  to pre-
vent a further deterioration in the Atlan-
tic  alliance  which  has already helped to 
create the so-called peace movement in 
Europe and fears of incipient neutralism 
in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
For the first time in many years, Euro-
pean capitals are again thinking in terms 
of a "European pillar" within the alliance. 
France and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many have already taken the initiative to 
use  the  moribund  Western  European 
Union (WEU)  as a forum for security dis-
cussions and, even if this exercise comes 
to nothing, the search for a clearer Euro-
pean identity on security issues is unlikely 
to be dropped. 
It is significant, however, that the ini-
tiative  within  the  WEU  represents  the 
abandonment for  the time  being of the 
attempt to develop  security discussions 
within  the  E.C.'s  political  cooperation. 
Opposition  from  Ireland (because  of  its 
neutrality),  Greece,  and  Denmark  has 
proved  too  much  of  an  obstacle.  The 
danger for  the  Community,  particularly 
after enlargement to include  Spain  and 
Portugal,  is  that  it  will  be  even  more 
politically and economically unwieldy and 
even less capable of significant develop-
ment. 
The Ten have barely begun to come to 
terms  with  the  implications  of  this.  A 
more determined use of majority voting 
in the Council of Ministers looks likely to 
be one response. Another ought to be an 
agreement to reduce the composition of 
the Commission so that there will be one 
nominee per member state, instead of a 
total of 17 commissioners which could be 
the case after Spain and Portugal join. 
The risk that a Community of 12 could 
be even more politically incoherent and 
divided than one of 10 is clearly seen in 
most capitals. Many are now flirting with 
the idea of "variable geometry" in which 
not all member states participate in new 
common policies.  This could be the for-
mula  either for  stronger growth or fur-
ther political decline. But the Community 
is a great political adventure and there is 
life in the young dog yet. E 
John Wyles reports from Brussels for the Financial 
Times of London. 
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TOWARD A NEW
KI ND OF COMMUNITY
ESPRIT PROGRAM ON INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY  REPRESENTS EUROPE-
WIDE INDUSTRIAL POLICY.
MICHEL CARPENTIER
he European Community  is more
correctly called the European
Communities. The European  Coal
and Steel Community  (Bcsc), founded in
the shadow of the war, was followed by
the atomic energy community,  Euratom,
and the European Economic Community,
the nnc. Now a new form of community is
being created in response to the chal-
lenges facing European  society in the age
of information.
Having led the l9th-century industrial
revolution, Europe  has lagged behind in
the industrial application of many 20th-
century technologies since the post-war
reconstruction  period. The newly indus-
triahzng  countries are increasingly  tak-
ing over traditional industries.  For such
industries as steel, textiles and shipbuild-
ing, the process of change has already
begun within a Community framework. It
is above all in the new sectors,  such as
information  technology and biotechnol-
ogy, that the Community must safeguard
its independence in preparing for the 21st
century.
Of the new technologies,  information
technology  is currently of the greatest
importance for modern industrial  compe-
titivity and as a source of new activities.
The Community's urgent need to keep up
with its competitors  in this area has per-
suaded govemments  and major informa-
tion-technology  companies  to embark on
an unprecedented venture in interna-
tional cooperation. This is Bspnrr-the
European  Strategic  Program for Re-
search and Development  in Information
Technology.
New information  technology will be
one of the dominant  sources of techno-
logical advance until the end of the cen-
tury and information technology will al-
ready be one of the world's largest
manufacturing  sectors by 1990. The
world information technology  market is
projected to grow to around $0SO billion
in 1992, at an annual growth rate of over
8 percent. Information-technology  is not
only a major industry in its own right but
also conditions the productivity  of other
industries.  About 6 percent of the Com-
munity's cop is derived from the informa-
tion-technology industry itseH. Another
29 percent is derived from sectors which
are heavily dependent on information
technology,  such as banking. A century
ago, nearly half the European workforce
was in agriculture. Today, nearly haH the
workforce is in information, in one form
or another.
However, although it is so important,
Europe has not seized the industrial and
market-building opportunities offered by
information  technology. Although the
Community represents over 30 percent
of the world market, European industry
commands  scarcely 10 percent of this
market  and little more than a third of the
European  information-technology  market
itself. The E.C. had a trade surplus in
information-technology  products of $1.7
billion in 1975. It is now in deficit bv $S
billion and that will double by 1986. If the
information-technology market had de-
veloped  in Europe at the same rate as in
Japan and the United States, supplying
the additional demand could have created
up to 2 million more jobs. As it is, perhaps
4 million jobs now depend on information-
technology-related  performance in a
Community  with 12 million unemployed
people.
Spending on information-technology
products  is at least one third lower per
capita in the Community  than in the
United States and Japan. Manufacturers'
profitability is lower. Telecommunica-
tions penetratiotr, h the proportion of
mainlines to population, is lower. All this
means that Europe has hitherto been
slower in becoming an information-tech-
nology society. Because of these factors,
European  information-technology  compa-
nies are relatively  small compared to
world leaders. E.C. governments have
attempted  to compensate  for this lack of
size by either protective measures or
subsidization.  The protective measures
Single-chip  memory for micro-computer.
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and subsidies  may have kept alive some
companies, but no world competitors
have emerged and these measures have
also slowed down the creation of a harmo-
nized Community market with an inte-
grated information-technology  infrastruc-
ture and compatible standards. Liberali-
zation in external trade, on the other
hand, has allowed a spate of licensing
agreements  between European,  Ameri-
can, and Japanese firms, which may hold
short-term  benefits, but cannot provide a
long-term  answer.
National protectionism  and overseas
partnerships,  however, are not the only
alternatives. The Community  offers a
continental approach and the major Euro-
pean electronics firms have been explor-
ing ways of taking up the challenge on a
Community scale since 1980. The cost of
high-technology  research and develop
ment now can seldom  be justified by the
size of individual E.C. member  states'
markets-it needs the E.C.-wide dimen-
sion. The Community's linguistic and
geographical fragmentation means com-
plex legal, financial, and industrial struc-
tures. Yet the information-technology  in-
dustry is increasingly  dominated by
economies of scale. With the industry
itself taking the initiative of launching a
transnational cooperative program, Es-
pnlr introduces the Community dimen-
sion through overall framework  policies
and specific action programs.  These will
have to be backed up nearer the market
by application programs addressed to
leading'edge  customers who can draw
the industry forward and promote a Com-
munity-wide harmonization  of standards
and regulations.
At the same time, through the Commu-
nity, national  information-technology  pro-
grams are being linked for greater effec-
tiveness  and less duplication of research.
Wider aspects of an information-technol-
ogy society can be addressed, such as
educational, social and cultural issues. A
coherent Community  telecommunica-
tions infrastructure is a vital complement
to the information-technology industry
and here again the E.C. Commission is
preparing the ground,looking  ahead to an
integrated telematics network. rspnlr
comes at a time when the Commission  is
pushing  hard to free the internal market
and create a forward-looking, industrial,
and technological  Community. In the
wider perspective,  the Community car-
ries considerable  weight on the world
stage which, beginning with Bspnlr, it can
put behind the European information-
technology industry.
ESIRIT pilot projects have given encour-
aging evidence that partnerships be-
tween large and small companieS, h-
tween universities  and laboratories,  have
been undertaken willingly, in all combina-
Th"  fundamental aim of the ESPRIT
I  program set up after lengthy  con-
sultations with industry small- and
medium-size  companies, universities,
and E.C. member states' administra-
tions is to mount a "technological
push" across the European  Commu-
nity to achieve parity with, if not su-
periority, over American and Japanese
competitors  within the next 10 years.
A first five-year phase, starting in
1984, will be allocated overall financial
support of 1.5 billion European  Cur-
rency Units (about $1.3 billion), fi-
nanced on a 50-50 basis by the Com-
munity budget on the one hand and
industry  on the other. This "catch-up"
strategy is designed to stop the pro-
cess of decline facing the European
information-technology  sector. The
broad research program  of Bspntr will
establish  a new technological basis for
the next generation of products and
systems in the information-technology
sector. Research activities will be con-
ducted in the so-called "precompeti-
tive" phase.
The program sets out five key areas
for action.  Advanced microelectronics,
advanced information processing, and
software are the three central technol-
ogies. Their mastery is the key to
making the strategy  succeed. The two
other action areas involve specific
applicatons: office automation  and
computer-integrated  manufacturing.
tions, across national frontiers in the
Community. esrrur is not the private pre-
serve of big business, nor is it in any way
an attempt  to create an information-tech-
nology "multinational"  based in Brussels.
ESeRIT is addressed, quite simply, to ev-
eryone in the Community who can con-
tribute to the program. In order to be
eligible for aid, projects must be put for-
ward by tirms or research teams estab-
lished and currently carrying out re-
search and development.
A primary justification of rspRrr is the
synergetic effect it will have. For this,
adequate dissemination of information  on
research that is being planned or under
way, as well as on its possible results and
their exploitation, is of fundamental  im-
portance. For the scientists directly in-
volved, the Commission intends to orga-
nize workshops  on each research  topic.
Meanwhile  a wider clearing-house infra-
structure is being established to sys-
tematically  collect and make available ap
propriate information on work in
progress.
The response to ESPRIT has been very
positive. But eSpRIT is only one strategic
action in a wider context. While it is
designed to encourage the necessary
change of approach by the European in-
formation-technology industry and to
speed up the transfer of technology
across the Community, a technology push
must be complemented by a greater mar-
ket pull if industry is to amortize the costs
of developing a new generation of in-
formation-technology products.  Staying
afloat depends on this push-pull process.(
Michel Carpentier is the E.C. Commission director
general responsible for the ESIRIT task force.
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EUROPE  AND  ITS 
AFRICAN  POLICIES 
THE  E.C.'S  TRADE-AND-AID  PACT  WITH 
DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  IS  BEING 
RENEGOTIATED. 
MARC PIERINI 
S 
ub-Saharan  Mrica  is  presently in 
the forefront of many international 
discussions.  The  European  Com-
munity and its member states are negoti-
ating the renewal of the Lome  Conven-
tion  with  64  developing  countries,  of 
which  45  belong  to  sub-Saharan Mrica. 
The World  Bank,  which  issued  a  major 
policy document in 1981 entitled "Accel-
erated Development in  Sub-Saharan M-
rica", is  bound to address the economic 
problems of that region again at its next 
annual  meeting  in  September.  Further-
more, last February, the Reagan Admin-
istration launched  an  "Economic  Policy 
Initiative for  Mrica" which is due to be 
implemented in  1985, pending Congres-
sional approval. 
All this does not mean that the interna-
tional community has recognized all  the 
consequences of the serious deterioration 
in the economic situation of Mrica. Offi-
cial development assistance (ODA) to sub-
Saharan  Africa  from  all  combined 
sources, which had increased from  $3.7 
billion in 1976 to $8.1 billion in 1980, an 
average annual  growth rate of about 22 
percent for net disbursements, stagnated 
at  that  level  in  1981  and  1982.  The 
International  Development  Association 
(IDA), the World Bank's arm for soft lend-
ing  to poor  developing  countries,  espe-
cially in Mrica where IDA, France, and the 
E. C. are the three main donors, now faces 
a 25-percent cut in nominal terms in the 
replenishment  of  its  resources  for  the 
next three years, due to U.S. opposition. 
Moreover,  most  of  the Mrican coun-
tries have only just begun to address their 
structural  adjustment  problems  effec-
tively  and  most of  the aid  donors  have 
only recently devised specific new instru-
ments to help  them do  so.  The severe 
drought which hit both southern Mrican 
and Sahel countries in 1983 and 1984, is 
not  only  imposing  new  strains  on  the 
population,  but  also  jeopardizing  the 
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longer-term efforts in  the food  and agri-
culture sector. 
What is the economic diagnosis Euro-
peans  make  about  sub-Saharan  Mrica? 
How have they helped Mrica to tackle its 
problems so far?  How do  they intend to 
respond to the prolonged and deepened 
Mrican economic crisis? 
A Worrying Diagnosis 
For the sub-Saharan region as a whole, 
but with wide variations between individ-
ual  countries, the recent record of  eco-
nomic development is a cause for serious 
concern. Since 1970, the global economic 
situation has deteriorated: Per capita in-
comes and  per capita  food  output have 
declined; infant mortality is much higher 
In  1980, sub-Saharan 
Africa had a population 
of 440 million;  in 20 I  0, 
it will  reach  I . I billion 
inhabitants. 
than in  other developing countries; sub-
stantial shares of the world markets have 
been lost to other developing countries by 
Mrican  exporters of  cocoa,  cotton  and 
groundnuts; and the debt burden has be-
come  unsustainable  in  many  countries 
(about  2  out  of  3  multilateral  debt 
reschedulings since  1979 have  involved 
Mrican countries). 
There  are  several  reasons  for  this 
deterioration.  The  physical  constraints 
are awesome:  poor  soils,  climatic  acci-
dents such as drought,  and  accelerated 
desertification.  Inherited structures and 
external economic factors  also  played  a 
negative role: The post  -colonial economic 
structures were often oriented primarily 
toward  the supply  of  tropical  commod-
ities to Europe, linkages between neigh-
boring countries were rarely taken into 
account.  In  recent  years,  commodity 
prices and official development assistance 
also  have  declined  in  real terms, while 
interest rates on commercially borrowed 
funds have increased. Sub-Saharan Mrica 
was  hit hardest by  the world  economic 
crisis. 
The adverse evolution of sub-Saharan 
Mrica is also due to misjudgments made 
by Mrican Governments in selecting eco-
nomic priorities and in  devising and im-
plementing  appropriate  domestic  poli-
cies. During the 1960s, only a handful of 
countries gave priority to the agricultural 
sector. When policies existed, they often 
acted  as  disincentives  to  increased  do-
mestic production. It is only recently that 
Mrican Governments have demonstrated 
an increased awareness-and have taken 
appropriate measures-of the critical im-
portance of macro-economic and sectoral 
policy frameworks for their development 
process. 
Long-Term Concerns 
In 1980, sub-Saharan Mrica had a popula-
tion of 440 million; in 2010, it will reach 
1.1  billion inhabitants. This corresponds 
to  the  highest  demographic  rate  of 
growth in  the world:  2.8 percent in  the 
1970s, over 3 percent in the 1980s, with 
even higher rates in  urban areas. A re-
cent study  commissioned  by  the  Euro-
pean Community-"A Long-Term Image 
of  Sub-Saharan Mrica"  -envisions pro-
found changes in the geographical alloca-
tion of  population in  sub-Saharan Mrica 
by the year 2010. 
For example, in  1970 only Lagos had 
more than 1 million inhabitants. In 1980, 
12 cities had  reached the million  mark;. 
while,  by  2010,  it  is  foreseen  that  70 
cities will have passed that level. Abidjan, 
Kinshasa,  and  Lagos  might  well  have 
more than 10 million inhabitants each. By 
then,  important  population  migrations 
also will occur between Mrican countries 
and the balance between rural and urban 
populations  will  have  changed  dramati-
cally, thus requiring profound changes in 
food production and food-supply patterns. 
The environmental evolution is no less 
serious. For example, in the Sahel region 
alone, the desert grows by 2 million hect-
ares (4.9 million acres) per year. Mrica as 
a whole  loses  3.6 million  hectares (8.9 
million acres) of forest every year. Long-
term consequences on population alloca-
tion and on agricultural production capac-
ities are potentially disastrous. 
Inadequate Help? 
With  respect to Mrica'  s environmental, economic,  and  social  problems,  outside 
governments and organizations have not 
always  come  up  with  optimal  responses 
or adequate policy instruments. Yet,  the 
E.C.  record  with  sub-Saharan  Mrica, 
however, is impressive. In the trade field, 
the one-way duty free area set up by the 
Lome Convention gives zero tariff treat-
ment for  99.5 percent of the $16 billion 
worth  of  commodities  and  goods  ex-
ported yearly from Mrica to the E.C.  In 
the  aid  field,  the E.C.  and  its  member 
states provide  about  $3.8 billion  in  ODA 
money to Mrica, some 30 percent of the 
total 1982 commitments. 
The  European  Community  itself, 
through Lome Convention funds and food 
aid,  commits nearly $1  billion  per year, 
roughly ·the same amount  as  France or 
the  International  Development Associa-
tion  (of  whose  resources  E.C.  member 
states presently provide 37 percent). In 
addition,  the  Lome  Convention,  a  five-
year treaty encompassing aid, trade, and 
investment  provisions,  brings  security 
and  predictability  to  governmental  au-
thorities and private operators. 
Despite the sophisticated instruments 
put  in  place  since  1975,  however,  the 
E.C.  policies  did  not change the face  of 
A water supply project in  Upper Volta financed under the Lome II  trade-and-aid treaty. 
Mrica. On the eve of the current negotia-
tions for  a third "Lome" Convention to 
run from 1985 to 1989, the E.C. Commis-
sion conducted a thorough review of the 
policy record over the past decade. Here 
are some of the findings. 
The almost  totally free  trade regime 
granted by the E.C. to sub-Saharan Mri-
can countries did not trigger any signifi-
cant increase in their exports to Europe, 
nor  a  change  of  the  export  structure 
toward industrial goods.  Indeed,  in  this 
field,  Mrican  countries  are at a  disad-
vantage  vis-a-vis  other  less  developed 
Per  capita  food  output  has  declined  in  Africa  due  to  poor  soils,  climatic  accidents,  and  accelerated desertification. Agricultural 
projects financed under the Lome Convention, such as  the one in the Ivory Coast shown here, help fight this deteriorating situation. 
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countries. The E.C. already had a world-
wide zero tariff on industrial raw maten-
als such as oil, copper, or bauxite. Elimi-
nating a 3-percent tariff on coffee or a
2O-percent  tariff on bananas often is not
enough to give the African producers an
edge on their competitors.
For manufactured goods, an area
where the Lom6 Convention  gives them a
substantial tariff preference,  African
countries could not compete, on the
whole, with developing countries in the
Far East. Nevertheless,  the fact of the
matt€r is that, had the Lom6 Convention
not existed,  sub-Saharan Africa would
have been hit harder by the increased
competition  among developing countries
that resulted from reduced demand from
recession-ridden European economies.
A case in point is the Lom6 Convention
scheme for the stabilization of export
earnings: srABEx. Its automatic mecha-
nisms have worked with remarkable
timeliness and speed to compensate for
shortfalls in export receipts  from a wide
range of agricultural commodities. But it
was never meant to regulate the world
prices of these commodities,  a role that
should have been performed by a set of
commodity agreements,  but was not. Nor
was the sTABEX supposed  to relieve recipi-
ent African Governments from imple-
menting the appropriate policies with re-
spect to producer prices, inputs, trans-
portation, marketing, and so on. Yet,
these two areas, off the srABEx limits,
were probably  essential  causes in the loss
of market  shares by African producers.
In the same fashion,  $1 billion per year
in project aid can have substantial effects
on the lives of the people and the area
concerned.  Conceived  in isolation or as a
substitute for self-help, left without an
appropriate  policy framework, externally
assisted projects are bound to have little
impact on long-term development.  Food
aid, the E.C. Commission acknowledged,
could have serious negative effects on
nutritional habits or on long-term depen-
dance on imported food and could act as a
disincentive to increased production.
Correcting the Course
When, in L974 and 1975, the European
Community introduced the Lom6 Con-
vention  as a new framework for its rela-
tions with sub-Saharan  Africa and other
countries in the Caribbean  and Pacific
Basins, it was a major step forward. For
the first time, the world's major trading
partner was embarking on long-term,
free-trade arrangements,  on a commod-
ity-insurance  scheme (srnspx), and on a
predictable,  guaranteed  supply of devel-
opment finance.
Clearly, in the light of the subsequent
economic crisis and the profound changes
in the international  economic environ-
ment, it was not enough. With its pro-
posal for the Lom6 renegotiation, with
the food-aid reforms adopted in Novem-
ber 1983, and with the Africa policy re-
view currently conducted by the E.C.
Commission,  the European Community
has acknowledged  the need to correct  the
course of its development policy.
Indeed, none of the distinctive  features
of the Lom6 Convention are going to be
withdrawn. African and other countries
will still benefit from the contractual  and
multipurpose character of the Lom6 Con-
ventions, from its politically  non-discrimi-
natory nature, and from the permanent
dialogue it enables. But the E.C. would
hke to put new emphases.
First of all, on trade, while little more
can be done, the E.C. Commission  did
propose the removal of remaining  tariffs
and other restrictions on the 0.5 percent
of Lom6 countries' exports that are not
already entering the E.C. duty-free.
On aid, the E.C. Commission  considers
that financial assistance  to Africa should
resume its increase and, in the particular
case of the Lom6 Convention, that there
should be an increase in real terms for
1985 to 1989. In addition, new forms of
dialogue on the recipient's development
policies should ensure, with full respect to
its sovereignty, that E.C.-assisted
projects are part and parcel of well-
thought-out sectoral  policies. Where  do-
nor coordination needs to be increased, it
should be under the leadership of the
recipient  country concerned,  with the full
participation  of the lead donors (the E.C.
or one of its member states is lead donor
in about three out of four sub-Saharan
African countries). New forms of assis-
tance should be implemented for long-
term problems such as desertification,
basic energy supplies such as fuelwood,
and others.
The E.C. has proposed  that the srennx
system be revised in order to tackle the
underlying structural  problems  and to
prevent situations where the scheme
could actually act as a disincentive to
structural reforms.  Reforms agreed upon
in November 1983 in the fogd-aid area
point in the same direction.  Alfeady, E.C.
food aid is used more and more as an
integral part of broader country  food
strategies.  In areas of mutual interest to
Europe and Africa, such as mining, €D-
€rgy, and fisheries, the types of action
already  used by the E.C. should be ex-
panded and new ones should be found.
Some of these reforms are already
being implemented, some are being nego-
tiated between  the 74 countries that are
partners in the Lom6 Convention, others
merely are being discussed within the
E.C. internally for the time being. Euro-
peans and Africans have a long common
history and mutual interests of substan-
tial magnitude. However, a lot more than
the European relationship with sub-Saha-
ran Africa is at stake these days: It is the
very survival of million of human beings
and the preservation  of peace and democ-
racy in Africa. History even recently,
shows how hunger, poverty,  and social
injustice lead to political unrest, foreign
intervention, and further suffering. Giv-
ing fair help to Africa in its struggle
toward long-term  development is the
joint responsibility  of the Western  democ-
racies and the international  institutions
they support. (
Marc Pierini is responsible  for development  affairs
at the E.C. delegation  in Washington,  D.C.
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FRANCE  AND  THE 
E.C.  PRESIDENCY 
DETERMINATION  AND  RELIABILITY  HAVE 
MADE  RENEWED  MOMENTUM  POSSIBLE. 
CLAUDE CHEYSSON 
The following  is an excerpt from a for-
eign-policy speech  delivered April 26 to 
the  National Assembly  by  French  For-
eign Minister Claude Cheysson.  France 
currently holds the  six-month,  rotating 
presidency of  the E. C.  Council of  Minis-
ters. 
F 
ranee is an essential element of the 
European  Community,  this  Com-
munity  that ...  is  attracting  ever 
greater attention. Now,  while  the Presi-
dent of the Republic, my colleagues, and I 
are exercising the presidency of the Com-
munity, we are in an even better position 
than  we  would  otherwise  be  to realize 
this. 
In the space of a few weeks, represen-
tatives of China, India, and japan will have 
visited  Paris,  currently the  seat of  the 
Community presidency. For the past few 
months,  East  European  countries  have 
been seeking increased contacts with the 
Community. I will only mention the exam-
ple of Hungary, which is especially inter-
esting as an indication of how the econo-
mies  of  these  countries  might  evolve 
toward greater realism,  that is,  toward 
greater freedom of trade. 
Moreover,  it  is  hardly  necessary  to 
remind  you  that for  several years,  two 
countries of southern Europe have been 
requesting admission to the E.C. And in 
the  Middle  East  and  Central  America, 
there have been increasing requests for 
Community intervention. So, at present, 
the  European  Community  is  attracting 
the attention of the outside world more 
than ever before. 
The Community has finally decided to 
emerge from its quagmire, to look toward 
the  future,  and  to  encourage  its  busi-
nesses to do the same .... 
I would just like to remind you of the 
ideas underlying France's policy, for our 
presence and our action within the Com-
munity are a central element of our for-
eign policy. I want to emphasize this point 
because the French Government believes 
that in Community matters attention has 
too often been sidetracked to problems 
that, although they are certainly impor-
tant,  are  nevertheless  relatively  mar-
ginal.  I am  referring to the Community 
budget. ...  What matters in the life of the 
Community  is  that  today  there  is  no 
longer  any  country in  Europe,  nor  are 
there any  political  or economic  forces, 
that fail  to acknowledge  that the Euro-
pean dimension is indispensable to all. 
French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson. 
It  is  indispensable  for  the  continued 
development of agriculture ...  and to im-
prove relations with the Third World. It is 
indispensable  to  bring changes in  areas 
that have stagnated in the past-in other 
words, to facilitate industrial reorganiza-
tion. It is indispensable to meet the third 
industrial  revolution in  such a way that 
workers will  not fall  victim to the great 
multinational  economic  forces.  Finally, 
the European dimension is indispensable 
to enable us to negotiate on equal footing 
with the other great economic powers of 
the world, not only the multinational com-
panies,  but  also  some  important  move-
ments. 
It is also important that member coun-
tries have  made  the long-overdue  deci-
sion to fight the immobility that was gain-
ing ground as the same speeches and the 
same actions were repeated to the point 
of absurdity while at the same time mar-
kets for  some products were falling  off. 
Constant repetition of the same gestures 
and the same statements was leading to 
paralysis. It was time to break out of the 
cycle. 
We have two significant chances to do 
so  and  in  this  way  to  look  toward  the 
future. First, general elections are to be 
held throughout Europe in June to choose 
a new European Parliament, a body that 
will  necessarily  introduce  a  breath  of 
fresh  air to the  life  of  the Community, 
challenge the areas of our shortcomings, 
stimulate ideas, and bring a promise for 
the future. 
And then there is the shock treatment 
decided  upon  at  the  European  Council 
meeting in  Stuttgart, an  approach  with 
which  I  wish  to  associate  myself  as  a 
member  of  France's  executive.  It  was 
decided that we would face up to all  the 
difficult subjects that had not been dealt 
with for years and  that we would  do  so 
together. What is commonly known as a 
"package" of basic decisions was put to-
gether. Its contents were outlined at the 
European Council meeting in Athens and 
further analyzed and defined at the Coun-
cil meeting in Brussels. 
We then made some decisions regard-
ing  each element of  the package,  deci-
sions  that  will  enable  solutions  to  be 
found,  or  at  least  pave  the  way  for 
progress.  Fundamental  subjects  that 
should  be  considered at the Community 
level  are  being  or  have  already  been 
taken  up.  No  one  still  scoffs  at  the 
progress  that  the  Community  is  once 
again making and in all areas, even if the 
E. C. has lagged somewhat behind its busi-
nesses.  Our  industrialists  who  are  di-
rectly involved with the economy did not 
wait for E.C. decisions in order to move 
forward in aeronautical cooperation (Air-
bus),  space  cooperation  (Ariane)  and 
adoption of common European computer 
standards. 
Now  that the  obstacles  blocking  the 
Community's path have been or are being 
removed, we  are in  a position to give a 
new impetus to Europe. Speaking without 
undue  modesty  and  in  the  name  of 
France's presidency,  I can say that our 
presidency has been demanding and tena-
cious.  But by its determination and reli-
ability  it has made  renewed momentum 
possible. 
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MITTERRAND'S SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT
IS FORCED INTO AN AUSTERITY
PROGRAM AND DIFFICULT REFORMS.
AXEL KRAUSE
rench President Frangois Mitter-
rand was winding up what had been
a successful, exhilarating trip to the
United States last month and he was
delighted. "It's been no vacation,"  he told
reporters, "but I have found all of it
deeply interesting and diverting."  In-
deed, as soon as Mitterrand returned to
the Elys6e Palace in Paris, he immedi-
ately was confronted  with a political up-
roar over a government plan to reform
France's ailing steel industry which in-
cluded laying off some 30,000 workers in
the Lorraine region.
Within several  days, the French leader,
appearing determined, but defensive,  told
ilElrlBER STATE REPORT/PO LlTl CS
a nationally televised news conference
that "the future of France  depends neces-
sarily on the modernization  of its indus-
try" and that he would implement the
government's austerity program  with
"all the patience and tenacity of which I
am capable." Meantime,  in Lorraine, an-
gry workers had sealed off the major
towns and shut the border crossings to
the Federal Republic of Germany,  Bel-
gium, and Luxembourg  as part of a pro-
test seeking a repeal of the plan.
Mitterrand and his ministers,  however,
have steadfastly refused to budge in pur-
suing-and implementing-the  key goals
for which they were elected  in May 1981:
easing France out of recessionary condi-
tions; reforming the beleaguered  econ-
offiy, notably industry; and reforming
abuses in the nation's social, judicial,  and
administrative  systems. "Given Mitter-
rand's strong commitment  to the alliance
and his well-known anti-Communist
views," a senior western diplomatic  offi-
cial in Paris commented, "it is clear that
his success,  or failure, will depend largely
on how he manages the economic crisis in
France."
Against a background of growing, vo-
ciferous attacks on the Socialists'policies
from opposition leaders,  including former
President  Val6ry Giscard d'Estaing, and
poor showings in national polls and local
elections, the Administration  has ex-
pressed confidence that its policies will
work and that they are being accepted by
the largest share of French people, de-
spite the protests. Many observers agree
with that assessment, but quickly add
that the policies remain shrouded in un-
certainties and are often poorly explained
to those directly affected.
Commenting on a mass demonstration
in Paris on April 13 by some 50,000
steelworkers protesting  the steel mod-
ernization plan, a senior executive of a
leading nationalized steel company said:
"The demonstration  probably could not
have been avoided, but the decision by
Mitterrand  to press ahead quickly-per-
haps influenced by his stopover in Silicon
Valley on the U. S. trip-should  have
been better explained. . . . Many people,
particularly  in the industry, were taken by
complete surprise and this influenced the
initial opposition."
Time is, however, of some importance
to the Socialists, who face parliamentary
elections in 1986 and clearly will seek to
maintain their absolute majority in the
National Assembly.  According to many
political observers, the Government's
goal is to prepare the country for a more
expansionary policy sometime in 1985,
The experts  ask, "has France become America's best ally?" lt would seem so after President
Mitterrand's recently  successful visit to the United States.coinciding  with the runup to the elections
and in which the economy is widely ex-
pected to be the central issue. But for the
remainder of this year, and probably into
1985, the government  will continue  the
present policies even though, as Jacques
Delors, the powerful Finance Minister,
said recently: "We know there is suffer-
ing, but it is less than what Britain and
Germany have experienced."
Delors, who perhaps  more than any
other Cabinet  member has come to sym-
bolize the present austerity policy, has
repeatedly insisted that the policies are
working. "What is really important  is that
we are winning the major battle-moving
the mood of the country toward realism,"
he commented  recently. What this means
is continuing restrictive fiscal and mone-
tary policies, aimed at reducing the coun-
try's chronic  inllation  rate, and bolstering
foreign confidence in the economy  and
the franc, while stimulating  investments.
Delors and other Government  leaders
have regularly brushed off widespread
speculation  that they will soon return to
the demand-stimulation  expansion  poli-
cies launched after the 1981 victories  and
which, with considerable  embarrassment,
were reversed in favor of austerity ayear
later. "We will maintain our present path
and although the players on our team may
change, the team will remain in place,"  a
presidential adviser  said, commenting re-
cently on reports of an impending  Cabinet
reshuffling.
However, pursuing what some observ-
ers call Thatcherism ) la frangaise has
stirred up widespread uncertainty, fear,
and hostility among labor groups,  the
Communist Party, rank-and-file Social-
ists, and many in the middle class, includ-
ing civil servants  and businessmen.  Some
6 million French civil servants, including
teachers, participated in a national  one-
day strike earlier this year, protesting the
Government's refusal to increase their
wages.
They and others who now bitterly op-
pose the Government's  austerity  pro-
gram-particularly  in ailing industries
such as steel, coal, and shipbuilding-
voted for the left in 1981. But recent polls
and rightist victories in municipal elec-
tions showed that support for the left has
eroded sharply around the country.
The critics mainly cite two factors.
The first is a growing-and  deliberate-
drift toward joblessness,  which is ex-
pected to exceed a record 2.5 million
persons by the end of this year, compared
to 2.1million unemployed at the end of
last year. The second major factor is the
Government's recent disclosure that cNp
growth during 1984 will be somewhere
between 0.5 percent and 1 percent. "Ev-
erything is oriented toward fighting infla-
tion and comes at the expense of stagna-
tion-it is a mistake," said Jean-Pierre
Chevdnement,  Mitterrand's  former In-
dustry Minister,  and the outspoken  leader
of the Socialist Party's leftist-leaning  fac-
tion.
He recently told reporters that what
France needed,  above all, was an expan-
sionary policy of "mobilization," which
should comprise  a fourth devaluation  of
the franc of around 15 percent accompa-
nied by its temporary  withdrawal  from
the European Monetary System (eus).
Heavy government  investments  also
were required, Chevdnement said, since
"we need action. . . elections are won
politically."  The reference was to wide-
spread expectations that the Socialists
will suffer losses both in the June 17
European  Parliament elections and in the
1986 elections for the French National
Assembly.
On April 19, the Government won a
confidence  vote in the National Assembly
which was designed to test Communist
loyalty as a junior partner in the Govern-
ment. Although Communist deputies
grudgingly voted in favor of the motion,
most political observers  said that on-go-
ing strains, and the threat of a possible
break, would continue to shape the coali-
tion of the left in the months to come.
Leaders of the Socialist Party, includ-
ing Chevdnement,  have been trying to
avoid an open break with the Commu-
nists, but they have not hidden their
growing annoyance over the confusion
being created, particularly in the minds of
French voters who supported the left in
1981. In a radio interview on April 15,
Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy said that
he was planning discussions with Mitter-
rand aimed at "clarifying"  the Commu-
nists' role in the Government.  He added
that he hoped they would not leave.
Meanwhile,  Raymond Barre, who was
Prime Minister in the previous  Govern-
ment of Giscard d'Estaing  and who is
widely viewed as a leading candidate in
the next Presidential election of 1988,
has bitterly expressed fears that the Gov-
ernment  has failed to improve the na-
tion's productivity and competitivity in
export markets,  mainly within the Euro-
pean community. The French  economy
presently is gripped by "paralyzing reces-
sion and fierce corporatism," he said in a
recent interview with the newsweekly
L'Erpress. The only solution, Barre sug-
gested, was to reduce gradually the role
of the state in the French economy.
Jacques  Chirac, leader of the neo-Gaul-
list Party, Mayor of Paris, and another
leading contender for the Presidential
election, has called for the de-nationaliza-
tion of the country's banks and industrial
corporations brought under state control
at the end of 1981.
"The French are looking for a bit of
fresh air and they are listening to Yves
Montand,"  Barre said in a reference to
several, recent television interviews  by
Montand, one of France's leading, and
formerly leftist singers. During one pro-
gram, Montand created a national sensa-
tion earlier this year by presenting  a
string of filmed, fictionalized  accounts  of
economic  disasters such as bank failures.
Many opposition leaders quickly por-
trayed the program as a warning  of
where things were heading under the
Socialists.
From Mitterrand on down, Govern-
ment leaders praised Montand for his
talents, and for having drawn dramatic
Mitterrand  recently  told a nationally
televised news conference that "the future
of France depends necessarily  on the
modernization of its industry."
national  attentron to the world's eco-
nomic situation. "The crisis," com-
mented Delors, "is nothing but a giant
challenge to Europe and the world. . . .I
say: uiae I'espoirl" But when all the dis-
cussion died down several weeks later,
two key questions  remained as crucial to
understanding  the debate: How are the
Socialists actually  doing and is a shift in
favor of an expansionary  policy emerging?
The first question is easier to answer.
In interviews, French Government  of-
ficials, U. S. and European  observers, and
diplomats cited the following achieve-
ments:
r Inllation is slowing. During each of the
first three months of 1984, prices rose by
0.7 percent, which works out to 8.6 per-
cent on a l2-month basis, but7.4 percent
when averaged  over six months, and the
lowest level since 1973. For all of last
MAY/JUNE  r984year, inflation averaged 9.3 percent. The 
results for March, however, immediately 
were criticized by the opposition press in 
Paris as a failure,  since the Government 
had projected-and commited itself to-
a 5 percent inflation rate in 1984. "A lost 
bet," said the daily newspaper Le Figaro 
in  a  front-page  story,  noting  that  the 
inflation rate would  be well  in  excess of 
the  goal  by  the end  of  the  year.  Most 
recent forecasts,  including  those of  the 
Conference  Board,  a  U. S.  business  in-
formation  service,  and  of  the  Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, showed that infla-
tion would average around 7 percent for 
the year, or slightly more. 
•  The trade deficit is shrinking.  Helped 
by a weakened franc in  export markets, 
and reduced imports at home because of 
stagnation  in  the  industrial  sector,  the 
nation's trade deficit  fell  to 42.4 billion 
francs (about $5.5 billion) last year from 
92.6 billion francs (about $14.1 billion) in 
1982. The trend is expected to continue 
this year. Assuming that the dollar contin-
ues to weaken, even slightly, against the 
franc-thus helping  France  reduce  the 
cost  of  importing  oil  and  other  dollar-
denominated commodities-Delors esti-
mates that the trade deficit will fall by 10-
15 billion francs in 1984. 
•  Nationalized companies are doing bet-
ter financially.  Last  year,  11  industrial 
companies, excluding the two steel com-
panies, Usinor and Sacilor, had cut their 
combined losses to 6 billion francs from 
11  billion  francs  in  1982.  By  the same 
token  during  the  past  two  years,  the 
Government spent a total of 17.5 billion 
francs in helping the companies expand or 
modernize;  it  plans  to  allocate  in  addi-
tional  12.8  billion  francs  in  aid  during 
1984. Laurent Fabius, Minister of Indus-
try, has warned that if the money-losing 
companies  are  not  profitable  by  1985, 
their top managers will be fired. Most of 
the managers are attempting to comply 
with the order, which has the backing of 
Mitterrand, but an  extension will  be al-
lowed for the steel companies. They each 
lost 5 billion francs last year and expect to 
lose the same amount this year. 
The  following  perceptions  about 
failings  in  present  policies  also  were 
cited: 
•  Doubts that the anti-inflationary policy 
will  prove  durable.  The  Conference 
Board,  summing  up  widespread  opinion 
among multinational corporations, noted 
that the average inflation-rate difference 
between France and its main E. C. trading 
partners, notably the Federal Republic of 
Germany, averaged around 3 percent in 
1983.  "The real problem remains that, 
despite  moderate  wage  increases,  unit 
costs will  continue to rise rapidly,  since 
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activity will  remain weak in  1984," the 
organization said. Indeed, the Conference 
Board cautioned that unless the Govern-
ment meets its inflation target of 5 per-
cent this  year,  a  fourth  devaluation  "is 
generally expected." It  would be part of a 
EMS realignment and also could involve a 
revaluation of the German mark. 
•  The investment climate remains gen-
erally poor. The French business commu-
nity remains skeptical about government 
intentions, particularly in light of growing 
unemployment, record bankruptcies, and 
France's growing  external debt.  At  the 
end of last year,  the nation's short- and 
medium-term  debt  rose  to  $53  billion, 
compared  to  $44  billion  at the  end  of 
1982,  representing  a  61  percent  rise 
over 1981. Stagnating investments in the 
private sector may force the Government 
··what is  really impor-
tant  is  that we  are win-
ning the  major battle-
moving the  mood of 
the country toward  re-
alism." 
into  heavier  borrowing  aboard,  which 
could further weaken the franc and erode 
confidence in the economy, French busi-
ness leaders said.  Noting  that business 
investments  fell  2-3  percent  from  the 
1982 level last year, their lowest level in 
recent history, Yvon Gattaz, president of 
France's employers' association, recently 
urged the Government to reduce or elim-
inate a wide  range of business taxes to 
spur capital spending. 
•  Opinion polls have shown that the aus-
terity program remains highly unpopular 
and  that the  Government  continues  to 
score low points on its ability to govern 
effectively. A recent survey by Le Quoti-
dien  de  Paris,  a  right-wing  opposition 
newspaper,  showed  that  61  percent  of 
those  interviewed  considered  that  the 
Socialists were relying on "visual naviga-
tion" in daily policymaking, implying they 
had  no  clear  idea  of  where  they  were 
heading.  Of  those  interviewed,  62  per-
cent said that they thought the first prior-
ity of the Government should be fighting 
unemployment and 72 percent said that 
they thought it  "probable" that France 
would  face  new  unrest and  demonstra-
tions later in  the year.  Most polls  have 
given  the Government higher  points  in 
the handling  of foreign  policy,  including 
the country's participation in the multina-
tional peacekeeping force in Lebanon and 
in conducting its current six-month Presi-
dency of  the  E.C.  Council  of Ministers. 
Public opinion polls also have shown that 
the French people favored excluding the 
'Communists  from  the  Government,  a 
move  hinted  at  broadly  by  Mitterrand 
during his news conference. 
However, if the Government was con-
sidering a major switch in  its policy,  the 
leaders, from Mitterrand on down,  were 
not  tipping  their hands.  Asked  whether 
easing of the austerity policy might come 
in a year, as the Government approached 
the legislative elections, Delors replied in 
very, very guarded terms. The President, 
he  said,  would  avoid  "acting  precipi-
tously."  And,  responding  to newsmen's 
questions,  Mitterrand replied with such 
comments "our situation is healthy" and 
"the battle is being won." What the lan-
guage  reflected,  in  the  view  of  many 
observers, was a commitment to waiting 
things  out,  hopeful  that  France  would 
benefit  from  accelerating  economic  re-
covery  in  the United  States-and to a 
lesser degree in the Federal Republic of 
Germany,  France's largest trading part-
ner-and in Britain. 
''The recovery here will  come  by  it-
self," Delors commented. To help move 
things  along,  the  Government  during 
March  began  cutting back  substantially 
on  foreign  borrowing,  and  according  to 
Government insiders, Mitterrand is stick-
ing with his intention to reduce tax and 
social-security payments by  the equiva-
lent  of  1  percent  of  the  nation's  GNP 
during  1985,  although  he  deliberately 
avoided citing a figure at his news confer-
ence.  How  this  can  be  accomplished, 
while keeping the Government's budget 
deficit  restricted  to  3  percent  of  GNP, 
remains  an  open  question.  Indeed,  that 
limit was exceeded slightly in 1983 amid 
widespread  speculation  that  further, 
sweeping, and highly unpopular spending 
cuts were being planned for  1984-1985, 
with the notable exception of the military 
sector. 
What  remains  certain  is  that  Delors 
and other key advisers to Mitterrand, as 
well as the President himself, are deter-
mined to continue pursuing their restric-
tive policies, hopeful that investments in 
the industrial sector will lead to a recov-
ery within  two  years,  and  even  if the 
policy leads to embarrassing losses in the 
coming parliamentary elections. "Recov-
ery in  the West  will  certainly  help  our 
economy,"  a  Presidential  adviser  com-
mented, "but we have no illusions-it will 
continue being rough for some time yet:' E 
Axel  Krause  is  economic  correspondent  for  the 
International Herald Tribune. MEMBER STATE REPORT  /ECONOMICS 
COALITION  OF  THE 
LEFT 
FACES  NEW  STRAINS 
THE  COMMUNISTS,  ALTHOUGH 
REMAINING  IN  THE  GOVERNMENT, 
OPENLY  CRITICIZE  ITS  POLICIES. 
BERNARD MAZIERES 
W
ith the arrival of spring, the 
French  are  beginning  to 
wonder  whether  they  still 
have a Government of the left. A turning 
point seems near. To overcome the eco-
nomic  crisis,  Prime  Minister  Pierre 
Mauroy has been forced to use methods 
that seem well removed from traditional 
Socialist principles. As a result, there are 
more  and  more  strains  and  frictions 
within the Government. The Communists 
have openly criticized the austerity mea-
sures extolled by President Fran~ois Mit-
terrand,  all  the  while  maintaining  their 
claim on Cabinet posts. 
The  Socialists  themselves  are  doing 
some soul-searching and  asking  a lot of 
questions. Some have publicly expressed 
their disagreement with  the  policies  of 
Finance Minister Jacques Delors. One of 
those  is  Jean-Pierre  Chevenement,  the 
leader  of  the left  wing  of  the Socialist 
Party, who resigned as Minister of Indus-
try. 
In short, faced with a recession and its 
consequences, the left has entered a tur-
bulent zone. It is so divided, in fact, that 
Mauroy had to take his Government be-
fore the National Assembly for a vote of 
confidence to force his troups to regroup 
and to put the Communists on notice. 
Government has authorized  in  basic  in-
dustries such as  steel production,  auto-
mobile  manufacturing,  coal  mining,  and 
shipbuilding-all  aimed  at  modernizing 
French industry and making it more com-
petitive  globally-are  very  difficult  to 
swallow  for  the parties of  the left  that 
came  to  power  to  safeguard  jobs  and 
improve the quality of life.  "Changer Ia 
vie,"  went the Socialist slogan.  But that 
has been the President's choice. 
Mitterrand,  on  the  advice  of  his  Fi-
nance  Minister,  has  put  an  end  to two 
years  of  generous  policies  that  threat-
ened to lead the country into catastrophe. 
Whether they liked it or not, the Social-
ists have accepted this choice. The Com-
munists have not. Indeed, they have chal-
lenged it, without however accepting the 
consequences:  namely,  their  departure 
from the Government. "We do not want 
to give any presents to the right," they 
say.  "Without us, the left would fail." 
That is a situation that could  not last 
very long. Mter Marchais's denunciation 
of the Government's entire industrial pol-
icy at the beginning of April, Mitterrand 
decided it was time to clear the air.  He 
asked his Prime Minister to put the mo-
tion of confidence before the parliament, 
a procedure which clarified nothing. The 
Communists in parliament voted with the 
Government April  19, while maintaining 
their opposition to its economic policies. 
Today,  all  the  elements  for  a  break 
between Communists and Socialists are 
assembled.  Many think it won't be long 
before  this  happens,  but neither of  the 
two partners wants to take the respon-
sibility  for  forcing  the issue.  Each  side 
sees  more  advantages  than  inconve-
niences in carrying on the present situa-
tion. 
For the Communist Party,  participat-
ing in  the Government allows it to keep 
key positions in  the machinery of state. 
At the same time, the party knows only 
too  well  that  a  break  on  its  initiative 
would  not favor  the Communists at the 
ballot  box.  They learned that lesson  in 
1977. Thus, the Communists won't leave 
on their own, but they now run the risk of 
being  forced  out.  If that  happened,  it 
would be proof of a turn to the right in the 
Government. 
For several months, in  fact, the Com-
munist Party has played a double-edged 
game  which  in  the long  run called  into 
question the authority and the credibility 
of the Government. While the four Com-
munist  Cabinet  ministers  have  main-
tained their solidarity with  the Govern-
ment, their party leaders have not done 
the same. French Communist Party head 
Georges Marchais has accused the Presi-
dent and the Prime Minister of not keep-
ing  promises made in  1981 and  he has 
asked that they modify their policies.  In 
the  meantime,  the  Communists  partici-
pate without supporting the Government. 
It is clear that the massive layoffs the 
President Fran~ois Mitterrand presides over a weekly Council of Ministers meeting. On the 
right, Michel Rocard, Minister of Agriculture. Left: Gaston Defferre, Minister of the Interior. 
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As  for  President  Mitterrand,  despite 
his inclinations, he does not want to push 
Marchais'  party  into  opposition.  The 
prime  reason  for  this  is  that  industrial 
restructuring has only just begun.  More 
layoffs  will  take  place.  Communist  sup-
port is essential if Mitterrand is to contain 
the unions and avoid social upheaval. Fur-
thermore, he wants to keep his image in 
the public eye as the man who unified the 
French left. 
That very left has become confused by 
the rigorous policies of the Government 
and supporters are not even getting ideo-
logical compensation. An example of this 
is the schooling system. The creation of a 
new lay system, one of the great princi-
ples of socialism, was announced by Mit-
terrand in 1981. His attempt to put it into 
effect  provoked  strong  reaction  among 
proponents of private schools, with back-
ing from  the opposition parties, and  re-
sulted  in  a  mass  demonstration  of 
800,000  people  last  March  4  in  Ver-
sailles. The Government had to backtrack 
and  make  do  with  a  compromise  that 
satisfies no one. The whole thing turned 
into a handy peg for the opposition parties 
to accuse the left of interfering with per-
sonal liberties. 
The opposition, meanwhile, is  turning 
to  its  advantage  all  the  unhappiness 
brought on by the Government's policies. 
A steady stream of  by-elections wins  is 
there to prove it. Districts that tradition-
ally  belonged  to the left  have  gone  the 
other  way  recently.  Sure  of  itself,  the 
opposition already sees a win in the par-
liamentary elections scheduled for  1986 
-if  there are no changes in the electoral 
laws. 
This renewal comes despite an absence 
of new faces. The political giants are the 
Jacques Chirac, Mayor of Paris and leader of 
the neo-Gaullist Rally for the Republic party. 
same people that were around when Mit-
terrand was  elected in  1981.  They are 
Jacques Chirac, Mayor of Paris and leader 
of the neo-Gaullist Rally for the Republic 
(RPR) Party; former French President Va-
lery Giscard d'Estaing; and former Prime 
The  European  Parlia-
ment elections could 
indicate how the 
political  winds 
are  blowing  in France. 
Minister Raymond Barre, who is running 
solo. There is a difference compared with 
1981: Taking their cue from a perceived 
rejection of the left, the opposition parties 
are rediscovering the virtues of avowed 
liberalism. 
What is more, the parties that make up 
the  opposition,  largely  the  RPR  and  the 
Giscardian Union for French Democracy 
(UDF),  have  learned a lesson from  their 
losses  in  the  last  presidential  election: 
They  understand  now  that  they  must 
present a united front. Consequently, for 
the June  17  elections  to  the  European 
Parliament, the RPR and the UDF will pre-
sent  a  joint  slate  led  by  Simone  Veil, 
former President of the European Parlia-
ment. 
This joint effort in  fact is  not without 
ulterior motives. The battle of the chief-
Former French Prime Minister Raymond 
Barre. 
tains still goes on behind the scenes and, 
while  the  three major  candidates  make 
public  pronouncements  of  friendship, 
they are keeping a very careful eye on 
each other with a view to the next presi-
dential election in 1988. Right now, there 
is no doubt that Chirac holds the lead as 
head of the opposition. The o9inion _ poJls 
confirm this.  Giscard d'Estairrg is trying 
to make a comeback: Next fall, through a 
parliamentary by-election, he will proba-
bly be back in the National Assembly. 
Until then,  there are the elections to 
the  European  Parliament.  The  results 
will define, about halfway through Mitter-
rand's presidential mandate, the political 
landscape  of  France.  The opposition  is 
out to prove that, on June 17, the left will 
be a minority in the country (taking care 
that  its  calculations  include  the  emer-
gence of a far-right constituency led by 
former member of parliament Jean-Marie 
LePen). 
This election will give the Communists 
a  chance  to  count  their  numbers  and 
determine whether their participation in 
the  Government  is  paying  off.  Current 
opinion  polls  are  not  favorable  to  the 
Communists.  As  for  the Socialists,  they 
have  no  illusions:  The  social  and  eco-
nomic context is not good. 
The result, whatever the outcome of 
the election, will be an indicator-with no 
political price to pay and no impact on the 
makeup  of  the  National  Assembly-of 
how the wind is blowing. The most impor-
tant poll,  though, remains the legislative 
elections of  1986.  By  then,  Mitterrand 
has wagered,  the program of  economic 
austerity will have paid off.  E 
Bernard Mazieres writes on politics for the French 
weekly L 'Express. TION 
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PARIS  SHOWCASES 
NEW  ARCHITECTURE 
DESPITE  CONTROVERSY,  THE  BIGGEST 
BUILDING  DRIVE  IN  THIS  CENTURY  IS 
GOING  AHEAD. 
CAROLYN LESH 
P 
arisian  architecture has  a history 
rich in  controversy, with some of 
the most beloved monuments and 
museums  being  condemned  at  birth. 
When the Eiffel  Tower appeared on  the 
skyline 95 years ago, Parisian artists sent 
an open letter to the Mayor denouncing it 
as a "dizzy,  ridiculous tower dominating 
Paris  like  a  gigantic  factory  chimney." 
When  the  Georges  Pompidou  center 
opened its doors seven years ago, its oil-
refinery-like architecture produced a hail 
of criticism.  "Take a pretty woman and 
imagine her intestines on the outside and 
you know why,  physically and inevitably, 
it is ugly," one newspaper critic wrote at 
the  time,  comparing  the  center  to  "a 
mushroom  on  a  dank  wall."  The Eiffel 
Tower  suryived  its  detractors  and  for 
decades ruled the French capital as  the 
most visited tourist site. It lost that honor 
only  a  few  years  ago  to  the  Georges 
Pompidou center. 
These days,  French government offi-
cials are fond  of recalling such past pro-
tests over controversial projects that be-
ca ~ .ae  architectural  wonders.  Their 
recollections come in the face of criticism 
about  certain  aspects  of  the  ambitious 
building  program  now  underway  in  the 
capital. Despite France's ailing economy, 
$1.8 billion will be spend on architectural, 
projects to be completed in  Paris during 
the  next  five  years.  It is  the  biggest 
building  drive  in  Paris this  century and 
the result of Socialist President Fran~ois 
Mitterrand's vow to give the capital "new 
cultural equipment.'' 
Mitterrand'  s  plans  include  the  con-
struction of the  Bastille opera  house,  a 
vast  renovation  project  for  the  Louvre 
museum,  the planned Arab  World  Insti-
tute, the Orsay museum for 19th century 
artwork,  an  expansion  of  the Pompidou 
center,  a  new  museum  of  science  and 
industry, a new national telecommunica-
tions  center,  and  new  quarters for  the 
42  EUROPE 
Ministries of Finance, Environment, and 
Urban Affairs. 
Many of the new constructions will be 
gleaming glass-and-steel structures that 
will add modernistic touches to the city's 
skyline of rooftop red chimneys. One such 
new building is the Arab World Institute, 
which is being built on the left bank of the 
Seine along the Quai Saint Bernard that 
fronts  part  of  the  Latin  Quarter. 
Other construction  projects  make  no 
attempt to alter the existing landscape of 
the capital. The Orsay museum, along the 
left bank of the Seine, is being built within 
the rococo  walls  of  the old  Orsay train 
station. Scheduled to open in  1986 at a 
renovation cost of $135 million, the mu-
seum will  house the state's collection of 
19th-century art from Eugene Delacroix 
to Henri Matisse. The new museum, di-
rectly across the Seine from the Louvre, 
will feature the entire contents of the Jeu 
de Paume and the Orangerie museums. 
Also crlong the Seine is the ultra-mod-
ern Bercy sports palace, which opened in 
February in Paris' bid to put itself on the 
international  sports  map.  The  massive 
indoor facility was masterminded by Paris 
Mayor Jacques Chirac, Mitterrand's con-
servative rival.  Built  of  glass,  concrete, 
steel, and brick, the 100-foot high build-
ing features "living walls" of grass grow-
ing on eight outer walls that slope at 45-
degree angles. 
The  cost  of  Bercy  pales,  however, 
when compared to the projected cost of 
Mitterrand's pet project-the $250-mil-
lion  proposed Bastille opera house.  The 
new opera house, along with Mitterrand's 
plans  to  renovate  the  Louvre,  have 
caused the most controversy among the 
current  construction  programs. 
Carlos Ott,  a 37 -year-old Uruguayan-
born  Canadian,  has  designed  the  new 
opera  complex.  It will  be  located  in  a 
working  class  neighborhood  in  eastern 
Paris around the Place de la Bastille, the 
starting point of the 1789 French revolu-
tion. It is  scheduled to open in  time for 
the bicentennial of  the revolution.  Ott's 
design was chosen from some 3,000 ap-
plicants. The new opera house has been 
praised for its boldness and imagination, 
while  critics have attacked its projected 
price. An association to fight its construc-
tion  has  been formed  by  residents  and 
businessmen who will be displaced by the 
expansive project covering 6.1 acres. 
While the new opera complex has been 
criticized for  its somewhat remote loca-
tion, the plans for renovating the Louvre 
have drawn fire  for the change it would 
bring  to  central  Paris.  Chinese-born 
American architect I.M. Pei has proposed 
putting  a  66-foot  glass  pyramid  in  the 
courtyard formed by the three wings of 
the  stately,  700-year-old  Louvre.  The 
pyramid, flanked by three mini-pyramids 
and water fountains, would top an under-
ground main entrance to the Louvre and 
a parking lot. Under the plan, the Finance 
Ministry  also  will  be  moved  out  of  its 
offices in the Louvre. No one denies that 
the  Louvre  needs  more  space-of the 
15,000 paintings  listed  in  the  Louvre's 
inventory, only 2,200 hang on its walls. 
Critics, however,  have denounced the 
pyramid, saying it would  block the view 
that runs through the Tuileries gardens 
to the Place de la Concorde. Architects at 
the government's department of histori-
cal monuments have howled that the pan-
oramic view of an elegant classical build-
ing will be spoiled. The renovation project 
led to the resignation last October of then 
Louvre  director  Andre  Chabaud,  who 
protested  that  the  plan  would  pose 
"architectural risks."  The French daily 
Le Monde attacked Pei directly by writ-
ing,  "just  because  he  likes  pyramids 
doesn't  mean  he  can  treat the  Louvre 
courtyard as an annex to Disneyland." 
Pei, who also designed the east wing of 
the National Gallery in Washington, D.C., 
has  said  the critics have  misunderstood 
his  concept.  "You  can't just walk  down 
into a sunken court," Pei said. "The Lou-
vre needs something prestigious. We  do 
not want to touch the building itself, but 
we  wanted to create a main entrance to 
the museum  that would  not  look  like  a 
subway entrance." 
Government officials do not seem to be 
taking  the  Louvre  criticism  to  heart. 
Commented Culture Minister 1  ack Lang: 
"In 20 years, the same people who have 
been fulminating against the pyramid will 
be the first to complain that the national 
heritage of Paris is being violated if ever 
there are plans to remove it." E 
Carolyn Lesh reports from Paris for the Associated 
Press. A taste of modern Parisian architecture, clockwise from above: the 
Georges Pompidou center, the most visited tourist sight in  Paris; a 
model of the new Bastille opera house; the Forum des Hailes, on the 
site of Paris' former central market; and a model of American 
architect I. M. Pei's pyramid for a new entrance to the Louvre. 
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prnvAstvr INFLUENcE- oN THE
cULTURES oF EuRoPE,
ROSE DOYLE
ever before have films been so
popular in EuroPe. All the indi-
cations are that PeoPle's  Passion
for movies is growing. But, it is also true
that today's audiences prefer to watch
them at home. Now, it is the small square
screen of television, not the silver screen
of the cinema, that holds sway. And there
is another, not so obvious, change. Eu-
rope's once-discerning  cinema-going  pub-
[C has become less so, and a lot less
addicted to European films. Apart from
the huge television audience, even the
larger cinemas in Europe are today domi-
nated by American films.
The most unhappy change of all is that
the film industry in Europe is facing its
most serious economic crisis ever. A re-
port from the European Parliament deal-
ing with the promotion  of film-making  in
the Community countries has come up
with some depressing statistics for the
European movie industry. The report
says that the American film industry  now
tai<es an overall 47 petcent share of the
main European markets  of Italy, France,
the United Kingdom, and the Federal
Republic of Germany. This leaves-5l  per-
cent to Europe's film leaders and 2 pet'
cent to share between the other six Com-
munity countries. So less than half the
market goes to a single industry, which
makes the Community the best foreign
market for American films. Again, the
development of television has meant that
the decline in the number of cinema-
goers over the last 25 years has varied
frorn 57 to 91 percent throughout the
member states.
The report points to the disastrous
effect the crisis is having in social terms
(on employment,  the standard of living'
and all tategories  of workers in the film
industry) as well as in cultural terms,
since it jeopardizes the future of a me-
dium for the cultural expression of every
European nation. It warns that time is
running out: It will soon be too late to
restore the cinema to its former preemi-
nent position as popular entertainment
unless the Community begins to deal with
what the report terms "anti-competitive"
practices by the American  film industry,
both by permitting and helping E.C'
member states to improve the distribu-
tion of European films and also by creat-
ing a distiibution system powerful
enough to compete on equal terms with
the major American  comPanies.
The report calls for a reversal of the
famous  dictum of Andr6 Malraux-"The
cinema is an industry, but it is also an
art." It is also concerned about the de-
cline in short films, feeling that all films,
as part of the Community's  cultural heri-
tage, should be afforded the same protec-
tion as other features of Europe's collec-
tive heritage.
Television offers no salvation. The film
industry's  earnings from the new mar-
kets which the medium has opened up are
derisory, since the cost of purchasing  a
film for a television  network represents,
It's as if you've never left home-American
fitms are shown everyrvhere in EuroPe'
z
o
3
)
z
t
uFrswLE/  E NT E RTAI N M E NT
on average,  no more than 3 percent of its
production cost-while the rate for one
minute's advertising is generally  enough
to cover the fee for broadcasting an en-
tire film. Films on television  come
cheaper for everyone, it seems. On the
othei hand, if television paid more for
films, the excessive numbers broadcast
would diminish (the broadcast rights for
one film are between nine and 25 times
less than an equivalent production  whose
costs are met by television).
The report reveals an "overwhelming
domination" by the American film indus-
try in Europe, with its two-fold  advan-
tage. Apart from the benefit of getting
the lion's share of the market, there is
also the pervasive  influence on the cul-
ture of Europe. In the recessional early
1930s, times not unlike today, U.S. Presi-
dent Herbert Hoover bluntly stated the
value, economic  and cultural,  of cinematic
dominance:  "Where the American film
penetrates  the market, we sell more
American  automobiles,  more baseball
caps, and more American  phonographs."
Wtrite acknowledging  the excellence  of,#; ; Grand*rr et dtradmnt iltmt d5
A reccnt report says that the American  film induitry now takes an ovelall 47 percent  share of the main EuroPean  ma.ketr of ltaly' France'
the United Kinrdom,  and the Federal RePublic  of Germany.
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many American films, the European Par-
liament's report indicates that the public
is not necessarily convinced that Ameri-
can movies are the only films worth see-
ing. Nevertheless, a meticulously  well
organized sales policy and the technical
perfection of U.S. films have combined  to
change public taste in favor of American-
style cinema. The public must choose
from the films on hand and the reality is
that most movies produced by the Euro-
pean film industry simply fail to gain
access to the market in other E.C. mem-
ber states.
This is the heart of the European film
industry's problem: Film scheduling is
controlled  by a group of large American
distribution  companies, known as the
"majors," who, before there was a Com-
mon Market in Europe, set up a sophisti-
cated and powerful network  there. It con-
trols test markets in capital cities and
first-release film theaters so that films
offered by other distribution  companies
(mostly non-American) have no effective
access to the market. In exchange for
box-office  films, the majors require cin-
ema managements to take all the other
films for which they have the distribution
right. The result leaves very little projec-
tion time for non-American films and
means that films which do not comply
with American  standards and taste in-
creasingly meet with public indifference.
To counter this situation, the Parlia-
ment's report calls for a commercial
structure on which European  films can
rely and for quick action before creative
cinema disappears. It wants a long-term
strategy for the film industry to meet
cultural and social needs. The E.C. Com-
mission has already taken steps toward
promoting  the Community's  film industry
in preparing, along with national televi-
sion authorities, a series of television
programs  which will present the cinema
of each E.C. member country to the pub-
lic in others. This is not enough, the
report feels. A European Film Festival  is
needed-on the Communitv's initiative.
and with its support, it should include aid
for the distribution industry itself.
There is a warning,  too, that the aboli-
tion of national aid would amount to the
complete disappearance  of the European
film industry. The Community is urged to
take a closer look at the truly non-com-
petitive practices on the part of the "ma-
jors," which have led to the closing of so
many local cinemas and turned smaller
conurbations into public wildernesses, as
well as alienating the cinema from its
public. There are also words about the
dangers  developing from the rapid move-
ment of cable and satellite television  and
video cassettes, as well as pirate record-
ings. The report's final plea is for the
Community to show both realism and
sensitivity-to build "the Europe of the
Treaty of Rome (establishing  the E.C.)
without destroying the cinema-which  is
one ramification  of the Europe of Cul-
ture." €
Rose Doyle writes from Brussels for the Irish
Times and reports for several  Irish radio stations.NEWS
OF THE
E.C.
E.C. PROPOSALS
WOULD LIGHTEN
FORMALTTIES
AT BORDERS
The much-publicized  border
blockades that snarled traffic
throughout  much of Europe in
February could have been
avoided had the E.C.'s Council
of Ministers acted on the E.C.
Commission's proposals to re-
form customs procedures,  ac-
cording to E.C. Commissioner
Karl-Heinz Narjes who is re-
sponsible  for the E.C.'s inter-
nal market. Narjes and Trans-
port Commissioner  Giorgios
Contogeorgis told Italian min-
isters recently that Council ac-
tion on pending legislation to
open up national frontiers to
intra-E.C. traffic could have
averted the massive  dem-
onstrations by European truck-
ers fed up with the adminis-
trative red tape they
encountered at  border
crossings.
The truckers blocked many
of Europe's  major road arteries
for several days. They were
protesting border-crossing  de-
lays touched off by a job action
by Italian customs officials
seeking  improved benefits and
working conditions. "When
things go wrong like this, it
illustrates vividly how far we
have to go before we have the
fully-effective internal market
which is so important for the
competitiveness of Community
industry and commerce and for
overcoming today's economic
problems," the Commission
said in reaction to the traffic
jams created by the truck
blockades.
The Commission has made
dozens of proposals in recent
years aimed at removing the
red tape that still hinders much
intra-E.C. trade. At least 10
proposals to that end put be-
fore the Council of Ministers in
1982 are still awaiting ap-
proval. Narjes told the press
that by creating the traffic
chaos the truckers in a sense
had done Europe a favor by
drawing public attention to the
problem and perhaps by pro-
viding a new impetus for solv-
ing it.
Among the Commission  pro-
posals designed to streamline
internal E.C. customs proce-
dures is the adoption of a uni-
form customs document to re-
place the myriad of forms that
presently  exist. The Benelux
countries have already  adopted
such a document and will begin
to use it as of July 1984. An-
other Commission  proposal  de-
signed to speed up the flow of
traffic across Europe's borders
involves shifting value-added
tax payment sites from frontier
posts to locations further into
the interior of each country
One of the most positive
developments to date in reduc-
ing administrative  obstacles  to
trade between E.C. countries
was a proposal  adopted by E.C.
Transport Ministers in Decem-
ber 1983. The ministers
agreed that each E.C. country
should centralize its various
controls and formalities at a
single location,  replace system-
atic controls with spot-checks,
and increase cooperation be-
tween the different national
customs  services in running
frontier posts and coordinating
working hours at those posts.
POLTS PREDICT
GOOD TURNOUT
FOR ELEGTIONS
TO PARLTA]IIENT
Election fever is not likely to
take Europe by storm as the
June 1984 election date for
members of the European Par-
liament approaches, but E.C.
policymakers  hope interest in
the event will increase before
Euro-voters  go to the polls. In
a recently published survey
taken by the E.C. Commission
in late 1983, a scant 14 per-
cent of E.C. citizens  questioned
knew about the June elections
Pieter Dankert, President of the
European ParliamenL
-only 
the second direct elec-
tions in the European Parlia-
ment's history.
Almost twice that number
knew equally far in advance
about the Parliament's  first di-
rect elections in L979. When
told about the elections,  49
percent of those surveyed said
they would definitely vote and
24 percent said they would
probably vote. About 42 per-
cent thought the upcoming
election would have important
consequences, while 32 per-
cent classified it as an "un-
important event."
The survey showed that only
one person in two had recently
seen or heard something in the
media about the European  Par-
liament-about  the same level
of public awareness  as in 1979.
But despite the lack of in-
formed opinion about the Par-
liament, the body is generally
viewed  in a positive light by the
Community's  voters. Slightly
more than two-thirds of those
surveyed said the Parliament
should have more power and a
greater say in how the Com-
munity is run. However,  opin-
ion was about equally divided
on the question of whether the
Parliament could actually solve
Europe's major problems.
Perhaps surprisingly, the
European Parliament's  mem-
bers did not fare as well as the
institution itself in the public
opinion rating. About two-
thirds of those surveyed said
the members of the European
Parliament  were too remote
from the problems of the peo-
ple who elected them. Only 11
percent disagreed with that es-
timation. The British and the
Irish were the most critical of
the European Parliament's
members,  while the Germans
were the least critical.Although the Luxembourg-
ers and Danes seemed to be
the best informed about the
Parliament's activities, the
Belgians knew more than their
other Community counterparts
about the June elections.  The
election's importance  was
rated highest by the Greeks
and the Italians and lowest by
the Germans and Dutch. Over-
all, 87 percent of the Greeks
and 82 percent of the Italians
questioned  said they would
probably cast a ballot in the
elections, compared with only
48 percent of the Belgians.
E.G. URGES
LESS ATRLTNE
REGUTATION
American-style  airline deregu-
lation is not the right prescrip-
tion for keeping Europe's air
routes profitable and its air
fares affordable,  the E.C. Com-
mission said recently in a re-
port on the development of an
E.C. air-transport policy. Al-
though the Commission  said
that less stringent regulation
of air fares and services  within
the E.C. could force Europe's
airlines to provide more effi-
cient service, it said there
were too many differences
between the European and
American  air transport indus-
tries for wholesale  deregula-
tion to be feasible in the E.C.
The United States deregu-
lated its airline industry in
L978, enacting legislation that
repealed  government restric-
tions on many aspects of the
airline business, including
fares, capacity, and market  en-
try. Whereas U.S. airlines are
privately owned businesses,
most of Europe's major air-
lines, however, are state-
owned and thus state-financed.
For this reason, E.C. policy-
makers fear that simple de-
regulation  of air routes and
fares within the Community,
rather than promoting more
legitimate competition among
the E.C.'s major carriers,
would set off a stampede for
government subsidies.
The Community  Air Trans-
port Policy proposed by the
Commission  in March compro-
mises between complete  de-
regulation  and the free compe-
tition mandated, at least in
theory, by the European  Eco-
nomic Community's  founding
Treaty of Rome for all E.C.
businesses-including  the air-
lines. "The direct application
of competition rules would lead
to revolution," Frederik Sor-
ensen, chief of the E.C.'s air-
transport  division, told an in-
dustry audience  recently. He
said the challenge was to es-
tablish fair and equitable op-
portunities for the airlines
while still limiting the amount
of competition  between them.
between the two. However, it
would allow a government to
intervene to insist that its own
national airline provide at least
25 percent of the service on a
given route.
The proposals would also
prohibit governments from im-
posing capacity sharing or rev-
enue pooling on intra-E.C. air
routes. Pools are agreements
in which the airline that col-
lects more revenue  from a par-
ticular route shares it with the
less profitable airline. Europe's
current system of air-transport
regulation has come under in-
Economic  output in the E.C.
increased by an average of only
0.8 percent in 1983. The Com-
mission attributed the brighter
prospects  for economic growth
this year to a recovery in world
trade and the effects of the
"corrective" economic  policies
adopted by many E.C. coun-
tries. However, the Commis-
sion said that the level of U.S.
interest rates, the value of the
U.S. dollar, and the size of the
U.S. budget deficit remain key
uncertainties  in the E.C.'s eco-
nomic outlook for 1984.
The Commission cited an
upsurge  in business confidence
and in investment intentions as
signs that the E.C.'s economy
will improve in 1984. It said
the outlook for increased  in-
dustrial investment  was par-
ticularly good in Denmark  and
the Netherlands,  but also
bright in France and the
United Kingdom. The Com-
mission said 1984 will see an
increase in business invest-
ment in the E.C. of an average
of. 2 percent following three
years of decline in real terms.
Inllation rates in the E.C.
countries (excluding  Greece)
this year are expected  to range
from 3.1 percent in the Neth-
erlands to 10.5 percent in It-
aly. The average inllation rate
across the E.C. in 1984 is fore-
cast at 5.2 percent, down from
6.2 percent in 1983. The ex-
pected decline in inflation will
add to the real disposable in-
comes of E.C. householders
and thus could increase private
consumption  by as much as 1.1
percent this year, compared
with 0.9 percent in 1983.
The news on the E.C.'s em-
ployment front, however, re-
mains relatively  bleak. Unem-
ployment  in Europe continued
its rise in 1983, though  more
slowly than in 1982. At the end
of January 1984, some L2.9
million people in the Commu-
nity were unemployed,
600,000  more than at the end
of January 1983. The modest
economic growth expected  in
the E.C. this year is not ex-
pected to reduce the Commu-
nity's overall unemployment
rate, but the employment  pic-
ture could improve toward the
end of the year. The Commis-
Relaxing current airline restrictions would give consumers a wider
variety of choice and would lower air fares.
Relaxing current airline re-
strictions would give consum-
ers a wider variety of choice
and would lower air fares,
while giving innovative  and ef-
ficient airlines a wider scope
for profits, the E.C. Commis-
sion told Community Trans-
port Ministers in presenting its
proposals. These restrictions
could be relaxed in such a way
as not to interfere with national
social and economic  objectives,
the Commission  said. The pro-
posals generally would bar E.C.
governments from granting fi-
nancial aid to their national
airlines.
Within the E.C., state-
owned national airlines may
hold a virtual monopoly on air
travel within their own national
boundaries. National govern-
ments decide whether or not to
license other airline companies
and negotiate flying rights with
other countries. The proposals
would prohibit two E.C. na-
tions from agreeing to each
take a 50-50 share for their
national airlines on air travel
creased  attack in recent years
from critics that charge that
the system's rigidity has al-
lowed airfares to become arti-
fically high. Critics of the pres-
ent system complain that a
one-way  economy flight be-
tween the E.C. cities of London
and Athens often costs as much
as a round-trip  flight from Lon-
don to New York.
E.C. FOREGASTS
II'IPROYED GDP
GROWTH IN '84
The E.C. member  countries'
economies this year probably
will grow by more than previ-
ously expected, but the upturn
will not be strong enough to
cut unemployment, the E.C.
Commission  reported  recently.
In a March report, the Com-
mission said it now expects  the
E.C.'s gross domestic product
to climb by 2 percent in 1984,
up from the 1.5-percent
growth forecast it issued last
October.
MAY/ll  INF lcn.sion said employment pros-
pects differ widely among the
E.C.'s members. The Federal
Republic of Germany  and the
United Kingdom actually may
experience reductions  in their
jobless rates, the first such de-
clines since 1979.
ll.s. REIECTS
GALL FOR
GURBS ON WINE
titPoRTs
The U.S. International Trade
Commission  (trc) in March ef-
fectively denied a call by U.S.
winemakers for penalty duties
on American  imports of French
and Italian table wines. The lrc
unanimously rejected allega-
tions brought by an American
industry group that imports
from France and Italy had hurt
the U.S. domestic wine indus-
try. The group, the American
Grape Growers Alliance for
Free Trade, had complained
that American grape growers
had lost money and that U.S.
winemakers  had suffered be-
cause American wines had
been forced to compete with
unfairly traded imports.
The growers claimed that
the French and Italian wines in
question benefited from gov-
ernment subsidies and were
being sold in the United States
for less than they were worth.
The group asked the U.S. Gov-
ernment to impose  counter-
vailing and anti-dumping duties
on the French and Italian wines
to offset allegedly unfair com-
petitive advantages  they en-
joyed in the U.S. market. The
Itc's ruling, however, in effect
ended the government's  inves-
tigation into the charges.
The E.C. Commission,
which had been involved in the
wine case on behalf of E.C.
members France and Italy,
welcomed  the trade agency's
ruling. The E.C. had vigorously
denied the charges that French
and Italian wines were being
subsidized or dumped-that  is,
sold at less than their f.air
value-on the U.S. market.
The French and Italian wines
covered by the complaints  ac-
counted for about $300 million
worth of U.S.-E.C. trade. The
E.C. had warned the United
States that a decision to im-
pose penalty duties on these
wines could have set off a chain
reaction of protectionism  in the
agricultural trade sector, with
wide ranging consequences for
U.S.-E.C. trade relations.
SPENDINGGURBS
FOR TOURISTS
RULED IILEGAI
Some European tourists may
soon be able to travel abroad
with a little more money in
their pockets following a re-
cent ruling by the E.C. Court of
Justice. Earlier this year, the
court ruled that it was illegal
for E.C. countries to stop their
citizens from taking money
abroad to pay for tourism, busi-
ness trips, foreign study, or
health care.
The ruling was a setback for
France and Italy, two E.C.
countries that impose  such
controls. French and Italian au-
thorities had urged the court to
uphold their right to control
foreign exchange outflows by
adopting  a narrow interpreta-
tion of portions of the E.C.'s
founding treaties pertaining to
payments, capital, and trade in
services between E.C. states.
The Court of Justice  is the "su-
preme court" in matters of
E.C. law. As such, it is often
called upon to interpret the
founding treaties that serve as
the E.C.'s constitution.
The court's decision came in
a case referred to it after an
Italian court in Genoa had fined
two Italian citizens for taking
more money outside Italian
borders than the permitted
500,000 lire (about $310) per
year. The two people claimed
that the money was for tourism
and medical treatment and to-
gether they challenged Italy's
right to bar them from taking
money out of the country for
those purposes. At issue was
whether the tourism  and
health-care funds constituted
"payments" in exchange for
services or were instead move-
ments of capital. The E.C.
treaties give member coun-
tries more leeway to restrict
capital outflows,  while they
provide for a relatively free
flow of payments between
member countries.
The court generally agreed
with two the Italians. The 11-
member tribunal upheld the
authority  of an E.C. member to
impose foreign-exchange  con-
trols as a means of verifying
that its citizens were not ille-
gally investing abroad. How-
ever, it ruled out limits on
foreign payments that could
impinge on the normal free ex-
change of services between
E.C. member countries, num-
bering education, tourism, and
medical care among these ser-
vices. The court's decision was
welcomed  by the E.C. Commis-
sion, which has consistently
pushed for fewer restrictions
on trade in goods, services, la-
bor, and capital.
GREENLAND
PREPARES TO
LEAVE E.G.
Greenland, the world's largest
island, will withdraw from the
European Community as of
January 1, 1985, but will keep
close ties with the E. C. under
a draft agreement recently ap-
proved by the Community's
Council of Ministers. Green-
land, a Danish dependency,  be-
came part of the E. C. when
Denmark joined in 1973. After
Greenland's  local government
won semi-autonomy  under
Denmark's Home Rule Act in
1979, it expressed its wish to
leave the E. C.
In a 1981 statement, the
Greenland government said it
wanted Greenland  to withdraw
from the E. C. in order to pre-
Y
z I
F
E
o
1
I 2 z
o
F
lo
TJ
Harbor of Jakobshavn  in Greenlandserve its identity and maintain 
local  control  of  its  fishing 
trade.  Greenland's  citizens 
then voted in  favor of leaving 
the  E. C.  in  a  1982  referen-
dum.  However,  the  island's 
government said it wanted to 
maintain  Greenland's  close 
·links  with  Denmark and  with 
Europe  and  requested  it  be 
granted  "Overseas  Countries 
and  Territories" (OCT)  status. 
The OCTs  are dependencies of 
E. C. member countries whose 
products  receive  preferential 
access to Community markets. 
The OCTs  include  the  British 
Virgin  Islands,  Guadeloupe, 
and the Netherlands Antilles. 
The  Council  of  Ministers 
this  year resolved  the last of 
the outstanding issues involved 
in setting the terms of Green-
land's  departure  from  the 
Community.  On  the  key  is-
sue-fishing  rights-the 
Council agreed that the Com-
munity  would  compensate 
Greenland  in  exchange  for 
guaranteed  access  to  Green-
land's waters. 
The fisheries protocol is part 
of  an  overall  1  0-year  accord 
defining  Greenland's  future 
relationship with the E. C.  Be-
cause  that  accord  requires 
changes  in  the  E. C.'s  basic 
·treaties, it must be ratified by 
the national parliaments of the 
E. C.'s  10  member  countries 
before becoming law.  The na-
tional parliaments should have 
ample time to act on the accord 
before  Greenland's  formal 
withdrawal  from  the  E. C.  at 
the start of next year. 
Under the fisheries protocol, 
the Community will be allowed 
to catch specified quotas of fish 
in  Greenland's  waters for  an 
initial five-year  period follow-
ing Greenland's withdrawal. In 
return the Community will pay 
Greenland about $23 million a 
year. 
NEWLY 
INDEPENDENT 
ISLANDS JOIN 
LOME PACT 
The newly independent Carib-
bean nation of St. Christopher 
and  Nevis  (also  known  as St. 
Kitts-Nevis)  on  March  5  be-
came  the  newest  member  of 
the Lome Convention, a trade-
and-aid pact that links the E. C. 
with about half of the world's 
developing countries. The two 
islands, a former British depen-
dency,  became  self-governing 
in  1967  and  independent  in 
1983. Together they now form 
a single country with a popula-
tion  estimated  at  close  to 
44,000. 
The accession of St. Christo-
pher and  Nevis  to the  Lome 
accord makes that country the 
64th Lome member worldwide 
and the 12th in  the Caribbean 
region.  St.  Christopher  and 
Nevis first  became associated 
with the E. C. in 1976 when, as 
a British dependency it became 
one  of  the  Community's 
"Overseas Countries and Ter-
ritories.'' As  a member of the 
Lome Convention, St. Christo-
pher  and  Nevis  will  receive 
trade  concessions  from  the 
E. C. as well as about $1.9 mil-
lion  in  financial  and  technical 
assistance. 
E.C. REDUCES 
DEPENDENCE 
ON FOREIGN OIL 
Europe  has  halved  its depen-
dence on imported oil over the 
past decade, but can't afford to 
relax  its  efforts  to  become 
more  energy  self-sufficient, 
the E.C.  Commission  said  re-
cently in a report on the E.C.'s 
energy strategy for  the next 
decade.  The Commission  said 
Europe hardly produced any oil 
at all in 1973-the year of the 
first  oil  price  shock.  During 
that  year,  imported  oil  ac-
counted for 62 percent of the 
E.C.'s total energy needs.  By 
1983,  however,  imported  oil 
only accounted for 32 percent 
of the E.C.'s energy use. The 
Commission attributed the de-
cline in imports to energy con-
servation and the development 
of  Europe's  petroleum  re-
sources in the North Sea. 
Energy saving measures and 
diversification into other forms 
of energy like coal and nuclear 
power-coupled  with  the  ef-
fects  of  the  recession-have 
meant that the use of oil  has 
declined relative to other en-
Platforms for processing, drilling, and living quarters on an offshore 
oil rig in the North Sea. 
ergy sources. In  1973, oil  ac-
counted for over 60 percent of 
the  E.C.'s  total  energy  con-
sumption.  By  last year it  had 
fallen  to  48  percent  and  by 
1990 is expected to fall  to 43 
percent. The E.C. will  still be 
relying on imported petroleum, 
however, for about a third of its 
energy needs at the end of the 
decade. 
This  continued  dependence 
on imported oil would make the 
E.C.  vulnerable-though  less 
so than in the past and in vary-
ing  degrees  from  country  to 
country-should political  ten-
sions in the Middle East lead to 
a third oil crisis. Denmark, Ire-
land,  Italy,  Greece,  and  the 
Nether  lands  will  still  depend 
on oil for at least 50 percent of 
their energy requirements by 
1990.  The  Commission  pre-
dieted that the members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting  Countries  probably 
would supply a larger share of 
those  imports  in  the  future 
than they do today. 
The  Commission  said  that 
the results of its research show 
that  the  E.C.  members  who 
have  most  actively  pursued 
policies to promote energy in-
dependence  have  been  most 
successful  in  encouraging  al-
ternatives  to  oil  in  electrical 
power generation.  It said  the 
combined role of solid fuels and 
nuclear  power  in  generating 
the E.C.'s electricity will  con-
tinue·  to rise through the end of 
the decade. 
In  1990,  nuclear  power  is 
expected to be providing close 
to  40  percent  of  the  E.C.'s 
electricity, while solid fuels and 
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account for about 80 percent of 
the electrical power generated 
in  the  Community.  When  hy-
droelectric  and  other  renew-
able  power sources are taken 
into account,  the Commission 
estimates  that  oil  could  ac-
count for less than 10 percent 
of  the  fuel  used  in  Europe's 
electrical power plants. 
In a recent shorter-term re-
port on the E. C.'s energy situa-
tion,  the Commission said the 
economic  growth  expected in 
the E.C. in 1984 will boost the 
Community's energy needs for 
the first time in five years. The 
anticipated  2  percent  gain  in 
the  E.C.'s  gross  domestic 
product is expected to raise the 
Community's  energy  use 
slightly,  but not by  enough to 
stimulate oil imports. 
In  1983, the E.C.'s  energy 
consumption fell by just over 1 
percent, following  steeper de-
clines  in  the  previous  three 
years. The Community's oil de-
mand  fell  by  4.6  percent  in 
1983, while oil imports fell  by 
12 percent.  Coal  demand  de-
clined  4  percent  last  year, 
while  demand  for  natural gas 
and electricity each increased 
about 2 percent. There was a 
22 percent increase during the 
year in the amount of electric-
ity produced by the Communi-
ty's  nuclear  power  plants  as 
several  new  power  facilities 
came on line. Over 20 percent 
of the E.C.'s electricity supply 
presently derives from nuclear 
sources. 
AID ROUNDUP 
The E.C. Commission recently 
authorized the following emer-
gency  or  development  assis-
tance  projects  (1  European 
Currency  Unit,  or  ECU  = 
$0.86): 
Emergency  Aid-Swazi-
land: 100,000 ECU to purchase 
vital supplies for victims of cy-
clone  "Domoina,"  which 
caused  numerous  deaths,  de-
stroyed homes,  and  disrupted 
essential services in that coun-
try  .... Mozambique:  1.3  mil-
lion  ECU  for  the purchase and 
transport of about 1,300 tons 
of corn and bean seeds to fight 
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the famine  caused by  drought 
and other severe weather con-
ditions.  Mozambique's  Gaza 
and  Inhambane  regions  have 
been afflicted by drought dur-
ing  the  past  several  months 
and  some  districts have  been 
dry  for  several  years.  The 
drought  has  already  claimed 
100,000 lives and has affected 
another 800,000 people. In ad-
dition, a violent cyclone struck 
Mozambique's  Maputo  prov-
ince  recently,  causing  exten-
sive damage to infrastructure, 
crops, and livestock. The E.C. 
already has allocated a total of 
2.6  million  ECU  to  Mozam-
bique's disaster victims. It sees 
the  corn  and  bean-seed  ship-
ments  as  a  first  step  in  re-
launching  agriculture  in  some 
of the disaster areas. The E. C. 
also  allocated  500,000 ECU  to 
Mozambique  to purchase pro-
visions  for  those  affected  by 
cyclone  damage .... Maurita-
nia: 500,000 ECU in aid to pro-
vide  medical  care  and  trans-
port  foodstuffs  to  drought 
victims .... Mali: 160,000 ECU 
to buy medicines, medical sup-
plies,  and  high-protein  food-
stuffs for  drought victims and 
to fight an increase in disease 
epidemics .... Niger:  500,000 
ECU  for  drought  relief.  The 
drought,  which  covers  large 
portions  of  West  Mrica,  has 
affected 930,000 people, many 
of whom  had  been considered 
in  need  of  immediate  relief. 
The E.C.  aid  will  be  used  to 
purchase grain and distribute it 
to drought victims .... Ghana: 
a 500,000 ECU contribution to a 
private  relief  effort  involving 
the transport of 3,000 tons of 
grain to Ghana. The grain, pur-
chased by  the Danish govern-
ment, will  be delivered by the 
private  relief  group,  Dan-
churchaid. The grain shipment 
will  help  compensate  for  a 
drastic decline  in  Ghana's do-
mestic grain production caused 
by drought. ... 
Emergency  Food  Aid-
Haiti: 2,000 metric tons of rice 
to relieve hunger caused by  a 
severe  drought .... Nicara-
gua: 1,000 tons of grain via the 
World Council of Churches .... 
Peru: 300 tons of vitamin-en-
riched  skimmed  milk  powder. 
Peru  has  been  hit  by  floods, 
which  followed  closely on  the 
heels  of  a  drought .... Tuni-
sia: 4,000 tons of grain to off-
set a shortfall in that country's 
crop production.  Bad  weather 
conditions last year caused Tu-
nisia's grain  output to plunge 
from 1.28 million tons in 1982 
to  863,000 tons in  1983. The 
E.C. grain will meet the needs 
of  120,000  people  for  about 
three months. Its value is esti-
mated at 740,000 ECU. 
Aid  to Non-Associated De-
veloping Countries: Hondu-
ras: 9 million ECU to help con-
solidate an agricultural reform 
program  in  southern  Hon-
duras.  The program proposes 
to set up a regional agricultural 
extension service in Choluteca 
and Valle provinces where land 
has  already  been  distributed. 
The service would provide the 
245 cooperatives in the agrar-
ian reform area and 100 or so 
small  private  owners  with  in-
puts and basic services that ex-
isting  institutions  have  been 
unable  to  supply .... Indone-
sia:  7. 5  million  ECU  for  the 
West  Pasaman irrigation proj-
ect.  The  project  will  irrigate 
the  fields  of  3,200  farming 
families. 
European  Development 
Fund-Lesotho: a  5.3 million 
ECU  grant,  plus  an  8.8-million 
ECU special loan to pave a grav-
elled  highway  that  links  the 
capital of Maseru with the agri-
culturally  important  south 
western lowlands and the east-
ern highlands and border coun-
try  .... Comores:  2.3  million 
ECU  to continue  a  project de-
signed to develop com produc-
tion  in  that  country .... 
Guinea-Bissau:  3.25  million 
for a bridge over the Campossa 
river.  The  bridge  will  enable 
the eastern part of the country 
to  benefit  from  new  highway 
construction .... Member 
Countries of the African and 
Mauritian  Common  Organi-
zation  (Benin,  Central Afri-
can  Republic,  Gabon,  Ivory 
Coast,  Mauritius,  Niger, 
Rwanda,  Senegal,  Seychelles, 
Togo,  and Upper  Volta)  and 
other African states: 4.5 mil-
lion ECU to expand and improve 
regional  training  schools  for 
construction  engineers .... 
Caricom: a 16-million ECU spe-
cial  loan  for  the  purchase  of 
four new aircraft for  the Lee-
ward  Islands  Air  Transport 
Ltd. airline owned by 11 Carib-
bean governments. It provides 
a public air transport service in 
the  eastern Caribbean .... Si-
erra  Leone:  1.55  million  ECU 
for a drinking-water project for 
the rural population of the Pork 
Loko/Kambia  districts .... Li-
beria: 880,000 ECU to improve 
agricultural training programs 
at the Rural Development In-
stitute in Suakoko .... Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Mauri-
tius,  Swaziland,  Tanzania, 
Uganda,  Zambia,  Botswana, 
Ethiopia,  Kenya,  Seychelles, 
Sudan,  Somalia,  and Zimba-
bwe: 1 million ECU for a regional 
education  and  training  pro-
gram ....  Botswana: a  special 
loan of 800,000 ECU to provide 
a line of credit to the National 
Development  Bank  of  Bo-
tswana  to  help  fund  the  na-
tion's  agricultural  and  indus-
trial  development  programs. 
... Domenica: 560,000 ECU to 
provide  for  the  replanting, 
weeding  and  fertilizing,  and 
other care of 690 acres of lime 
trees. The project is part of a 
program designed to diversify 
Dominica's agriculture so that 
its farmers  no  longer  depend 
on  bananas as their sole  cash 
crop .... Solomon  Islands:  1 
million  ECU for a line of credit 
to stimulate industrial and eco-
nomic development in that na-
tion. 
STRONGER TIES 
WITH LATIN 
AMERICA 
URGED FOR E.C. 
At  the initiative  of  one  of  its 
Vice-Presidents,  Wilhelm  Ha-
ferkamp, the E.C. Commission 
has requested the E. C. Council 
to approve a number of guide-
lines  designed  to  strengthen 
and intensify relations between 
the  Community  and  Latin 
America  as  part of  a  specific 
Community policy for  that re-
gion.  It proposed a number of 
measures in  the spheres of fi-
nancial cooperation, industrial, 
scientific and energy coopera-
tion, trade promotion, training, 
information  and  cultural  ex-changes. 
The  Commission  considers 
that these relations should re-
flect  the  Community's  many 
links-historical,  cultural,  po-
litical,  and  economic-with 
Latin America. This would fur-
ther the  two  sides'  economic 
and  political  interests, the ar-
eas  in  which  their economies 
complement  each  other,  and 
Latin  America's  development 
potential. 
The  Commission  sees  the 
time as being ripe for the Com-
munity and its member states 
to make determined moves to-
ward  strengthening  relations. 
It points to the willingness  of 
the  two  sides  to  resume  the 
institutional dialogue following 
the crisis in the south Atlantic, 
the support shown on the two 
sides at parliamentary level for 
a  rapprochement,  the conclu-
sion of the cooperation .  agree-
ment between the Community 
and the Andean Pact, and  the 
prospect  of  Spain  and  Portu-
gal's  joining  the  Community, 
these countries being particu-
larly close to Latin America. 
The  Community's  commit-
ment  to  Latin  America  is  all 
the  more  essential  at  a  time 
when  that  continent  is  going 
through  a  serious  economic 
and financial  crisis, but is also 
experiencing  a  positive  politi-
cal development in  th~ form of 
a  return  to  democracy.  The 
Commission  says  that  the 
Community,  having  advocated 
and encouraged these political 
changes  over  the  years,  now 
has a duty to support them by 
all the means available to it. 
E.C. PLANS 
PROGRAM FOR 
EMPLOYMENT 
OF DISABLED 
PEOPLE 
"Disabled  people  are  among 
those  most  severely  affected 
by  the  present  situation,  not 
merely by  unemployment, but 
also by the impact of budgetary 
austerity  which  has  cut  into 
many of  the essential support 
services on which disabled peo-
ple depend in their struggle to 
maintain  an  independent  way 
of life, and in turn, their capac-
ity and motivation for employ-
ment." 
These  were  E.C.  Commis-
sioner Ivor Richard's words to 
a recent conference organized 
by the Commission on the em-
ployment  of  disabled  people. 
The  conference  brought  to-
gether nearly  a  hundred par-
ticipants  from  government 
bodies and voluntary organiza-
land,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands,  and  the  United 
Kingdom).  The  exhibit  de-
scribes and explains the Euro-
pean  Community,  its  history, 
its goals,  and  its place  in  the 
world. 
The E.C. presence this year 
follows  a Community tradition 
of  participation  in  World's 
Fairs since the 1958 event in 
Brussels,  Belgium.  The Com-
munity welcomed this opportu-
nity  to  participate in  a fair  in 
the United States in a city with 
strong  ties  to  Europe.  The 
E.C.  also  exhibited  in  North 
America  in  1962  in  Seattle, 
Washington, at EXPO  1967 in 
Montreal,  Canada,  and  at the 
1982 World's Fair in Knoxville. 
tions,  from  rehabilitation cen-r----________  l._  _________ _  __j 
ters and the social partners, as 
well as the leaders of the dis-
trict projects on the social inte-
gration of disabled people, set 
up  as  part of  the  action  pro-
gram  adopted  by  the  E.C. 
Council in December 1981. 
The  conference  itself,  also 
an  important  element  of  the 
same  action  program,  had  as 
its aim the definition of princi-
ples  and  policy  guidelines  for 
action to promote the employ-
ment of disabled people, which 
the Commission intends to pre-
sent as a draft instrument for 
adoption by the Council in the 
near future. 
E.C. TAKES 
PART IN NEW 
ORLEANS 
WORLD'S 
FAIR 
The European Community pa-
vilion at the 1984 World's Fair 
in New Orleans, Louisiana, will 
feature a new audiovisual sys-
tem,  "Rondovision."  Using 
only one projection device, the 
system  covers  the  whole  pe-
rimeter area of a 52-foot-diam-
eter rotunda with a continuous 
dynamic image.  In  this way,  a 
new,  impressive vision  is  cre-
ated which earlier was possible 
only  with  the  use  of  nine  or 
more projectors. The 360-de-
gree  projector  was  produced 
especially for the E. C. pavilion. 
As  in  the  World's  Fair  in 
Knoxville, Tennessee, the E.C. 
member states participating at 
New Orleans, France and Italy, 
will have their own exhibitions 
sharing a common facade with 
the E.C. pavilion. 
The E. C. pavilion represents 
the European Community and 
all its member states (Belgium, 
Denmark, Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, Greece, Ire-
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MICHAEL D. MOSETTIG 
T 
he career of Roy Jenkins synthe-
sizes two themes of modern Brit-
ish politics-the struggle for the 
soul of Socialism and the influence of the 
European idea as a maker and wrecker of 
careers and historical reputations. In this 
succinct and  graceful masterpiece of  bi-
ography, author and critic John Campbell 
has presented a vivid portrait of Jenkins 
the politician.  He also draws the reader 
into the excitement of British politics of 
the  1950s and  1960s, especially on the 
Labor side, when an assemblage of bright 
and talented young politicans was trying 
to stake out the direction of its society at 
home and in the world. 
Campbell's  book  makes  fascinating 
reading because it so skillfully blends the 
personal  struggles  for  power  with  the 
intellectual and ideological motivations of 
such rivals and allies as Jenkins, Anthony 
Crosland,  Richard  Crossman,  Denis 
Healy and Anthony Benn, as well as their 
leaders Hugh  Gaitskell and  Harold  Wil-
son. This is not a full-scale personal biog-
raphy and certainly not a Freudian one, 
but it offers perceptive glimpses and in-
sights on Jenkins's personal path from a 
Welsh  town  through  Oxford  to  Hamp-
stead. This development, plus his moder-
ate instincts  and  refined  tastes,  helped 
set him apart from his Labor colleagues 
who later in life tried to rediscover their 
long-buried or non-existent roots in  the 
working class. 
Yet, what really sets Jenkins apart from 
the rest, according to Campbell,  is  that 
early in his career he established an inde-
pendent reputation as a promoter of Eu-
ropean unity and of British participation 
in  Europe.  Jenkins  had  distinguished 
stints  in  the  Aviation  Ministry  and  the 
Home  Office  and  then  he  rescued  the 
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Wilson  Government, after the 1967 de-
valuation,  as  Chancellor  of  the  Exche-
quer. Nevertheless, as Campbell asserts, 
it was Jenkins's role as a European that 
ultimately created the ups and downs of 
his career and reputation. 
Future historians and biographers will 
have to go  back to Campbell's book be-
cause it captures the moments of exhila-
ration and the years of torment that the 
European  issue  has  brought  to  British 
politics and especially to the Labor party. 
Nearly 40 years after a Labor Govern-
ment rejected the invitation  to join  the 
Schuman plan for pooling European coal 
and  steel resources and  15 years after 
another  Labor  Government  began  the 
Common Market entry negotiations com-
pleted by the Tories in 1972, the issue of 
Europe still runs like a fault line through 
the British Socialist movement. 
Campbell's  book  portrays  another 
failed vision as well. Jenkins and others of 
the moderate left saw a Labor party mov-
ing away from class struggle, doctrinaire 
Socialism, and parochialism and hoped to 
lead a classless,  non-ideological,  and  in-
ternationalist party. Events of the 1970s 
turned  that  vision  into  dust.  By  1976, 
when Wilson stepped down as Prime Min-
ister,  it  was  clear  already  that neither 
Jenkins  nor  anyone  of  his  stripe  would 
ever lead the party. 
As Labor turned more isolationist, anti-
European, and ideological, the choices for 
such  moderates  as Jenkins  grew  more 
difficult.  His  good  fortune,  despite  the 
many frustrations of the job,  was to as-
sume the Presidency of the E. C. Commis-
sion in Brussels in  1977. Campbell sums 
up the Brussels phase of Jenkins's career, 
even  while  acknowledging  such  accom-
plishments as  the monetary union,  with 
the observation: "It is really a waste of a 
major  politican  to  condemn  him  to  the 
frustration of Brussels; and yet it takes a 
major politician to achieve even as little 
as Jenkins did." 
Four years removed from domestic of-
fice  and  the  center  of  British  politics, 
Jenkins was  ideally  poised  to grasp the 
leadership of the homeless center-left in 
1981. With far more energy, verve, and 
elan than his opponents expected him to 
devote  to  the  task,  Jenkins  created  a 
powerful new political force in the Social 
Democratic-Liberal alliance. 
Again,  Campbell skillfully brings alive 
this  brief  epoch  of  British  politics,  its 
internal rivalries, as well as its ability to 
capture the enthusiasm of a middle class 
disenchanted with the hard left of Labor 
and  hard  right  of  the  Tories.  Unfortu-
nately for American readers, this edition 
aimed at college readers ends as a cam-
paign biography in the runup to the 1983 
general elections and has Jenkins all but 
poised  on  the  doorstep  of  Number  10 
Downing Street. The lack of an update is 
a  major  drawback for  an  otherwise su-
perb piece of biography.  The only other 
flaw  is  attributing to President Franklin 
D.  Roosevelt, not to Harry Truman, the 
Marshall  Plan  and  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Jenkins, in a great British tradition, is 
also an accomplished and prolific author. 
One literary assignment he turned down 
in  1952, however, was the biography of 
Ernest Bevin.  Instead,  the job  went  to 
Oxford  historian  Alan  Bullock,  best 
known to American readers for his Hitler, 
a Study in Tyranny. More than 30 years 
after he  took  up  the  task,  Bullock  has 
completed  the  last  of  a  three-volume 
work, this one concentrating on  Bevin's 
six dramatic years as Foreign Secretary 
after World War II. The bulk and price of 
this book will keep it off the shelves of all 
but specialists and libraries. Even so, with 
its reliance on papers only recently made 
available  to historians,  it will  stand as a 
major  and  invaluable  source  of  a  still 
much-debated period. 
One point does emerge clearly from his 
mass  of  material-just  how  lucky  the 
British and  their Western allies were to 
have had Bevin in the Foreign Office after 
Clement  Attlee  and  the  Labor  Party 
achieved their surprising ouster of Win-
ston Churchill  at war's end.  Bevin's ca-
reers as a trade unionist and as the war-
time  Minister  of  Labor  were  brilliant. 
Even so, there was little reason to expect 
a man with such little training or experi-
ence in foreign affairs would go into his-tory as one of the most important Foreign 
Secretaries of the century and the last to 
achieve a policy  reputation independent 
of his Prime Minister. 
Controversy  inevitably  will  surround 
the  record  of  a  secretary  whom  time 
placed in the role of withdrawing Britain 
from Palestine, aligning it firmly with the 
United States in the Cold  War,  grasping 
the offer of Marshall Plan aid, but reject-
ing  any  participation  m  Continental 
schemes of European federation. 
In the Middle East, Bevin came under 
attack from Israelis and Arabs as well as 
many Americans. Even Bullock acknowl-
edges that Britain's efforts to mediate the 
claims  for  the  mandate  and  then  its 
abrupt withdrawal hardly were a triumph 
of policy. But in many of his other policies, 
Bevin's strongest critics were on the left 
of  his  own  party,  Laborites  seeking  a 
policy more accommodating to the Sovi-
ets.  And  he  is  still  under  attack  from 
revisionist historians for vainly trying to 
maintain Britain's global role and setting 
the country on a course that would drain 
it economically for two more decades. 
The European record is more compli-
cated and  less subject to the passionate 
divides of the Middle East or to Cold War 
or Socialist theologies. Bevin's decision to 
grasp  U.S.  Secretary  of  State  George 
Marshall's offer of reconstruction aid and 
to create the European planning and dis-
tribution mechanism that the Americans 
demanded is universally regarded now as 
brilliant  statesmanship.  Yet,  two  years 
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later,  Bevin  fudged  and  let  slip  by  the 
opportunity  to  join  the  Schuman  plan. 
Bullock  makes a  lengthy explanation of 
what  happened  and  why  (including 
Bevin's  declining  health),  but  even  he 
comes away largely agreeing with Dean 
Acheson's assessment of  20 years later 
that this was  "the great mistake of the 
post  -war period." 
Yet,  as  Bullock  observes,  the Europe 
that  has  emerged  would  be  much  less 
likely  to  arouse  the  anti-federationist 
fears  of  Bevin  than  to  disappoint  the 
hopes of Jean Monnet. If  any one person 
can be  held  responsible for  this turn of 
events,  it  is  former  French  President 
Charles de Gaulle, now the subject of his 
first biography by an American, journalist 
Don Cook. 
Cook,  now  with  the  Los  Angeles 
Times,  has covered Europe since World 
War  II.  Unfortunately, in  this biography 
he has chosen to devote far more space to 
de  Gaulle's  wartime  career than  to his 
second  Presidency,  from  1958-1969. 
That is a pity because any accomplished 
historian  could  handle  the early period, 
while Cook has passed up a chance to add 
the insights  of  his  personal  experience 
and of a man on the scene to a relatively 
contemporary biography. And it is all the 
more a pity because the years in which de 
Gaulle contemporaries will be writing his 
biographies are diminishing quickly. 
In fact,  Cook makes a major theme of 
de Gaulle's wartime disputes with Chur-
chill  and  Roosevelt.  To  this  period  he 
does  bring  a  subtle  appreciation  of  the 
conflicting pressures on all three leaders. 
He  spreads  the  blame  for  the  discord 
more evenly than such authors as Milton 
Viorst,  who  have  placed  most  of  it  on 
Roosevelt. If anything, Cook is a bit too 
sympathetic to Roosevelt and too under-
standing of his misguided policy of dealing 
with Vichy France long after there were 
any political dividends to be gained from 
it. 
Cook defines much of de Gaulle's sec-
ond Presidency in terms of those wartime 
disputes, of settling scores with the An-
glo-Saxons.  That becomes  the explana-
tion  for  the  1963  veto  of  the  British 
application  to join  the Common  Market 
and the 1966 expulsion of NATO headquar-
ters from France. What this type of analy-
sis  overlooks  is  that  Gaullist  policy,  in 
substance if not  in  tone  and  style,  has 
been maintained by all his successors as 
in the best interests of France. 
Cook's  biography  does  provide  some 
interesting glimpses into de Gaulle's pe-
culiar  relationship  with  his  successor 
Georges Pompidou and also a fascinating 
look at a diplomat carrying on a thankless 
job,  U.S.  Ambassador  Charles  Bohlen. 
The writer is  a master of the anecdote, 
and his book is the most readable, espe-
cially for the generalist, of the recent de 
Gaulle biographies. E 
Michael D. Mosettig is a producer on the MacNeil-
Lehrer NewsHour. 
Europe periodically lists books dealing with Community and Atlantic topics. 
Prices  are  also  given  when  known.  This  presentation  does  not  indicate 
approval or recommendations of  these publications, which can be purchased or 
ordered from  most booksellers. 
A pictorial essay highlighting signifi-
cant events in the history of the Euro-
pean  Community.  Compiled  to  com-
memorate the 25th anniversary of the 
signing of the Treaties of Rome. Text 
in English, French, and German. With 
preface by Gaston Thorn. 
Based  on  interviews with  key  offi-
cials and  on  United Nation's and U.S. 
government documents, this study ex-
amines the nature, provisions, and pos-
sible effects of the UNCTAD Liner Code. 
Compares  the  code  with  the  present 
U.S.  framework  for  liner  regulation 
and  promotion,  and  outlines  and 
assesses the major policy options avail-
able  to  the  United  States, given  the 
positions  taken  by  the  developing 
states and the E.C. 
The World  Tin  Market:  Political 
Pricing  and  Economic  Compe-
tition. By  William  L.  Baldwin.  Duke 
University Press, Durham, 1983. 273 
pp.  $45.00 
Presents  the  case  that  while  the 
structure, conduct and performance of 
the world  tin  industry  are subject  to 
strongly  competitive  market  forces, 
major  intervention  by  governments 
has  exerted  a  controlling  influence 
over the world tin market for the past 
60 years.  Analyzes economic and  po-
litical forces in the context of both the 
Sixth International Tin Agreement and 
continuing discussion over the proper 
structuring  of  the  international  tin 
market. 
Unemployment  in  France,  the 
Federal Republic of Germany and 
the  Netherlands:  A  Survey  of 
Trends,  Causes  and  Policy  Op-
tions.  International  Labour  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.,  1983.  116  pp. 
$10.00. 
Based on case studies of France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and the 
Netherlands, this monograph seeks to 
identify factors which  have led  to in-
creased unemployment in the industri-
alized market economies. 
Socialism in France: From J aures 
to Mitterrand. Edited by Stuart Wil-
liams.  St.  Martin's Press, New  York, 
1983. 180 pp.  $22.50. 
A collection of papers presented at 
the third conference of the Association 
for  the Study of Modern and  Contem-
porary France. Looks at the contempo-
rary position of the French left, exam-
ining  such  questions as  the declining 
influence of the Communist Party and 
the achievements of  the Soclialists  in 
power.  Also  studies  the  French  left 
from  historic,  literary,  and  cultural 
points of view. 
25 Years of Common Market. By 
G.F.  Seingry  and  F.  Visine.  Editions 
Delta, Brussels, 1982. 80 pp. 
Yearbook  of International  Orga-
nizations 1983-84, 20th edition, 
Volume  2  (Geographic  Volume). 
Edited  by  the  Union  of  International 
Organizations.  K.G.  Saur,  Munich, 
1983.  Available  from  Gale  Research 
Co., Detroit. 1,000 pp.  $168.00. 
A geographical listing of all  the in-
ternational  organizations described in 
the main volume of the series. Divided 
into  two  sections,  the  yearbook  ar-
ranges  organizations  by  country  ac-
cording to membership and to location 
of the organization's secretariat. In ad-
dition to providing a reference to the 
organization's full  profile  in  the main 
volume,  entries contain organization's 
name,  acronym,  address,  and  tele-
phone and telex numbers. 
The UNCTAD Liner Code: United 
States  Maritime  Policy  at  the 
Crossroads.  By  Lawrence  Juda. 
Westview  Press,  Boulder,  1983.  234 
pp.  $20.00, paper. 
The Political Economy of France: 
From Pompidou to Mitterrand. By 
Volkmar  Lauber.  Praeger Publishers, 
New York,  1983. 270 pp.  $28.95. 
Proposes to study the politics of the 
French economy since former French 
President Charles de Gaulle's resigna-
tion in  1969. Describes the positions, 
philosophies,  and  programs  of  major 
political  parties,  business,  and  labor 
unions during three periods: the Presi-
dency of Georges Pompidou, the years 
under  Valery  Giscard  d'Estaing,  and 
the beginning of the  Fran~_;oise Mitter-
rand Administration. 
The Second Enlargement of the 
European  Community:  Adjust-
ment  Requirements  and  Chal-
lenJ!es  for  Policy  Reform.  By 
MAY /IUNE  19R4  n juergen B.  Donges et al. J.C.B.  Mohr, 
Ttibingen, 1982. 24  7 pp. 
Studies the policy implications of and 
the major adjustment challenges posed 
by the E.C.'s southern enlargement to 
include  Greece,  Portugal,  and  Spain. 
Discusses the prospect of enlargement 
in  the  context  of  the  following:  the 
manufacturing  industry,  E.C.-Third 
World  preferential trade agreements, 
the Common  Agricultural  Policy,  and 
the E.C.'s Mediterranean and regional 
policies. 
The Structure of the Defense In-
dustry: An International Survey. 
Edited  by  Nicole  Ball  and  Milton 
Leitenberg.  St.  Martin's Press,  New 
York,  1983. 372 pp. $27.50. 
Examines the role that the defense 
industry has played since World War II 
in  the industrial  and  economic  struc-
ture of  the United States, the Soviet 
Union, France, the Federal Republic of 
· Germany, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, It-
aly, China, Israel, and the Third World. 
Attempts to defme the degree to which 
domestic  factors  such  as  defense-re-
lated employment and  the role of the 
defense sector in industrial production 
influence the armament of states. 
Government  Employment  and 
Pay: Some International Compari-
sons. Occasional Paper 24.  By Peter 
S.  Heller  and  Alan  A.  Tait.  Interna-
tional  Monetary  Fund,  Washington, 
D.C.,  1983. 64 pp. $5.00. 
Looks at the following in an effort to 
produce an international comparison of 
public-sector employment and pay: the 
size  of  government  employment;  the 
magnitude  of  wages  at each  level  of 
government;  relative  levels  of  public 
and private-sector salaries; and the de-
gree of inequality observed in govern-
ment salary structures. Provides inter-
country  indices  that  can  be  used  in 
analyses  of  government  wage  rates 
and employment structure. 
EEC  Dairy  Facts  and  Figures 
1983. 12th edition. Milk Marketing 
Board,  Surrey,  U.K.,  1983.  192  pp. 
£4. 
Provides  a compact  and  authorita-
tive summary of the E. C.'s dairy indus-
try.  Includes chapters on  prices,  pro-
duction  and  consumption,  trade, 
industry structure, and population and 
land  utilization.  Lists  pertinent  E.C. 
dairy  regulations  and  directives  and 
details  E.C.  expenditure  in  the dairy 
industry. 
EEC Competition Law:  Business 
Issues  and  Legal  Principles  in 
Common Market Antitrust Cases. 
By Utz Toepke. John Wiley and Sons, 
Somerset,  N.J .•  1982.  925  pp. 
$124.95. 
A handbook-style reference guide to 
the body of antitrust case law that has 
been  created  by  the  E.C.'s  Court  of 
Justice and  the E.C.  Commission.  Di-
vides case law into the following cate-
gories:  reprehensible  business  con-
duct;  joint  ventures;  distribution; 
pricing;  and  patents,  trademarks and 
copyright. Scheduled to be updated on 
a regular basis. 
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International Debt and the Stabil-
ity of the World Economy. By  Wil-
liam  R.  Cline.  Institute  for  Interna-
tional  Economies,  Washington,  D.C., 
1983. 134 pp.  $6.00. 
Addresses the origins of the current 
global debt problem and  assesses the 
potential  risks posed  by  the  debts of 
developing· and  East  European  coun-
tries to the economies of industrialized 
nations. Studies the dynamics of invol-
.  untary lending, debt rescheduling, and 
default decisions.  Seeks to determine 
whether the international debt crisis is 
a problem  of  tempOrary  illiquidity  or 
rather a difficulty  which  can be  over-
come only  through  radiCal  measures. 
Sets forth policy recommendations. 
World Military and Social Expen-
ditures 1983. By Ruth Leger Sivard. 
World  Priorities,  Washington,  D.C., 
1983. 46 pp.  $4.00. 
An annual.  accounting of the use of 
world resources for social and for mili-
tary purposes. Contains tables, graphs, 
and  articles chronicling  what  the  au-
thor believes are extremes of milita-
rism  and  a  lack  of  social  progress 
characterizing 1983. Sections on  mili~ 
tary expansion,  wars and  war-related 
deaths  since  1945,  the  nuclear  arms 
race,  and  unmet  human  needs.  With 
statistical annex. 
Economic Sanctions in Support of 
Foreign  Policy  Goals.  By  Gary 
Clyde  Hufbauer and Jeffrey J.  Schott. 
Institute for  International Economics, 
Washington,  D.C.,  1983.  102  pp. 
$6.00. 
Based on 7  8 case studies of the use 
of economic sanctions since World War 
I,  this book presents a comprehensive 
analysis  of  the sanctions ·issue  in  the 
20th century. Studies the anatomy of a 
sanctions episode, assesses the imple-
mentation of sanctions in terms of po-
--- ----
litical and economic variables, andre-
lates economic costs to the measure of 
success achieved in  the attainment of 
foreign policy goals. 
The  Exchange  Rate  System.  By 
John Williamson, Institute for Interna-
tional  Economics,  Washington,  D.C., 
1983. 81 pp. $6.00. 
An  evaluation  of the  current,  un-
structured system of floating exchange 
rates. Attempts to measure both the 
volatility  and  misalignment  in  the 
present system and  estimates recent 
misalignments  of the five  major  cur-
rencies that make up the Special Draw-
ing Right. Calls for the replacement of 
the  current  system  with  a  managed 
exchange rate under the guardianship 
of the International Monetary Fund. 
Die  Zukunft  des  Welthandels: 
Protektionismus  od·er offener 
Welthandel?  /The Future of World 
Trade:  Freedom  or  Protection-
ism? Nomos  Verlagsgesellschaft,  Ba-
den-Baden, 1983. 95 pp. 
A  collection  of  essays  written  to 
commemorate  the  60th  birthday  of 
E.C.  Commission  Vice-President  Wil-
helm  Haferkamp,  who  is  responsible 
for  external  relations.  Topics  ad-
dressed include the future of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
the  role  of  trade  in  services  in  the 
world  economy,  and  the  need  to re-
structure E.C.  industrial  policy.  Con-
tributions. by  U.S.  Trade  Represen-
tative  William  Brock,  former  French 
Prime  Minister  Raymond  Barre, and 
E.C.  Commission  President· Gaston 
Thorn, among others. 
EEC Protectionism: Present Prac-
tice and Future Trends, Vol. II. By 
Wolfgang  Hager  and  Robert  Taylor. 
European Research Associates,  Brus-
sels, 1982. 312 pp. 
Focuses on two aspects  of  protec-
tionism in the E. C.: effects on the Com-
munity's individual trading partners-
including  the  United  States,  Japan, 
third world countries, Spain, and Por-
tugal-and  the  Community's  instru-
ments  and  options  for  dealing  with 
protectionism. 
Yearbook  of  Labour  Statistics 
1982, 42nd. edition. By  the Inter-
national . Labour  Organization,  Wash-
ington, D.C., 1983. 760 pp. $63.00. 
A  summary ·of  labor  statistics  for 
approximately 180 countries and terri-
tories.  Includes  data  on  employment 
and  unemployment,  working  time,· 
wages, consumer prices, occupational 
injuries, and  industrial disputes.  Also, 
whenever possible, provides statistics 
covering the period from 1972-1981. 
An Energy Efficient Future:·  Pros-
pects for Europe and North Amer-
ica. By the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe. Butterworths. 
Publishers,  Woburn,  MA,  1983.  259 
pp. $89.95. 
Based  on  data  from  17  countries, 
this study analyzes the prospects for 
both  energy  consumption  and  con-
servation for  the  next  20  years.  In-
cludes  projections  for  future  energy 
demand  by  sector and  by country on 
the· assumption  that  measures  for 
greater energy efficiency will be imple-
mented. Points to international cooper-
ation as a means of achieving the adop-
tion of energy-efficient practices. 
Guide to the International  Reg-
istration of Marks. World  Intellec-
tual  Property  Organization,  Geneva, 
1982. 159 pp. 
A manual outlining general rules of 
procedure and the application process 
for·  the individual or legal entity inter-
ested in obtaining a patent in countries 
belonging  to  the  Madrid  Union  on 
trademarks. 
The Inefficacy of Trade Policy. By 
Robert  E.  Baldwin.  International  Fi-
nance  Section,  Department  of  Eco-
nomics,  Princeton University,  Prince-
ton, 1982. 26 pp. $2.50. 
A  survey  of  the  conditions  under 
which trade policies may be ineffective 
in carrying out stated objectives. Cites 
international economic distortion,  the 
offsetting  of  supply  and  demand  re-
sponses, and a policy's uncertain indi-
rect  effects  as  three  elements  that 
influence the success of trade policy. 
U.S. Trade Problems in Steel: Ja-
pan, West Germany, and Italy. By 
A. W.  Harris. Praeger Publishers, New 
York,  1983. 276 pp.  $29.95. 
Through examination of U.S.  steel 
trade with Japan, the Federal Republic 
of  Germany,  and  Italy,  this study  at-
tempts  to  isolate  and  measure  vari-
ables affecting the cooperation of trad-
ing  partners with  American  requests 
to  limit  steel  exports  to  the  United 
States.  Also  discusses  trade  restric-
tions  used  by  the  United  States for 
steel during the last 15 years and ana-
lyzes pertinent sections of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. THE 
~MMUNITY 
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desired items and fill out the order form. 
D  Europe As Seen by Europeans: 
Ten Years of European Polling 
1973-198~{. European Documenta-
tion No.  7/83, Commission, Brussels, 
1983, 47 pages. Compilation of the re-
sults of 20 public opinion  polls carried 
out in  the member states over the past 
10 years.  Free 
D  EEC Competition Rules: Guide 
for Small and Medium-Sized En-
terprises. European Documnt!ation 
1983/84. Commission, Brussels, 1983, 
62 pages. Guide to Community anti-
trust rules under Article:>  85 and 86 of 
the Treaty of Rome establishing the 
E.E.C.  Includes a section on procedural 
rules.  Free 
D  The European Community: 
Some Questions and Answers. Eu-
ropean File No.  5-6/84, Commission, 
Brussels,  March 1984, 23 pages. Out-
lines Community policies on unemploy-
ment, industrial and regional develop-
ment, ilJlriculture, the E.C.  budget, and 
trade. Available in  bulk quantities for 
classroom use.  Free 
D  New Rights for the Citizens of 
Europe. European File No.  1/84, 
Commission, Brussels, january 1984, 
10 pages.  Free 
D  Equal Opportunity for Women. 
European File No.  4/84, Commissi011. 
Brussels. February 1984, 10 
pages.  Free 
D  Young People in the European 
Community. European File No.  3/84, 
Commission, Brussels,  February 1.984, 
10 pages.  Free 
D  The European Social Fund: A 
Weapon Against Unemployment. 
European File No.  2/84, Commission, 
Br~~~~els,  january 1984,  10 pages. Free 
D  The European Community and 
the People's Republic of China. 
Europe Information External Rela-
tions No.  71/83, CommissioN, Brussels, 
October 1983,  15 j>ages.  Free 
D  Seventeenth General Report 
on the Activities of the European 
Communities 1983. Commission, 
Brussels.  1984, 376 pages. Organized 
by  subject, the report provides are-
view of Community activities in 
198:l.  $4.50 
D  The Agricultural Situation in 
the Community: 1983 Report. 
Commission, Brussels, 1984, 427 
pages. Analysis and statistics on the 
market situation for  <~gri cultu ral prod-
ucts,  factors of production, agricultural 
incomes, consumers, and financing of 
the Common Agricultural Pol- -
icy.  $18.00 
0  Programme of the Commission 
for 1984. Comnn:ssion, Brussels, 
1984, 47 pages. Address delivered to 
Parliament on  Febru<~ry 15, 1984, by 
Commission  President Gaston Thorn 
and the Commission's work program 
for  1984.  $1.50 
D  Europe Today: State of Euro· 
pean Integration 1982-1983. Euro-
pean Parliament, Luxembourg, 1983, 
653 pages. Handbook outlining E.C.  leg-
islation with references to the full texts 
i!S well  <IS  opinions and reports of the 
Europeiln P<1rliament.  $12.00 
D  Thirty Years of Community 
Law.  Europea ~l Perspectives,  Commis-
Sl011,  Brussels,  1983, 498 pages. A col-
lection of essays surveying the develop-
ment of the Community's legal system. 
Covers the legal nature of the E.C., its 
powers, institutions, financing, and 
relationship to national law.  Separate 
articles on  policy sectors such as agri-
culture, trade, energy. transport, com-
petition, and economic and  monetary 
union.  $15.50 
D  The Structure of Public Lim-
ited Companies: Amended Pro-
posal for a Fifth Directive. Bulletz:n 
of the European Communities Supple-
ment No.  6/83, Commission, Brussels, 
1983, 68 pages. Amended version of the 
1972 Commission  proposal.  The 
amendments, submitted in  August 
1983, reflect the changes recom-
mended by  the Parliament and Eco-
nomic and Social Committee.  $3.00 
D  Report on Economic and Trade 
Relations Between the European 
Community and Latin America. 
Working Docume11t No.  1-580/83, Eu-
ropean Parliament, Luxembourg, july 
15,  1983, 46 pages. Report prepared for 
the Committee on Extemill Economic 
Relations by Jochen van  Aerssen. 
$2.00 
D  Report on the Delineation and 
Further Development of GATT 
and of the Free Trade Principle 
Underlying the GATT System and 
Possible Consequences for the 
EEC and GATT.  Worl<ing Document 
No.  493!83,  European Parliament, 
Luxembourg, july 12,  1983, 47 jJages. 
Report for  the Committee on  External 
Economic Relations by  Hans-joachim 
Seeler.  $2.00 
0  Regional Development Pro-
gramme (Second Generation) Ire-
land 1981-85. Commission, Brus-
seis,  1983,  203 pages.  Description of the 
current economic and  social situation in 
Ireland and program for  promoting 
development at the national and 
subnationallevel.  $11.00 
D  Trends in the Public Finances 
of the Member States (1970-
1981). Studies of National Accounts 
No. 3, Statistical Office,  Luxembourg, 
1983, 62 pages. l'vtain  trends in  govern-
ment revenue and expenditure in  the 
member states including tax receipts, 
borrowing, debt burden, and spending 
on  defense. education, housing. and 
other social benefits.  $3.00 
D  Structural Data Base Tables 
by Branch 1960-1981. Studies of 
National Accounts No.  4.  Statistical 
Oj fic~. Luxembourg,  1984,  173 pages. 
Data by  industry branch and country 
on  value added at  market prices, labor 
force, gross fixed  capital formation, and 
exports and  imports.  Provides the 
methodology  used for  the retrapolation 
of data for  the  1  960s.  $4.50 
D  Sto(:k of Fixed Assets in Indus-
try in the Community Member 
States: Towards Greater Compara-
bility. Studies of  National Accounts 
No.  2,  Statistical OJ[ice,  Luxembourg, 
1983,  76 pages.  Compares the param-
eters used in  the calculation of fixed as-
sets by  the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. France, Italy, and  the United 
Kingdom ilnd  proposes a harmonized 
estimation method.  $3.00 
D  Iron and Steel 1952-1982. Sta-
tistical Office,  Luxembourg, 1983, 89 
pages. Compilation of economic data on 
the E.C.  iron and steel industry: em-
ployment, size of enterprises, produc-
tion. consumption of raw materials, ex-
ternal trade of ECSC  products, and steel 
consumption.  $8.50 
D  Balances of Payments: Geo-
graphical Breakdown 1977-1981. 
Statistical Office, Luxembourg, 1983, 
163 pages.  $14.00 
D  The Vocational Trainer of 
Young People in Ireland. European 
Centre for the Development of Voca-
tional Training, Berli11,  1983,  79 
pages.  Outlines the structure of voca-
ORDER FORM 
tiona! training and educational systems 
in  Ireland and then examines the job 
situations and professional status of 
tr<~ine rs.  $4.00 
D  Information Technology and 
the Training of Skilled Workers in 
the Service Sector: Report on the 
Evaluation of the Literature and 
of Interviews With Experts. Euro-
pean Centre for the Development of Vo-
catiollal Training, Berlin, 1983,  199 
pages. Examines the impact of the in-
troduction of inforlllation technology in 
the service sector on  vocational train-
ing methods.  $4.00 
D  Information Technology and 
Job Creation: Software and the 
Software Industry. FAST Series No. 
13, HUR 8550,  Commissim1, Luxcm-
botog, 1983,  133 pages. Study on the 
evolving structure of the informatics in-
dustry and factors shaping the develop-
ment of soft\vare.  $13.00 
D  Vici Faba Research In Europe. 
EUR 8649.  Commission, Luxembourg, 
1983, 87 pages.  Description of beam re-
search projects being conducted in  vari-
ous research centers in  Europe.  $5.00 
D  Euronet-Diane User Logfile: A 
User's Structured View of the 
Similarities and Differences Be-
tween the Euronet-Diane Hosts at 
the Operating System and Applica-
tions System Level. EUR 7878, 
Commission, Luxembourg, 1983, 90 
pages.  $5.50 
D  Catalogue of Facilities in 
Member States of the European 
Communities for Testing the 
Packaging of Radioactive Materi-
als. EUR 8254,  Commissi011, Luxem-
bourg,  1983,  104 pages.  List of test fa-
cilities and terms and  conditions under 
which services are ilvailable for testing 
packagings, designed  in other coun-
tries, for compliance with regulations 
for  the safe transport of  radi~)a ctiv e 
materials.  $6.50 
t\lail entire page to the European Community Information Service, 2100 M Street, N.W., 
Suitt>  707, Wi!shington,  D.C.  20037, (202) 862-9500. In  the New  York area, copies of the 
free publications may be  requested from the European Community Information Service, 
245 East 47th Street, New Y ork, NY  10017, (212) 371-3804. Sales publications ilre only 
available from  the Wa:-;hingtorl office. Telephone orders are also welcome. 
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"EURO-
PESSIMISM" 
I 
n April of 1963, as a guest of Cornell 
University, I took part in a debate on 
the Common Market and its relations 
with the United States. E.C. Commission 
Vice  President  Sicco  Mansholt,  Pierre 
Uri (one  of the authors of the Treaty of 
Rome  establishing  the  E.C.),  and  john 
Tuthill,  then  U.S.  Ambassador  to  the 
E.C., were on the panel. Unlike the other 
speakers,  who  very  competently  dealt 
with  the  disputes  of  the day-the pro-
gressive  installation  of  the  E.C.'s  Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (CAP), the threat 
of  a  dollar  glut,  the  first  steps  in  the 
Kennedy round of  trade negotiations-! 
immediately introduced a dramatic note 
to the debate. 
"The  European  idea  has  been  badly 
bruised,"  I  said,  "following  the  abrupt 
breakdown in negotiations for British ac-
cession to the European Community. This 
is  serious,  more  than  a  routine  strain. 
This break shows that the old demon of a 
European hegemony has not disappeared 
and  that the fundamental  pact between 
the six founding members of the E. C. can 
be called into question. 
"Europe is beset by a deep malaise," I 
added,  "just  when  it  was  successfully 
headed  toward  unity.  Its  problems  are 
those brought about by its very success. 
Without a doubt," I concluded in my ad-
dress  to  the  Americans,  "the spirit  of 
unity  one  day  will  prevail,  but,  for  the 
time  being,  be  careful.  Don't  send  us 
challenges  that  could  cause  irreparable 
splits on our side." 
A  lot  of  time  has  passed  since  that 
conference, but those concerns are still 
largely valid  today.  The political  leader-
ship, in  Europe as well as in  the United 
States,  must  take  them  into  account. 
Why?  Because not everything that could 
have been done  was done  (the blame is 
shared,  but it  is  mostly  European).  Be-
cause there are differences between the 
two  continents  that  are  simply  in  the 
nature of things and cannot be eliminated, 
but  merely  smoothed  over  by  constant 
negotiation. And  also  because the world 
has changed. 
Europe must take its  responsibilities. 
In 1962, European debate on the Fouchet 
plan  for  political  union  was  floundering. 
The  direct  or  indirect  consequences 
were:  a  break  in  the  British  accession 
negotiations; a feeling of distrust between 
the six countries of the Community; and 
an  institutional  crisis  in  1965,  with  the 
introduction  of  a  veto  process  and  the 
blocking  of  the  Community's  decision-
making machinery.  How could one think 
of an  equal partnership with the United 
States when the European half was lost 
from sight. 
At the same time, helped by its internal 
momentum and a favorable economic cli-
mate, the Community was making spec-
tacular progress. It consolidated the CAP, 
it  entered  into  contractual  links  with 
many  Third  World  countries,  it  signed 
trade-and-aid agreements with other na-
tions,  it  successfully  participated  in  the 
Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds. 
This was indeed spectacular progress, 
but it was fragile. The E.C. was neglect-
ing to put in place policies for dealing with 
an  expanded  marketplace,  with  techno-
logical  advances,  with  new  competitors 
around the world, and with the difficulties 
resulting from  the financial  and  energy 
crises.  Without  the  automatic  treaty 
mechanisms of its transition period,  the 
E. C. had practically no integrated institu-
tional  structure. More than ever,  there 
was  no  way  of  knowing  who  spoke  for 
Europe. 
The "Euro-pessimism" that I had ex-
pressed  in  April  1963  and  which  still 
inspires a number of  Europeans can  be 
beneficial  in  so  far  as it  encourages an 
understanding of the historical  role  Eu-
rope still  can play.  There is  no  point  in 
going back to the way it was, but we must 
establish certain principles and make the 
best use of past experience. In sum: 
•  We knew back then that the uniting of 
Europe  can  be  done  only  within  the 
framework  of  a  federal  organization. 
Other paths have been tried without suc-
cess. Today,  most European leaders are 
coming back to the original idea even if 
they don't have the courage yet to admit 
it.  This  direction  must  be  pursued · 
•  We  knew back then that Europe must 
assume  responsibilities  and  burdens  in 
the  area  of  security.  Today,  Europeans 
are "discovering" that Europe must de-
fine  its  "personality." 
•  We  knew  back  then  that  a  customs 
union would be an automatic result of the 
treaties,  whereas  economic  and  mone-
tary union can only result from voluntary 
choices and actions. 
•  American  politicians  understood  per-
fectly well, at the beginning of the 1950s, 
the historical value  of  a political invest-
ment in  the building of a united Europe. 
Europe's failures, along with the increase 
in  America's internal and external prob-
lems fed the disappointment, the indiffer-
ence, and finally the hostility. The acces-
sory,  the  sectoral,  and  the  short-term 
took  over the stage and  hid  the impor-
tance of fundamental common interests. 
•  Europe's "crises" were intetpreted as 
signs  of  decadence,  whereas  they  are 
proof of vitality.  Europe doesn't need to 
be  "helped." But it has the right to be 
understood and to be accepted. Its com-
plexity is its wealth and it is up to Europe-
ans  to  master  this  and  turn  it  into  a 
unifying force. 
What is to be done? In the first place, 
we must seize the opportunity presented 
by  the extraordinary interpenetration of 
cultures that has developed over the last: 
quarter century.  There can be  no  more 
separate debates, but instead one, over-
all, enlarged debate, from which new ini-
tiatives can spring. 
The  Atlantic  alliance's  vocation-to 
defend free societies, to reject all  hege-
mony-would thus  find  itself  strength-
ened.  The  more  Europe  is  strong  and 
capable of making its own decisions, the 
less it will run the risk of being absorbed 
into the Soviet sphere of influence. This 
will  allow  Europe  to  establish  balanced 
relations with  the Soviet Union.  At  the 
same time, Europe need not~  "taken in 
charge" by  the United States. The dia-
logue of continents will always encounter 
difficulties. With clarity, respect, and dig-
nity, they can be surmounted. E 
Emanuele  Gazzo,  the dean  of journalists covering 
the  European  Community,  is  the  chairman  of 
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